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I. INTRODUCTION
For centuries, America has tried to subdue abusive inter-
est rates with the inflexible interest ceilings of usury regula-
tion. The 1980s, however, brought dramatic change as several
states deregulated interest controls,' and Congress preempted
state usury ceilings for significant areas of consumer lending.2
1. Refer to text accompanying notes 58-63 infra-
2. Refer to text accompanying notes 64-71 infra.
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At the same time, lenders devised new financing schemes to
elude remaining usury regulation and shelter effective rates of
return outrageous on their face.
In the 1980s and 1990s rent-to-own operations have
charged consumers up to the equivalent of 300 percent annual
interest,3 rates for 'rapid refund" income tax transactions
reached 520 percent on an annualized basis,4 pawnshops
charged as much as 690 percent,5 and the newly fashioned
"auto pawn" transaction charged effective annual rates of up to
900 percent.' Other loan hybrids such as check cashing servic-
es7 and installment payments of insurance premiums8 often
charge similarly outrageous rates.
Freed from usury controls by deregulation or federal pre-
emption, rates for more traditional loans have spiraled out of
control as well.' Small consumer loans by finance companies
in deregulated states have exceeded a 200 percent annual re-
turn,0 and deregulated home equity and car loans exceeded
100 percent.1
3. Rent-to-Own: Providing Opportunities or Gouging Consumers?: Hearing Be-
fore the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Seas.
68, 69 (1993) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez).
4. Rapid Refunds Warning, ACCI NEws. (American Council on Consumer In-
terests, Columbia, Mo.), Mar. 1993 (reporting results of a survey by the State Con-
sumer Protection Board of New York).
5. See, e.g., Quick Cash, Inc. v. State, 605 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that Florida's Division of Consumer Services had statutory authority
to seek to enjoin a car pawn operation allegedly charging 690% annual interest).
6. See KATHLEEN E. KEEST, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, USURY AND
CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION § 5.5.1.3, at 85 (Supp. 1993) (describing an auto
pawn transaction as one in which the borrower pledges her car as security for a
small loan and at the same time leases the car from the lender).
7. See Elizabeth Ryan, Plus Ea Change: Part II (Or, Check Cashers as Lend-
era: The More Things Change, the Worse They Get), NCLC REPS. CONSUMER CREDIT
AND USURY EDITION (National Consumer Law Center, Boston, Mass.), July-Aug.
1993, at 25 (describing Virginia litigation filed in 1993 against check cashing compa-
nies charging up to a 2044% return for services that are the functional equivalent of
loans).
8. See Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 548 (Cal. 1992)
(confronting an automobile insurance premium financing program charging over 126%
annual interest).
9. For example, there are notorious pockets of abuse in even the competitive
first mortgage lien market. See Ronald Kessler, Woman Fights 142 Percent Loan
Rate, WASH. POST, July 31, 1984, at B1 (describing a 62-year old disabled homeown-
er needing money for utilities who obtained a one-year first lien loan at 142%).
10. See, e.g., First Occasional 'Can You Top This One!" Award, NCLC REPS.
CONSUMER CREDIT AND USURY EDITION (National Consumer Law Center, Boston,
Mass.), Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 30 (reporting that a Utah finance company was making
small, short-term loans at rates of 278%).
11. See Walt Bogdanich, After Deregulation: Critics Charge Lenders Exploit Most
Vulnerable, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1985, at 19 (describing a car dealer who reserved
the right to charge 500% interest and loan companies that charged 127% interest);
HeinOnline  -- 31 Hous. L. Rev. 724 1994-1995
RATE REGULATION
These astounding rates evidence that free market control
offers borrowers scant protection from abusive lenders. Con-
sumer advocates therefore urge that the government enact
blanket usury ceilings for both loan and quasi-loan transac-
tions. 2 The lending industry desires a market solution free of
statutory and judicial control. 3
This Article builds on the argument that the usury solu-
tion is flawed and urges a compromise between usury and
market control that employs the variable fairness standard of
unconscionability to police unfair interest pricing. The Article
examines American and comparative usury and unconscionabil-
ity regulation to develop appropriate guidelines for
unconscionability's new duty. It then proposes a model statute
articulating the unconscionability standard for consumer
loans. 4 Finally, the Article advocates employing usury con-
trols under a limited regime of "spot treatment," rather than
blanket control, for persisting pockets of lender abuse the un-
conscionability standard may fail to deter."
A. The Six Percent Solution: A Brief History of American
Interest Pricing Regulation by a Fixed Fairness Standard
Until recent years, the Bible and England were the two
strongest influences on America's regulation of abusive interest
rates. 6 In England, and elsewhere in Europe, religious oppo-
sition to charging any interest at all shifted as the industrial
world developed to moral opposition to abusive interest. 7 In
1545, England became the first European country to establish
a statutory rate of interest.18 This "legal" rate gave lenders
the certainty of knowing that rates below the legal rate were
Michael Hudson, Loan Scams that Prey on the Poor, Bus. & Socy REV., Winter
1993, at 11 (describing home equity loan abuses in deregulated states).
12. Refer to text accompanying note 86 infra.
13. See, e.g., Kenneth Howe, Banks Losing War, Industry Chief Says, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., Nov. 2, 1988, at C4 (reporting that the president of the Ameri-
can Bankers Association called for less consumer-oriented regulation).
14. Refer to Part II(G) infra.
15. Refer to text accompanying notes 417-21 infra.
16. See generally Jarret C. Qeltjen, Usury: Utilitarian or Useless?, 3 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 167, 171-80 (1975) (presenting a general history of interest rates in England
and America).
17. See Marion Benfield, Money, Mortgages, and Migraine--The Usury Head-
ache, 19 CASE W. RES. L REv. 819, 831 (1968) (describing the change from prohibit-
ing interest in the Middle Ages to prohibiting only unconscionable rates after the
Reformation).
18. A Bill Against Usury, 1545, 37 Hen. 8, ch. 9 (Eng); see Oeltien, supra note
16, at 173 (discussing the English statute that made taking interest legal but sub-
ject to regulation).
7251994]
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immune from attack. Though England repealed its usury laws
in 1854,"9 the English experience had already set the stan-
dard of interest regulation followed by the American colonies:
interest was allowed, but restricted by statute to a maximum
single digit rate.'°
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, here, as in
England, arguments against regulating interest rates gained
favor. A few states repealed their usury laws, notably Massa-
chusetts in 1867, while in others legislative and judicial excep-
tions eroded usury controls.2'
The first significant exception was the so-called "corporate
exemption."' In 1850, New York became the first state to leg-
islatively prohibit corporate borrowers from asserting the stat-
utory defense of usury.' Eventually, a majority of states en-
acted similar statutes excluding corporate borrowers from the
protection of general usury statutes.' Some states went fur-
ther, excluding loans made for business purposes regardless of
whether the borrower was a corporation or an individual.'
Following on the heels of the corporate exemption was the
"time-price" exemption. Borrowed from English courts
19. Oeltjen, supra note 16, at 174; see Benfield, supra note 17, at 821 n.6 (cit-
ing the Usury Laws Repeal Act of 1854).
20. American interest pricing regulation has never been uniform. For example,
most colonies initially adopted a 6% maximum, but Massachusetts fixed an 8% rate,
and Virginia a 5% rate. SIDNEY HOMER & RICHARD SYLLA, A HISTORY OF INTEREST
RATES 274-75 (3d ed. 1991). At the time of settlement of the colonies, England's
Statute of Anne limited interest to 5%. Mark B. Riley, Note, Usury Legislation-Ite
Effects on the Economy and a Proposal for Reform, 33 VAND. L REV. 199, 201 n.9
(1980).
21. 1867 Mass. Acts 56. See generally James M. Ackerman, Note, Interest Rates
and the Law: A History of Usury, 1981 Amz. ST. L.J. 61, 86-88. Several states re-
pealed their usury statutes during this period, but most reenacted them later. See
Benfield, aupra note 17, at 826.
22. Refer to note 351 infra for a discussion of the rationale for this exemption.
23. 1850 N.Y. Laws 172 (codified and amended at N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-
521 (McKinney 1989)). In New York Dry Dock Bank v. American Life Ins. & Trust
Co., 3 N.Y. 344 (1850), the court held that a loan of £48,000 from an English lender
for a promised repayment of £50,000 plus 6% interest was usurious and ruled the
corporate borrower had no obligation to repay any part of the loan. New York's leg-
islatively created "corporate exception" to its usury law resulted from public outrage
over the Dry Dock decision. See Ackerman, supra note 21, at 87-88.
24. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2306 (1974) ("No corporation shall inter-
pose the defense of usury in any action."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7105 (1988) ("No
corporation shall plead any statute against usury in any court in any suit instituted
to enforce the payment of any bond, note or other evidence of indebtedness issued or
assumed by it."); see DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAw § 10.03[2]
(1991) (stating that most states exempt corporations from usury statutes).
25. See PRIDGEN, supra note 24, § 10.03[2] (explaining that a substantial minor-
ity of states do not extend the protection of their usury statutes to business loans
made to individuals).
726
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interpreting England's usury statutes, this doctrine employed
the strained judicial fiction that merchants don't receive "inter-
est" when selling their goods on time.' Merchants charging
more for goods paid over time than goods purchased for cash
were thus freed from usury. After its rapid spread, this exemp-
tion persisted until the mid-twentieth century when some
courts began rethinking and rejecting it' and several state
legislatures enacted retail installment sales acts with rate ceil-
ings directed specifically at merchants' credit sales.'
Another significant exemption from the single digit ceiling
of American usury statutes was conceived in the early 1900s to
facilitate small consumer loans that could not be made profit-
ably at such rates. Legitimate lenders' refusals to make un-
profitable loans were driving desperate consumer borrowers to
loan sharks who exacted exorbitant, illegal rates.' To reclaim
the consumer lending market for more reputable lenders, most
state legislatures passed special small loan legislation that
allowed lenders submitting to licensing and consumer protec-
tion regulation to charge double digit rates on consumer loans
below a specified dollar amount.'
Despite the emergence of these exemptions, as of the early
1970s all but two states still restricted rates of consumer
loans,3' and several regulated rates of commercial loans.32
26. See generally KEVIN W. BROWN & KAThLEEN H. KEEST, NATIONAL CONSUM-
ER LAW CENTER, USURY AND CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION § 9.3.2.1.1, at 224
(1987) (stating that the difference between the time price and the cash price was
labeled the 'time price differential" and not treated as interest).
27. See Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 249 S.W.2d 973, 978 (Ark.
1952) (affirming the case at bar based on the doctrine of stare decisis but announc-
ing the future rule that increased credit sale prices may create a question of fact
concerning whether the transaction is a loan that may be attacked for usury).
28. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 12-610 (1990) (setting a maximum
rate of 24% on installment sale agreements); see BROWN & KEEST, aupra note 26,
§ 9.3.2.1.1, at 224 (citing state legislative action as the major force behind the de-
cline of the time price exception).
29. Rates of 150-300% were being charged for consumer loans. See James T.
Campen & William H. Lazonick, Regulation of Small Loan Interest Rates: Public
Policy and Consumer Welfare, 1 NEW ENG. J. Bus. & ECON. 30, 30 (1980).
30. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 399-A (1983) (setting a maximum interest
rate of 2% per month up to $600 and 1 % per month for amounts between $600
and $1500 for lenders submitting to the prescribed licensing requirements); see
BROWN & KEEST, 8upra note 26, § 2.3.3.1 (explaining that many states adopted
small loan laws in the early twentieth century patterned on the Uniform Small Loan
Law). See generally Oeltjen, supra note 16, at 177 (discussing early solutions to
"loan shark! domination of small loans).
31. See Christopher C. DeMuth, The Case Against Credit Card Interest Rate
Regulation, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 201, 202 (1986) (citing Massachusetts and New
Hampshire as the two states without such regulation).
32. See, e.g., TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.04(bX2) (Vernon 1987) (lim-
iting interest on commercial loans in excess of $250,000 to 28% and imposing lower
HeinOnline  -- 31 Hous. L. Rev. 727 1994-1995
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These circumstances prompted a resurgence in the late twenti-
eth century of the usury policy debate-a debate whose battle
lines had been drawn centuries before.
B. Point/Counterpoint-The Usury Policy Debate
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham articulated the classic freedom
of contract objection to interest pricing regulation: no person of
"sound mind" who is "acting freely" should be hindered from
striking a loan bargain on terms she finds acceptable.' Usury
proponents decry this depiction of loan bargaining as rosy-eyed
and idealistic by arguing that lenders' bargaining strength
over borrowers prevents the arms-length negotiation Bentham
presupposes.' Correct or not, their argument misses the
mark; a fixed ceiling on rates doesn't necessarily ensure fair
bargains. Usury statutes impose an arbitrary cap on rates
without regard to the operational costs of the particular lender,
the degree of risk the individual borrower presents, or the
borrower's level of sophistication.' As a result, only a narrow
class of borrowers benefits from usury's approach-those bor-
rowers who would otherwise have paid above the ceiling rate
under a free market system because of ignorance or despera-
tion, but whose credit standing would have garnered them the
ceiling rate if they were bargaining equalsY
Rate ceilings are useless to correct bargaining inequalities
for other borrowers. A consumer deserving of a ten percent
rate but unable to bargain equally is protected little by a thir-
ty-six percent rate ceiling.'m Usury does no more than place
ceilings for other loans).
33. Jeremy Bentham, Defence of Usury, in 3 THE WORxS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
3 (John Bowring ed.) (Edinburgh, William Tait 1843).
34. See Robin A. Morris, Consumer Debt and Usury: A New Rationale for Usu-
ry, 15 PEPP. L REV. 151, 156 (1988) (challenging Bentham's free market argument).
35. See Jacob S. Ziegel, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Canadian Consumer-
Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L REV. 488, 490 (1968) (noting that consumers typi-
cally lack both equality of bargaining power and appreciation of the legal conse-
quences of consumer credit transactions).
36. See Riley, supra note 20, at 206 (explaining that usury statutes do not
consider the variables that determine the cost of lending).
37. See Robert W. Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on Consumer Install-
ment Credit, 66 MIcH. L REV. 81, 94 (1967) (noting that rate ceilings do not benefit
high risk borrowers because lenders will simply refuse to make loans to them, and
do not benefit low risk borrowers because lenders will already lend to them at rates
lower than the ceiling); Oeltjen, supra note 16, at 214 (asserting that rate ceilings
fail to protect consumers from paying unconscionable interest, especially for credit
sales).
38. See Robert W. Johnson, The New Law of inance Charges: Disclosure, Free-
dom, of Entry, and Rate Ceilings, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 671, 684 (1968)
728 [Vol. 31:721
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an arbitrary limit on the extent of the unfair advantage a
lender can take. The reflex response to redress this egregious
example might be to lower the rate ceiling (to, say, twelve
percent) and thereby better protect these less risky borrowers.
This adjustment, however, would increase the ranks of borrow-
ers most deserving of protection but, in fact, least protected by
usury: those borrowers unable to qualify for credit at or below
the legal limit. Further adjustment to the rate maximum
serves only to shift borrowers from one class to the other.
When the ceiling is too high, large numbers of borrowers gain
no real protection; low ceilings fail to serve credit-risky borrow-
ers and, in fact, may drive them to the illegal lending mar-
ket.' The elusiveness of the appropriate balance of protection
is endemic to the usury solution.
Usury proponents offer unconvincing answers to these
objections. They argue that the illegal loan market flourished
at the turn of the century not because it is an unavoidable
consequence of low rate ceilings, but because law enforcement
was lax.' The persistence of the illegal market is now less
significant to the debate, however, because lenders and mer-
chants have developed creative evasions of usury regulation
that are exploitative but nonetheless legal. Rent-to-own opera-
tors, for example, sometimes charge rates that rival those in
the illegal market.4' Though proponents admit that you
cannot help everyone, they claim that usury statutes "undoubt-
edly benefit more borrowers by limiting contract interest rates
than they harm by restricting credit."42 Such head counting
impedes the search for a more complete solution to the prob-
lem of abusive interest pricing. Moreover, borrowers excluded
from the legal loan market by arbitrary rate ceilings are the
(observing that a 20% usury ceiling "does not protect consumers who deserve a rate
of twelve per cent but pay eighteen per cent because of carelessness or indiffer-
ence').
39. Oeltien, supra note 16, at 214. "Loan-sharking* provides a prime example of
the illegal lending market and involves lenders who operate outside legal loan limits
and who usually collect debts in an offensive manner. Exorbitant rates charged by
those involved in illegal lending are further inflated to compensate for the added
risk of usury penalties if caught. Note, An Ounce of Discretion for a Pound of Flesh.
A Suggested Reform for Usury Laws, 65 YALE L.J. 105, 107 (1955-56) [hereinafter
Ounce]; see also Lionel Bently & Geraint G. Howells, Loansharks and Extortionate
Credit Bargains-2, 1989 CONY. & PROP. LAW. 234, 240 (noting that usury ceilings
send high risk borrowers to loan sharks who charge "disproportionately high rates
thinking that they 'might as well be hanged for a sheep as a lamb'").
40. See George J. Wallace, The Uses of Usury: Low Rate Ceilings Reexamined,
56 B.U. L. REv. 451, 488 n.150 (1976) (arguing that inadequate enforcement efforts
and poor legislative drafting encouraged illegal lending in the early 1900s).
41. Refer to note 3 supra and accompanying text.
42. BROWN & KEEST, supra note 26, § 2.4.1, at 38.
7291994]
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very borrowers the usury rationale most seeks to protect: the
poor and uneducated."
Some usury advocates argue paternalistically that usury
protects such high risk borrowers from themselves." Noting
the disruptive consequences, both psychological and economic,
of seemingly inevitable default,' these proponents argue that
usury is a "legitimate use of paternalism.' This unflagging
allegiance to consumer welfare may be laudable, but their
argument is flawed both in theory and practice.' The premis-
es underlying scholarship advocating usury's paternalistic func-
tion are that (1) usury statutes in fact exclude high risk bor-
rowers from the lending market, (2) these borrowers are prone
to default, and (3) a responsible society should prevent the
harmful consequences of default by excluding these borrowers
from the lending market. The first premise is the most dubi-
ous. A high risk borrower excluded from the legal lending mar-
ket may resort to the illegal one. 8 Usury limits intended to
protect the most vulnerable borrowers from disruptive debt
collection and the other consequences of default may instead
43. See Riley, supra note 20, at 214 (explaining that the presence of rate ceil-
ings prompts lenders to be reluctant to lend in the small loan market, which pri-
marily serves the poor).
44. See BROWN & KEEST, supra note 26, § 2.4.1, at 38 (asserting that borrow-
ers who have already borrowed large amounts should not be allowed to go fiuther
into debt); Benfield, supra note 17, at 879 (proposing that borrowers who can only
borrow at excessive interest rates should be forbidden from borrowing).
45. See Wallace, supra note 40, at 458-59 (explaining the psychological strain of
high risk credit); see also Campen & Lazonick, supra note 29, at 44-45 (arguing that
extending credit to high risk borrowers is not in their best interest because of diffi-
culties in repaying the debt). See generally Morris, supra note 34, at 167-68 (discuss-
ing the effects of default).
46. Morris, supra note 34, at 174.
47. The debate between usury critics and supporters may reflect an impasse
over public moral values. Compare id. at 177 ("Usury laws are a useful and reason-
able tool for limiting consumer debt. .. .") with Michael Kawaja, The Case Against
Regulating Consumer Credit Charges, 5 AM. Bus. UJ. 319, 328-29 (1967) ('[The pa-
ternalistic argument] is at odds with one of the basic tenets of our economic system
which is constructed upon a belief that consumers should be free to make their own
choices (including whether and how much they will borrow).").
48. See HILLEL BLAcK, BUY Now, PAY LATER 177-78 (1961) (speculating that
large numbers of debtors rejected by finance companies turn to loan sharks); see also
Jarret C. Oeltjen, Pawnbroking on Parade, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 751, 773 (1989) (argu-
ing that pawnshop usury rates should be set high enough so that people are not
forced to turn to loan sharks). See generally NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FI-
NANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 104-05 (1972) [hereinafter CONSUMER CREDIT
REPORT] (describing the characteristics of loan sharks). But see Campen and
Lazonick, supra note 29, at 36 n.7 (observing that only people desperate for cash
seek out loan sharks, not those who borrow for typical consumer purchases or debt
consolidation). However, consumers do frequent the rent-to-own industry to purchase
consumer durables, often at exorbitant rates. Refer to note 3 supra and accompany-
ing text
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drive them to the market with the most notorious collection
record. Moreover, these usury advocates assume that only ab-
stinence can prevent the harmful consequences of default.
There may be less drastic means. For example, pawn shops
avoid the trauma of loan collection because they already pos-
sess the collateral and the debtor assumes no personal liabili-
ty." Strict enforcement of fair debt collection laws can deter
any creditor misconduct in collecting conventional loans.
50
Usury opponents also criticize usury in economic terms"
related inextricably to those freedom of contract concerns artic-
ulated above. The economist's critique of usury is best summa-
rized as follows:
Those [economists] who oppose interest rate restrictions view
credit markets as relatively efficient when left alone to oper-
ate freely. According to this position free competitive markets
lead to an optimum allocation of resources and maximum indi-
vidual satisfaction. Consequently, interferences with normal
credit flows by use of imposed ceilings on lending or deposit
rates can only create inefficiencies in financial markets which
hamper production and exert an adverse influence on the dis-
tribution of goods and services.52
The usury advocate might answer that rate controls are
needed for borrowers unable to allocate resources efficiently'
because they cannot comparison shop for interest rates effec-
tively despite rate disclosure mandated by statutes and
49. See Oeltjen, supra note 48, at 773 (stating that pawnshops present a less
critical problem 'because if the payment is not made, there is no harassment of the
debtors, no lawsuits, no loss of worktime due to court appearances, and no bad cred-
it reports).
50. See CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra note 48, at 101 (noting that legisla-
tion is often adequate but enforcement insufficient).
51. The author agrees with Professor Warren that '[i]t is time to usher in a
new, realistic era of consumer protection" in which economists challenge legislators
"to take into consideration the economic implications of consumer-oriented legisla-
tion." William D. Warren, Consumer Credit Law: Rates, Costs, and Benefits, 27 STAN.
L REV. 951, 961 (1975). Although economic principles should not always determine
the legislative outcome, they should be considered as a relevant factor in policy set-
ting.
52. Norman N. Bowsher, Usury Laws: Harmful When Effective, 56 FED. RES.
BANK OF ST. Louis 16, 17 (1974).
53. See Geoffrey Giles, The Effect of Usury Law on the Credit Marketplace, 95
BANKING LJ. 527, 529 (1978) (explaining that the economic argument for usury con-
trols is that small loan interest rates are inelastic because consumers will enter into
the loans regardless of the costs).
54. See Oeltjen, supra note 48, at 771-72; Kawaja, supra note 47, at 325 (ex-
plaining that an assumption underlying usury advocates' argument that consumers
cannot shop for better rates is that consumers do not understand required disclo-
sures).
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because, even if they could comparison shop effectively, they
are reluctant to do so because of the stigma of being rejected
by other creditors.' This is said to give every creditor a mo-
nopoly over any prospective applicant, permitting rates unaf-
fected by the "competition." The usury solution, however, over-
shoots the mark and has too many negative side effects. If
consumers' inability to understand rates prevents effective com-
petition, rate disclosure should be reformed and consumer edu-
cation pursued.' The stigma of creditor rejection discouraging
comparison shopping should similarly be addressed by more
direct solutions.
C. The Nays Have It: The Recent Cycle of Rate Deregulation in
America
Usury critics have had some success at various times in
American history," but the "remarkable" development of more
widespread deregulation occurred abruptly in the late 1970s
and early 1980s.' As a result of double digit inflation, rates
extended to even the most creditworthy borrowers bumped up
against usury ceilings.59 Some states responded by raising ex-
isting usury ceilings, a few opting for a variable limit tied to
indices reflecting inflationary changes." These reforms made
loans to more creditworthy borrowers viable despite inflation,
but they ignored the larger economic and contractual concerns
55. See Jeffrey Davis, Revamping Consumer-Credit Contract Law, 68 VA. L
REV. 1333, 1355 (1982) (stating that often consumers prefer not applying with other
creditors over risking rejection); see also Qeltjen, supra note 16, at 211 (noting that
most consumers only shop locally for credit, resulting in a monopoly for local lend-
ers). See generally Kawaja, aupra note 47, at 325 (enumerating the reasons put forth
by usury advocates to support the argument that the consumer credit market is
ineffective in allowing consumers to obtain competitive rates).
56. See Giles, supra note 53, at 530 (asserting that consumer education would
be better for loan market efficiency than interest ceilings); Kawaja, supra note 47, at
330 (advocating rate statement reform). Refer to Part II(H) infra for a discussion of
these and other potential market perfection reforms.
57. Massachusetts repealed its usury statute in 1867, and by 1900, 11 states
had no usury limit. See Ackerman, supra note 21, at 86-87 (discussing the status of
usury laws in America during the late nineteenth century). Usury ceilings were re-
enacted later in most of those states. Refer to note 21 supra.
58. See DeMuth, supra note 31, at 213 (discussing the factors leading to the
easing of usury laws).
59. See Ackerman, aupra note 21, at 105-07 (noting that when the prime rate
was 20% in April 1980, the federal rate ceiling for business and agricultural loans
was 21%).
60. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2301(a) (1974 & Supp. 1992) (setting the
maximum rate at the Federal Reserve discount rate plus 5%). See generally BROWN
& KEEST, supra note 26, § 2.4.1 at 37 (discussing how states adapted their usury
statutes to deal with high inflation).
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of usury critics. Loans to willing but more risky borrowers were
still effectively outlawed.6' Some states receptive to more sub-
stantial reform repealed their general usury limits, leaving only
piecemeal consumer credit controls in place, 2 and several re-
pealed usury limits for even consumer credit transactions.'
Usury critics won more important victories in Congress.
Congress responded to inflation outpacing state usury limits
with the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA), which preempted state regu-
lation of certain consumer loans. DIDMCA overrode state usury
restrictions on loans secured by first liens on residential real
estate or residential mobile homes.' As DIDMCA sets no rate
61. See Riley, supra note 20, at 221 (explaining that the sliding scale maximum
does not account for the lender's risk or cost so high risk borrowers are still unable
to get loans). Compared to fixed rate standards, which demand legislative amend-
ment, variable interest rate usury caps adjust readily to inflationary changes, but
they nonetheless exclude high risk borrowers from the legal lending market when
their risks exceed the variable cap. Thus, the variable rate solution does nothing to
address the fundamental problem of the usury standard. See id.
62. BROWN & KEEST, supra note 26, § 2.4.1, at 37 (noting that special usury
ceilings governing retail installment sales and small consumer loans were typically
retained by the states); see, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 28-42-201 (Supp. 1994) (stating that
parties may contract for any rate not otherwise prohibited); id § 28-41-101 (Supp.
1994) (regulating certain consumer loans).
63. See HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 20, at 425 (discussing state interest rate
legislation in the mid-1980s); DeMuth, supra note 31, at 213, 234 (listing Arizona,
California, Delaware, Illinois, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Nevada, New York, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Virginia as among
the states that repealed their limits on credit card rates).
64. Pub. L No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980). Congress in 1974 had already im-
posed federal usury limits on business and agricultural loans over $25,000. Act of
Oct. 29, 1974, Pub. L No. 93-501, § 202, 88 Stat. 1558. That legislation expired in
1977. I& § 206, 88 Stat. 1560. However, it was reenacted from 1979 to 1981. Act of
Nov. 5, 1979, Pub. L No. 96-104, 93 Stat. 789. Business and agricultural loans over
$25,000 were again temporarily governed by federal law as part of DIDMCA. That
regulation expired in April 1983. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 512, 94 Stat. 164 (1980).
65. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a) (1988). First lien loans are preempted by DIDMCA
whether purchase money or not, thus removing usury limits on home equity loans,
and even automobile loans, if secured by a first lien on residential property. See
Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 907, 908 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding
that DIDMCA preempted state usury law when an automobile lender acquired first
liens on realty by refinancing and consolidating prior liens on residences). DIDMCA
applies to loans by lenders regulated by a federal agency, lenders making residential
real estate loans exceeding $1,000,000 per year, and lenders meeting certain other
eligibility criteria. 12 C.F.R. § 590.2(b) (1994). This broad scope encompasses most
lenders. States were allowed to "opt out" of this DIDMCA preemption, though that
opportunity expired April 1, 1983. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(bX2) (1988). Colorado, Geor-
gia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Neva-
da, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Wisconsin opted out of some
or all of this first lien preemption. KEEST, supra note 6, § 3.2.2.4, at 39. Opt out
rights might seem inconsistent with federal repeal of usury limits. The practical ef-
fect, however, was to shift the burden to usury proponents at a time when high
inflation made reenactment of state ceilings difficult. See BROWN & KEEST, supra
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ceiling,' these consumer loans are subject to no express state
or federal limits."' DIDMCA also allows federally chartered or
insured lenders' to make other loans at the greater of a
DIDMCA federal rate ceiling' or the rate otherwise allowed
by state law.70
In combination, state deregulation and federal preemp-
tion7' have freed more transactions from usury control than
ever before in American history. But, as the "fixed" fairness
control of usury lost ground in the late twentieth century, a
"variable" fairness standard-the unconscionability doc-
trine-has emerged in contract law to take its place.
note 26, § 2.4.1, at 37 (explaining that if a state failed to act its usury limits were
effectively repealed).
66. Federal law does require creditors offering variable rate home loans to spec-
ify a "cap" on the rate, but leaves that amount to the parties' agreement. 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.30 (1994).
67. Refer to note 86 infra for a discussion of whether the unconscionability
standard applies to loans subject to federal preemption.
68. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1785 (1988); 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
69. The DIDMCA ceiling is 1% above the discount rate on 90-day commercial
paper in effect at the local federal reserve bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (Supp. IV
1992).
70. Id.; 12 U.S.C. § 1785(g) (1988). This is based on the federal preemption
"rate" established previously for national banks by the federal National Bank Act. 12
U.S.C. § 85 (1988). It is unsettled whether the 'most favored lender" doctrine apply-
ing to national banks under that Act applies to lenders under DIDMCA. See
PRIDGEN, supra note 24, § 10.04[3]. As with DIDMCA's first mortgage preemption,
states were allowed, and six exercised, 'opt out" rights. Colorado, Iowa, Massachu-
setts, Maine, North Carolina and Wisconsin opted out; Maine, however, rescinded its
opt out. KEEST, supra note 6, § 3.4.3, at 47. Unlike DIDMCA's first mortgage pre-
emption, the opt out period for federally chartered and insured depositories has no
expiration date, so states may still opt out. See Pub. L No. 96-221, § 521, 94 Stat.
164 (1980) (setting no deadline for states to opt out for federally insured and foreign
banks).
71. Apart from DIDMCA's preemption, the National Bank Act preempts state
rate regulation of national banks and thus shields the credit card industry from
restrictive state usury limits. See, e.g., Marquette Natl Bank v. First of Omaha
Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 308, 318 (1978) (finding that credit card interest rates
charged by national banks are governed by § 85 of the National Bank Act, allowing
the higher of a federal rate or the state rate for the state in which the bank is
chartered). There is also federal preemption for loans by federally chartered credit
unions, certain agricultural loans and housing loans insured by the FHA or VA. See
Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1785(g) (1988) (Insured credit union may
charge interest at specified rate "notwithstanding any state constitution or statute
which is hereby preempted"); Federal Land Bank v. Wilson, 719 F.2d 1367, 1372
(8th Cir 1983) (finding that Congress preempted state usury laws for credit transac-
tions involving Federal Land Bank); KEEST, supra note 6, § 3.2.3 (discussing preemp-
tion of state usury law for housing loans insured by the FHA and VA).
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D. Rate Regulation at the Crossroads of Usury and
Unconscionability
The unconscionability concept has roots at least as deep as
the Roman fair exchange doctrine of laesio enormis.'2 In the
last few centuries, equity courts have invoked unconscionability
to deny specific performance of contracts conveying land for
grossly inadequate consideration and, occasionally, to police
unfairness in other contracts. 3 The codification of the uncon-
scionability concept in section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial
Code ([UCC) has prompted legislative and judicial acceptance of
policing fairness of bargains generally. Section 2-302's uncon-
scionability standard has been applied freely by analogy to
bargains outside its scope74 and is often adopted as a matter
of common law separate from the UCC.75 Employed by almost
every recent uniform act governing consensual transactions, the
unconscionability standard has been adopted in multiple
codifications in almost every state.7" It has also been inducted
into the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,7 thereby entering
72. See Dando B. Cellini & Barry L Wertz, Unconscionable Contract Provisions:
A History of Unenforceability from Roman Law to the UCC, 42 TUi. L. REV. 193,
193 (1967). Refer to notes 325-27 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of
laesio enormis. Some commentators attribute the origin of unconscionability to the
desire to regulate unfair interest rates. See Morris, supra note 34, at 153 n12 (stat-
ing that the common law of unconscionability derived from the church doctrine of
usury); K.L Fletcher, Review of Unconscionable Transactions, 8 U. QUEENSLAND LJ.
45, 48 (1973) (stating that the English Court of Chancery developed the unconsciona-
bility doctrine to police transactions that eluded usury regulation).
73. See SINAI DEUTCH, UNFAIR CONTRACTS 46-49 (1977) (discussing the role the
equity courts have played in denying enforcement of contracts on unconscionability
grounds).
74. See generally JOHN D. CALAMAi & JOSEPH M. PELLo, CONTRACTS § 9-39,
at 403-04 (3d ed. 1987) (listing various instances when the UCC's unconscionability
provision has been applied to contracts not involving the sale of goods). Section 2-
302 has also been applied directly to contracts other than for the sale of goods, al-
though these decisions should properly have applied § 2-302 by analogy. See, e.g.,
White River Conservancy Dist. v. Commonwealth Eng'rs, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 1011, 1017
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (finding an 18% rate in an engineering services contract
conscionable under § 2-302).
75. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448-49
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (noting that inclusion of an unconscionability provision in the then
recently enacted UCC did not preclude the court from developing a similar common
law rule to address unfairness before the effective date of the UCC); see also Morris
G. Shanker & Mark F. Abel, Consumer Protection Under Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 689, 703 (1968) (noting that Walker-Thomas
established that unconscionability could be asserted without statutory authority).
76. Refer to Parts II(BX1) to II(BXS) infra for discussion of certain uniform acts
codifying unconscionability.
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (incorporating lan-
guage derived from § 2-302(1) of the UCC).
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the general common law of contracts.'
There is little question that courts have the authority to
apply the unconscionability standard to interest rates.' Sec-
78. CALAmmu & PERILO, supra note 74, § 9-39, at 403.
79. One commentator has questioned judicial authority to apply the uncon-
scionability standard to interest pricing. See Bernard H. Goldstein, Unconscionability:
Some Reconsiderations with Particular Reference to New-Type Mortgage Transactiona,
17 REAL PROP., PRoB. & TR. J. 412, 416 (1982) (suggesting that mortgage interest
rates cannot be held unconscionable when usury restrictions have been repealed or
preempted). Corbin, in contrast, believed unconscionability could be employed in the
absence of usury protection. 1 ARTHUR L, CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 129, at
556 (1963) (arguing that very high interest rates may be found unconscionable in
the absence of a usury statute).
One potential argument against applying the unconscionabiity standard to
interest pricing as distinct from other contracts is that the legislature, by creating
exceptions to usury or abolishing usury entirely, made a statement of public policy
in favor of freedom of contract with no fairness control. Proponents of this argument
might cite examples of enactments repealing usury that expressly recognized the
potential application of unconscionability as supporting the denial of such a challenge
if such language is not employed. See ALA. CODE § 8-8-5 (1993) (removing interest
rate ceilings on loans and credit sales of $2000 or more and expressly providing that
'all laws relating to unconscionabiity in consumer transactions ... shall apply to
transactions covered by this section"); see also CAT_ FIN. CODE §§ 22450.5, 24450.5
(West Supp. 1994) (stating that California's general unconscionabiity statute applies
to loans made by personal property brokers and consumer finance lenders and that
'a loan found to be unconscionable .. . shall be deemed to be in violation of this
division and subject to the remedies specified in this division'). It is unlikely that
legislatures repealing usury intended interest pricing to be free from the now estab-
lished unconscionability standard of fairness review, at least without an express
statement to that effect. Moreover, decisions have long applied the unconscionabiity
standard to loans exempted from a state's usury laws by the "corporate exemption."
Refer to text accompanying notes 22-24 supra. See, e.g., Levin v. Johnson (In re
Chicago Reed & Furniture Co.), 7 F.2d 885, 885 (7th Cir. 1925) (holding that the
court of equity would not enforce a harsh and oppressive contract despite a statute
exempting corporations from state usury laws); Metal-Built Prods., Inc. v. Bornstein
(In re Metal-Built Prods., Inc.), 3 B.R. 176, 178-179 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (noting
that the usury defense was not available to a corporate borrower, but concluding
that the bankruptcy court can determine the conscionability of claims before it be-
cause equitable considerations are invoked when a creditor seeks a preferred position
in bankruptcy); First Mut. Corp. v. Grammercy & Maine, Inc., 423 A.2d 680, 687
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (noting that courts have refused to enforce interest
rates on grounds of unconscionabiity even though the borrowers were corporations
not entitled to the usury defense). A California appellate court in 1965 concluded
that it had no authority to review the conscionability of a loan excluded from
California's usury restrictions. See Peoples Fin. & Thrift Co. v. Mike-Ron Corp., 46
Cal. Rptr. 497, 501-502 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965). However, that case was disapproved
by a more recent California appellate decision. See Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr.
2d 845, 847 n.5 (Ct. App. 1991). But see Williams v. Alphonse Mtge. Co., 144 So. 2d
600, 602 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (holding that the court had no discretion to find inter-
est unconscionable when the legislature authorized charging above the statutory limit
for the disputed loan).
Applying the unconscionabiity standard to interest pricing already governed
by usury is less certain. For example, a state ceiling rate of 60% could be substan-
tively unfair for creditworthy borrowers. It is doubtful, however, that such borrowers
could challenge the 60% rate as unconscionable, at least without showing what has
been termed "procedural unfairness." The Uniform Consumer Credit Code appears to
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tion 2-302 governs credit sales of goods.' At least one state
has an unconscionability statute for contracts generally.1
State unfair trade practices acts, many of which proscribe un-
conscionable conduct expressly12 or implicitly,' may govern
the loan. In the equitable contexts of bankruptcy and judicial
foreclosure proceedings, challenges to interest pricing have been
pursued for decades as a matter of common law.' The only
significant open questions as to a court's ability to review inter-
est rates under an unconscionability standard arise when the
challenged rate complies with an express usury limit provided
by applicable state laws or when the loan is subject to federal
preemption of state usury limits.'
adopt this approach in stating that "a charge . . . expressly permitted by this Act is
not in itself unconscionable." UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108(3), 7 U.L.A 811
(1974); see also Seaboard Fin. Co. v. Wahlen, 260 P.2d 556, 562 (Utah 1953) (stating
that the 'wholly unconscionable rate" was sanctioned by Utah's usury statute).
80. See, e.g., Mobile Am. Corp. v. Howard, 307 So. 2d 507 (Fla. Dist. Ct App.
1975) (applying § 2-302 to interest pricing of installment sale of mobile home); Jones
v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (applying § 2-302 to the
purchase of a freezer under a retail installment contract).
81. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West 1985) ("If the court as a matter of law
finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the
time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract .... *); see also
Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 847 n.5 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting that
§ 1670.5 applies the doctrine of unconscionability to all contracts).
82. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03 (Anderson 1993) ('No supplier shall
commit an unconscionable act or practice in connection with a consumer transac-
tion.").
83. See Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 652 (N.J. 1971) (construing New Jer-
sey trade practices statutes to proscribe unconscionable conduct). New Jersey later
amended its statutes to explicitly proscribe unconscionable conduct. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 1989) ('The act, use or employment by any person of any un-
conscionable commercial practice ... is declared to be an unlawful practice ... .).
84. See, e.g., Levin v. Johnson (In re Chicago Reed & Furniture Co.), 7 F.2d
885, 885-86 (7th Cir. 1925) (holding that a $300 commission for making a $2000
loan was oppressive and refusing to enforce the loan in the bankruptcy court); Met-
al-Built Prods., Inc. v. Bornstein (In re Metal-Built Prods., Inc.), 3 B.R. 176, 179
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (finding interest in excess of 100% 'draconian! but not un-
conscionable in a suit by a creditor of a bankrupt corporation); In re Elkins-Dell
Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 866-74 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (holding that unconscionability is
a valid defense in a bankruptcy court); Cheshire Mtge. Serv., Inc. v. Montes, 612
A.2d 1130, 1137-38 (Conn. 1992) (holding that a home improvement loan was
conscionable because the loan charges were "in the middle of the market" and the
borrowers were not oppressed or unfairly surprised); Harm v. Taylor, 429 A.2d 946,
948-49 (Conn. 1980) (reversing the trial court's reduction of an effective annual inter-
est rate from 16% 6 to 12% for a mortgage debt of $20,000 when no evidence of cir-
cumstances surrounding the loan was presented to support or negate a finding of
unconscionability); Means v. Anderson, 32 A. 82, 82 (LI. 1895) (holding that an in-
terest rate was high but not unconscionable for a loan of $25 for one month at 10%
interest, but permitting mortgagor to redeem on payment of $25 and interest at 6%
per annum when the loan had not been repaid for 11 months).
85. Refer to note 79 supra.
86. When federal law allows the greater of a federal rate or the rate allowed
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The law of unfair interest regulation in the 1990s is at an
historic crossroads. Lower inflation since the early 1980s has
halted the dramatic surge of deregulation and given usury pro-
ponents the opportunity to retake ground they lost in the
1980s. They are targeting specific industry abuses in their
quest to establish new usury limits and reestablish old ones.
The credit card industry narrowly escaped a federally imposed
usury limit in 1991.7 In 1993, bills were introduced in Con-
gress to annul DIDMCA's preemption of nonpurchase money
(home equity) first mortgage loans88 and to subject rent-to-own
transactions to existing usury limits in a majority of states on
retail installment sales. 9 Consumer advocates are also urging
by state law, rates would be limited under state law by the unconscionability stan-
dard if there was no state usury ceiling. Refer to notes 68-70 supra and accompany-
ing text. The analysis is more problematic with regard to DIDMCA preemption of
first mortgage loans because DIDMCA does not specify an alternate federal rate for
such loans. Applying the unconscionability standard as a matter of state common
law, however, does not appear to be precluded by either express or implied preemp-
tion. Section 501 of DIDMCA preempts "[tihe provisions of the constitution or the
laws of any State expressly limiting the rate or amount of interest" 12 U.S.C.
§ 1735f-7a (1988). The unconscionability standard does not "expressly limit" the in-
terest rate, as it employs a case-by-case analysis of fairness.
Implicit preemption depends on whether the unconscionability standard would
frustrate the purposes of Congress in enacting DIDMCA. See, e.g., Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (finding that federal preemption of state law
occurs when state law obstructs Congress from achieving its objectives). Enacted
during rampant inflation, DIDMCA was intended to 'enhance the stability and via-
bility of our Nation's financial system and [was] needed to facilitate a national hous-
ing policy and the functioning of a national secondary market in mortgage lending."
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, DEPOSITORY INSTITU-
TIONS DEREGULATION ACT, S. REP. No. 368, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1979).
DIDMCA's purpose was to free home loans from restrictive state rate ceilings that
prevented loans at prevailing market rates. The unconscionability standard would
further that purpose by validating market rates reflecting inflationary risks, while
prohibiting abusive rates charged without relation to risks and costs.
Even if DIDMCA does preempt state unconscionability standards, the stan-
dard might exist under the federal common law. See Perdue v. Crocker Natl Bank,
702 P.2d 503, 516 n.19 (Cal. 1985) (raising the issue, but not deciding it, in an
analogous preemption challenge to the unconscionabiity standard as applied to bank
NSF charges).
87. In November, 1991, the Senate passed a bill imposing a federal variable
ceiling on credit card rates. After the banking industry's acrimonious reaction drew
threats of a presidential veto, the bill was tabled. See generally Todd M. Finchler,
Capping Credit Card Interest Rates: An Immodest Proposal, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING
L 493, 499-500 (1993) (describing the events leading to the Senate's Credit Card
Cap proposal). The impetus for that failed legislation, industry's slow response to
reductions in the inflation rate, is ironic given lenders' critique of usury ceilings as
unresponsive to increases in the inflation rate.
88. H.R. 3153, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). This legislation was introduced by
Rep. Joseph P. Kennedy II on September 28, 1993 as the Home Equity Protection
Act of 1993. Certain other home equity loan protection from this Act, although not
the annulment of DIDMCA preemption, was enacted as part of the Riegle Commu-
nity Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994. Pub. L No. 103-325.
89. H.R. 3136, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). This legislation would classify rent-
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Congress to either enact a federal usury ceiling for consumer
loans generally (and their functional equivalents) or to remove
existing federal preemption to restore state usury limits.' In-
dustry continues to lobby the free market standard." This Ar-
ticle advocates settling the regulatory tug-of-war9* through
adoption of the unconscionability standard as a compromise to
police unfair interest pricing.
E. An Argument for Regulating Unfair Interest Rates Under
the Variable Fairness Standard of Unconscionability
Unconscionability's aim to redress overreaching in contracts
is consistent with usury's rationale: the protection of borrowers
from overreaching creditors.93 Moreover, unconscionability is
more resistant to evasion. Because usury regulation typically
recognizes a violation only when certain discrete elements are
present,' lenders can skirt usury by structuring transactions
so as to avoid one or more of these elements. Rent-to-own
transactions, when terminable at the consumer's will, may not
fulfill the element of a loan or that of an obligation to repay
principal.' Pawnbrokers structure their transactions as
to-own transactions within the scope of these statutes presumably whether or not
state law agreed. See 139 CONG. REC. H7142 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1993) (statement of
Rep. Gonzales) (describing a proposal to subject rent-to-own transactions to re-
strictions on credit sales and retail installment sales).
90. Consumer Groups Back Bill that Would Regulate Home-Improvement Loans,
BALT. EVENING SUN, May 20, 1993, at 12A (reporting testimony of Michelle Meier of
Consumers Union before the Senate Banking Committee in favor of legislation intro-
duced eventually as H.R. 3153).
91. See generally Finchler, supra note 87, at 500 (describing industry reaction
to the Senate credit card interest rate cap proposal).
92. See generally Warren, supra note 51, at 966 (noting a lack of consensus on
consumer credit regulation despite decades of regulatory experience). These parties
battle a regulatory tug-of-war of "loosening and [then] tightening of consumer credit
regulation [that] has been evident through much of the twentieth century." BROWN
& KEFST, supra note 26, § 1.2, at 14 n.3 (describing credit industry pressure for
loosened regulation which succeeds until egregious abuse leads to reimposition of
restrictions).
93. Cf Scarr v. Boyer, 818 P.2d 381, 383 (Mont. 1991) (stating that usury laws
provide protection for borrowers without real bargaining power against overreaching
creditors).
94. These elements are the existence of a loan or forbearance, an obligation to
repay principal, interest charged in excess of the allowed maximum, and usurious
intent. See BROWN & KEFT, supra note 26, § 9.3.2.
95. See, e.g., Givens v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 160, 162 (S.D. Ala.
1988) (holding that a week-to-week or month-to-month rental agreement is not a
credit sale), affd, 885 F.2d 879 (11th Cir. 1989). But see Miller v. Colortyme, Inc.,
518 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. 1994) (holding that a rent-to-own transaction constitutes a
credit sale subject to Minnesota's general usury statute). Usury statutes similarly
may or may not apply to income tax refund assignment transactions. See Cullen v.
HeinOnline  -- 31 Hous. L. Rev. 739 1994-1995
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
sale/repurchase options rather than as loans.' Lenders also
exploit the often narrow statutory definition of "interest" by im-
posing unregulated fees and costs.' Retail vendors might in-
flate the cash price of their goods to keep compensation desig-
nated as interest within legal limits.' These evasion devices
operate without regard to the underlying purpose of usury.
Once sanctioned by courts, they at best allow legitimate profit
when credit cannot be extended profitably below legal rates. At
worst, however, they permit overreaching by creditors of needy
and unsophisticated borrowers.' Evasion devices cannot elude
the unconscionability standard, which operates in the law of
contracts generally.1" Whether the transaction involves a
pawnshop, a rent-to-own center, a vendor, or a third party
lender, its terms must withstand scrutiny as being either
conscionable or unconscionable.
The one pro-usury argument the unconscionability standard
may not address is the paternalistic claim that usury protects
uncreditworthy borrowers from high risk borrowing doomed to
default.'"' An unconscionability standard might validate high
but nonetheless fair rates and thus fail to protect these borrow-
ers from themselves. However, the unconscionability standard is
flexible enough to protect these borrowers. Several states'
codifications of unconscionability proscribe loans made with no
reasonable probability of repayment." Although this author
Bragg, 350 S.E.2d 798, 800 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the state usury law
does not apply to a tax refund assignment). See generally KEEST, supra note 6,
§ 5.5.3 (discussing assignment of tax refunds in relation to usury laws).
96. See Oeltjen, supra note 48, at 755, 784 n.166 (noting that many states
therefore regulate pawnbroker rates by specific statutes, but observing that in the
1980s at least fifteen states did not have such statutes).
97. See Ackerman, supra note 21, at 96.
98. See Jeffrey E. Allen & Robert J. Staaf, The Nexus Between Usury, Time
Price" and Unconscionability in Installment Sales, 14 UCC L.J. 219, 231-32 (1981)
(citing Jones v. Star Credit Corp. as an example of a case wherein a retail vendor
attempted to circumvent the usury statute by inflating the initial purchase price in
a credit sale). Shifting risk factors, such as the buyer's credit, to the price of the
good penalizes the defaulting buyer who must pay unearned postdefault interest as
part of the cash price. Id. at 233-34.
99. Cf Ackerman, supra note 21, at 99 ("Avoidance may be better than the ap-
plication of some laws, but is clearly less desirable than a rational law of interest
rates.").
100. Refer to text accompanying notes 74-78 supra.
101. Refer to notes 44-50 supra and accompanying text.
102. For example, both the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (1974 Act) and the
Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act employ this standard. UNIF. CONSUMER CRED-
rr CODE § 5.108(4Xa), 7A U.L.A. 167 (1974) ('In applying ... [the unconscionability
provision], consideration shall be given to . . . [a] belief by the seller, lessor, or lend-
er at the time a transaction is entered into that there is no reasonable probability
of payment in full of the obligation by the consumer or debtor . . . .); UNIF.
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opposes usury's paternalistic goal and opposes the use of uncon-
scionability to reach the same end, the doctrine is flexible
enough to encompass this goal if a legislature or a court be-
lieves saving people from "problematic debt situations""~ justi-
fies limiting their freedom to obtain credit from a willing lender
at a fair rate.
The unconscionability standard addresses the primary argu-
ment of usury opponents as well: usury ceilings drive to abu-
sive illegal lenders those borrowers too uncreditworthy to bor-
row at or below legal limits.1" Under the unconscionability
standard, legitimate lenders would be able to compete to lend
to these borrowers at high but nonetheless fair and therefore
legal rates. Under the logic of unconscionability, for every bor-
rower, no matter how credit-risky, there is a fair rate; that is,
a rate justified by the risks and other circumstances of the
loan.1 6
The unconscionability standard is an irresistibly compelling
regulatory replacement for usury."e Industry, however, prefers
the free market standard and rejects both the usury and uncon-
scionability standards."° Consumer advocates may tolerate
CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 4(cX4), 7A U.LA. 241 (1971) ('In determining
whether an act or practice is unconscionable, the court shall consider circumstances
such as ... [whether] the supplier knew or had reason to know: ... that when
the consumer transaction was entered into there was no reasonable probability of
payment of the obligation in full by the consumer .... ."). Even if a high rate is
fair given the borrower's poor credit standing, the loan might be struck down as
unfair if the borrower had no chance of repaying the loan. Cf. Fidelity Fin. Servs.,
Inc. v. Hicks, 574 N.E.2d 15, 20 (Ill. App, Ct. 1991) (holding that an unfair trade
practices act claim was stated by allegations that the lender structured loan pay-
ments to precipitate default and foreclosure).
103. See Morris, supra note 34, at 178 (discussing the need to consider the so-
cial impact of problematic debt caused by over-leveraged borrowers).
104. Refer to text accompanying note 39 supra.
105. Refer to Part II(CX3) infra for a discussion of risk as a factor in determin-
ing a fair interest rate.
106. Two commentators have advocated the use of unconscionability to control
American interest rates. The idea was first expressed in a 1955 Yale Law Journal
note advocating adoption of the unconscionability standard for commercial borrowers
left unprotected by the corporate exemption from usury in most large commercial
and industrial states. See Ounce, supra note 39. That author did not consider the
use of unconscionability for consumer loans. More recently, a commentator dubbed
the unconscionability standard a "compromise" model of rate regulation, but pre-
ferred the 'free market" model with unconscionability employed only 'if some mar-
ginal protection is deemed essential." Oeltjen, supra note 16, at 231-35; see also
Susan P. McAllister, Note, Judicially Imposed Usury Penalties in the Absence of
Statutory Penalties: Can Freedom of Contract Co-Exist with Public Policy After
Merritt v. Knox, 68 N.C. L, REV. 1021, 1033 (1990) (advocating that courts use the
unconscionability standard as a "safety net" to protect against overreaching lenders
when a usury statute is repealed or modified after a loan is made and the court
applies those changes retroactively).
107. Commentators have often noted attempts by various industries to avoid or
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unconscionability while vigorously pursuing reenactment of com-
prehensive usury limits." Criticism of the unconscionability
standard can be expected from both.
Industry advocates favoring a free market approach with
no unconscionability "safety net" can mine the wealth of noted
scholarship critical of the unconscionability standard as applied
to contracts generally, particularly its codification in section 2-
302 of the UCC. Unconscionability's staunchest opponent, the
late Professor Leff, compared unconscionability to both usury
and Roman laesio enormis'" as seeking "fairness of distribu-
tion" rather than "efficiency of allocation,""' a felony in the
economists' (if not the emperor's) code. Leff viewed uncon-
scionability not as a market-perfecting strategy, such as con-
tract's and torts' prohibition of fraud, but as the free market's
"covert enemy."'
1
'
Other commentators have observed that courts' use of un-
conscionability sometimes has inefficient results; clauses that
operate in both parties' interests are voided. For example, the
"add-on" clause employed by the merchant in Williams v. Walk-
er-Thomas Furniture Co."2 may be justified by the risks credi-
tors face of not otherwise being made whole on the debtor's
default."3 The unconscionability standard might raise costs to
consumers generally if lenders, forced to forgo clauses like the
"add-on" clause, increase the cost of credit to compensate for
their additional risk."4 Unlike other clauses, unfair interest
rates do not invite the same inefficient use of the
oppose interest rate regulation of any kind. See, e.g., Finchler, aupra note 87, at 500
(describing banking industry opposition to a Senate proposal to cap credit card in-
terest rates); James P. Nehf, Effective Regulation of Rent-to-Own Contracts, 52 OHIo
ST. L.J. 751, 752 (1991) (discussing regulation of the rent-to-own industry and noting
that industry's assertion that usury laws are not applicable to rent-to-own transac-
tions).
108. See, eg., Davis, 8upTa note 55, at 1338 (discussing regulation of the con-
sumer credit industry and pressure from consumer groups for more regulation due to
the perceived inadequacy of the unconscionability doctrine).
109. Refer to the text accompanying notes 325-27 infra for a discussion of laesio
enormis.
110. Arthur A. Leff, Thomist Unconscionability, 4 CANADIAN Bus. I.J. 424, 427-
28 (1979).
111. I& at 427.
112. 350 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
113. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L &
ECON. 293, 306-08 (1975) (arguing that 'add-on" clauses in consumer credit sales
make good economic sense, despite being attacked on unconscionability grounds).
114. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS 74 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co. decision and suggesting that the lender will increase its interest rate to compen-
sate for having its "add-on" provision disallowed).
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unconscionability standard. That standard should imperil only
rates exceeding the risks of the transaction."5 Unlike certain
other clauses, the lender whose rate is held unconscionable
cannot reallocate the risks for future transactions by raising
the cost of the credit."6 That cost itself is already unconscio-
nable.11 7  Professor Lefts scholarship also counsels that even
if free market control of fairness proves ineffective, offensive
clauses can be controlled better by legislation than by
unconscionability's expensive case-by-case method of achieving
consumer justice."' The most cogent observation in this un-
settled debate, however, is that "[a]ll of the arguments about
[which is] the proper forum for effecting social change probably
have some merit.""' Professor Left's criticism of unconsciona-
bility is inapposite, however, when applied to unfair interest
pricing. A legislature could outlaw add-on clauses and avoid
case-by-case adjudication of consumer policy, but the legislative
115. Refer to Part II(CX3) infra for a discussion of the standard courts should
employ in gauging rate fairness.
116. See Epstein, supra note 113, at 308-15 (discussing unconscionability as ap-
plied to typical contract clauses).
117. One commentator has observed in a broader context that courts could effi-
ciently restructure transactions 'to allow the weaker party a larger share of the
gains, provided the stronger party receives enough benefit to keep the transaction
mutually beneficial.' DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, THE EcoNoMIcs OF CON-
TRACT LAW 68 (1992) (Teacher's Manual). The unconscionability standard as applied
to unfair interest pricing will not lessen the lender's incentives to bargain.
Usury regulation has been criticized as giving creditors an economic incentive
to oppose consumer protection legislation. See Warren, supra note 51, at 958 (argu-
ing that creditors, squeezed between low interest rate ceilings and moves to extend
consumer protection legislation, have an incentive to oppose any protective legislation
that would increase their costs). Consumer protection measures often entail costs
passed to consumers through higher interest rates. If unrealistic rate ceilings pre-
vent that transfer, creditors must oppose measures the legislature has not "costed
out." There is no similar concern under the unconscionabiity standard, as higher
costs would justify a higher rate.
118. See Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd--Consumers and the
Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PIrt. L REv. 349, 354-57 (1969) (criticizing the in-
efficiency of case-by-case litigation of "unconscionable' clauses in consumer
transactions); see also In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 872 (E.D. Pa.
1966) (reasoning that regulation of the financing industry should rest with the legis-
lature, due to its ability to conduct a broad investigation encompassing the problem
as a whole and avoiding piecemeal regulation). But see Benfield, supra note 17, at
884 (noting that the Elkins-Dell factors for determining the fairness of interest pric-
ing argue against legislatures fixing rates for business loans, as "(c]ourts can take
such factors into consideration in the particular case; the legislature cannot tailor its
rules finely enough to do so'). See also H. James Stedronsky, Note, Unconscionability
and Standardized Contracts, 5 N.Y.U. lsv. L & SOC. CHANGE 65, 79 n.87 (1975)
(criticizing the result when government replaces flexible market checks and balances
with rigid rules).
119. Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconsconability: A New
Framework for UCC Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L REV. 1, 29 (1981).
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alternative to adjudication of interest rate fairness is usury.
Moreover, outlawing add-on clauses allows the loan transaction
to proceed, though perhaps at a higher price, but usury stat-
utes deny loans to risky borrowers as a class."2 This result
compels solutions other than usury to remedy the problem of
unfair interest pricing. 1
21
The unconscionability standard has also been criticized as
applied specifically to interest pricing. Lenders decry its uncer-
tainty and lack of standards. Unconscionability's case-by-case
factual analysis forces them to "act at their peril or at least
without sufficient objective standards for them to know in ad-
vance of litigation whether their loans are valid.""2 Judges
have applied the unconscionability standard to interest rates in
a manner claimed to be too subjective and logically inconsis-
tent."2 This recalls early criticism of the UCC and the price
cases thereunder; courts were accused of applying the uncon-
scionability standard irrationally, and, worse, section 2-302 was
believed to encourage them to behave that way."U
There is some truth to the accusation that the unconsciona-
bility standard is uncertain. Despite its uncertainty, however,
unconscionability is less offensive to freedom of contract than
the alternative of more certain usury limits, and less offensive
to those who value fairness over certainty than the free market
alternative. This Article articulates the unconscionability stan-
dard to the extent possible to lessen lender uncertainty while
promoting borrower enforcement."2  Moreover, any risk of
120. Refer to text accompanying notes 36-43 supra.
121. Legislation can nonetheless play a role in achieving consumer-and commer-
cial-justice in interest pricing. This Article proposes codifying the unconscionabiity
standard, at least for consumer credit, in order to ease the burden on consumers of
adjudicating rate unfairness on a case-by-case basis. Refer to Part II(G) infra for a
proposed statute for consumer credit.
122. Jack C. Merriman & James J. Hanks, Jr., Revising State Usury Statutes in
Light of a Tight Money Market, 27 MD. L. REv. 1, 17 (1967) (advocating variable
rate ceilings for consumer and small business loans and freedom of contract for busi-
ness loans of $10,000 or more).
123. See Edward A. Giedgowd, The Expansion of California's Unconscionability
Doctrine to Interest Charged on Loans, 47 CONSUMER FIN. LQ. REP. 98, 104 (1993)
(criticizing the court's ruling in Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845 (Ct. App.
1991) that an interest rate of 200% per annum was unconscionable, for inconsistent
reasoning and a result-oriented approach).
124. See Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 550 (1967) (criticizing the ruling in American Home
Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886 (N.H. 1964) for a lack of analysis of the
economic factors involved in a transaction held to be unconscionable); see also WAL-
TER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 211 (1991) (describing the unconscionabii-
ty standard as one "of almost dreamlike floating indeterminacy").
125. Cf. John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconcionability Problems, 117 U. PA.
L. REv. 931, 936 (1969) (stating that the stabilizing effect on contracts of the
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borrower strike suits exploiting uncertainty can be reduced by
granting courts explicit authority to levy attorneys' fees for
such tactics."n
Consumer advocates level their own criticisms against the
unconscionability standard. They argue that the high transac-
tion costs of case-by-case judicial intervention"2 burden those
"incapacitated borrowers who are least able to absorb such
costs. " " Arguably, these critics should prefer expensive pro-
tection to the free market model. Moreover, the unconscionabili-
ty standard can be augmented with the measures proposed in
this Article to make claims less expensive and daunting to pur-
sue, particularly for consumer borrowers."2
The author predicts that debate in the next few decades
will follow that under the UCC and shift from the propriety of
employing unconscionability, here in place of usury, to the ap-
propriate standard for its application."3 The remainder of this
Article seeks to anticipate the latter debate by examining possi-
ble standards for applying unconscionability to interest pricing
and proposing a model statute to guide courts' use of the doc-
trine.
unconscionability doctrine is dependent on the courts' ability to devise 'solid defini-
tions of the basic concepts" of the doctrine).
126. See Ounce, supra note 39, at 110 (arguing that discretion to assess
attorneys' fees and costs has prevented vexatious lawsuits by borrowers in England,
and proposing adoption of this technique by American courts). The model statute
proposed for consumer transactions adopts this approach. Refer to Part II(G) infra.
127. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 34, at 173-74 (noting that defining unconsciona-
bility standards requires the intervention of the courts resulting in high transaction
costs).
128. Id. at 173. Another commentator predicts that applying the unconscionabili-
ty standard to interest pricing would add significantly to the caseload of "already
burdened judicial and administrative systems." Riley, aupra note 20, at 222.
129. One commentator argues against employing unconscionability because con-
sumers frequently are unaware that the interest charged them is unreasonable. See
Maxine M. Long, Trends in Usury Legislation-Current Interest Overdue, 34 U. MI-
AMI L REv. 325, 338 (1980) (arguing that consumers continue to sign agreements
without reading or understanding them despite disclosure of interest and finance
charges required by law). However, borrowers could similarly be unaware they had
been charged usurious rates. Perhaps this commentator believes lenders might be
more tempted to charge excessive rates when the legal standard is less explicit. This
temptation can be reduced, however, by expressing the standard of unconscionability
as clearly as possible and backing that standard with remedial teeth. Refer to Part
H1(G) infra for a summary of the standards proposed for consumer loans.
130. See DEUTCH, supra note 73, at 78 (observing such a shift in the criticism of
§ 2-302).
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II. DRESSED FOR SUCCESS: DEVELOPING STANDARDS TO
REGUIATE INTEREST PRICING THROUGH UNCONSCIONABILITY
Certain recurring issues have plagued the application of
the unconscionability standard in areas other than interest
pricing, particularly under section 2-302 of the UCC. These
issues can be framed for interest pricing as follows:
(1) Must procedural unfairness' be shown in proving in-
terest pricing unconscionable?
(2) If so, what elements constitute procedural unfairness?
(3) When is interest substantively unfair?
(4) What remedies should courts grant to redress rates held
unconscionable? Should the lender forfeit all principal and in-
terest, interest only, or only the interest that exceeds a fair
rate?
(5) Should the answer to any of these questions turn on
whether the loan is for a consumer or a commercial purpose?
To anticipate and resolve these questions for interest pric-
ing, this Article examines general unconscionability scholarship,
the classic price unconscionability cases under section 2-302,
more recent statutory codifications of unconscionability, and
American and comparative statutes and courts applying uncon-
scionability to interest rates. American and comparative usury
statutes and federal loan disclosure regulation are also explored
as analogous sources to resolve these issues for interest pricing.
A. Developing Standards: Unconscionability Scholarship and
the Classic Price Unconscionability Cases
Price unconscionability cases decided under section 2-302
are particularly relevant to standards for policing interest pric-
ing." If the standards of unconscionability for regulating cash
and credit prices for goods differ too much, sellers on credit
might shift their returns from the cash price to the cost of
credit, or vice versa, depending on the differing standards ap-
plied. This shifting has occurred in the past when usury limited
interest rates but no comparable controls limited price."
131. "Procedural unfairness" is defined by at least one commentator as "bargain-
ing naughtiness." Leff, supra note 124, at 487.
132. Several cases applying the unconscionability standard to interest pricing
regard the classic UCC price unconscionability cases as persuasive authority. See,
e.g., Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 847-48 (Ct. App. 1991) (stating that
cases analyzing UCC § 2-302 can be used to help interpret the state's unconsciona-
bility statute and indicating that those cases which found unconscionability on the
basis of gross price disparity may be used as analogous authority for finding uncon-
scionability based on a 'shockingly high" interest rate).
133. See, e.g., Allen & Staaf, supra note 98, at 231-35 (noting the irony that
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1. The Procedural v. Substantive Debate Under Section 2-
302. UCC scholars have debated vigorously whether an exces-
sive price alone, without proof of specific bargaining miscon-
duct, is unconscionable." The late Professor Leff first ob-
served and coined the distinction between "bargaining naughti-
ness" in the contract formation process and "evils in the result-
ing contract" as "procedural" and "substantive" unconscionabili-
ty.13 Most courts applying section 2-302 purport to require
some combination of procedural and substantive unfairness to
support a finding of unconscionability, but the issue is unset-
tled." Several courts acknowledge a "sliding scale" whereby
unusually harsh terms permit a lesser quantum of contract
formation unfairness to support unconscionability.37 Some de-
cisions, particularly those involving excessive prices, appear to
hold that substantive terms can be so unfair as to be uncon-
scionable without proof of any procedural unfairness."
retail installment sales acts that regulate the price of merchant credit may encour-
age merchants to inflate the cash price to permit sales to persons too
uncreditworthy to obtain credit under the legal limit); Richard S. Brooks, Note, Is
The High Mark-up in Low Income Areas Unconscionable?, 16 How. LJ. 406, 409
n.15 (1971) (stating that bloated cash prices are employed to circumvent usury laws).
Several of the price unconscionability cases under § 2-302 involved challenges to the
price of goods sold on credit despite facial compliance with the applicable usury
standard. See, e.g., Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640 (N.J. 1971) (stating that an
excessive credit price was unconscionable in light of the respondent's deceptive trade
practices, even if the excessive price was not per se unconscionable).
134. Compare Epstein, supra note 113, at 315 (stating that unconscionability in
its "substantive dimension" only undercuts the private right of contract so that more
social harm than good is done) with JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-7, at 200 (3d ed. 1988) (favoring the interpretation that
excessive price alone is a sufficient basis for finding unconscionability). Other com-
mentators appear to stake a middle ground by advocating dispensing with procedural
unfairness if substantive unfairness is extreme. See, e.g., DEUTCH, supra note 73, at
282 (stating that in extraordinary cases when a term is excessively unreasonable
and unfair it is unconscionable regardless of whether procedural fairness is present).
135. See Leff, supra note 124, at 487; see also Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination
of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L REV. 1053 (1977) (labelling these clas-
sifications as 'nonsubstantive" and 'substantive").
136. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 134, § 4-7, at 199; Hillman, supra note 119,
at 2-3.
137. See Spanogle, supra note 125, at 950.
138. Refer to note 150 infra and accompanying text. Historical resolution of this
issue provides little guidance. In 1804, Lord Eldon articulated what became an of-
ten-cited standard in equity that inadequacy of price alone does not justify relief un-
less it shocks the court's conscience. Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. Jun. 234, 246, 32
Eng. Rep. 592, 597 (1804). See generally KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE AN-
GLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 315-16 (1990) (stating that mid-nine-
teenth century cases often invoked Eldon's dictum, although oppression or other
'sharp practices" were usually also present); Cellini & Wertz, supra note 72, at 198
(stating that unless it was so excessive as to shock the conscience, inadequacy of
consideration required another element of unfairness for relief); John P. Dawson,
HeinOnline  -- 31 Hous. L. Rev. 747 1994-1995
748 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:721
Section 2-302's drafting history does not resolve the de-
bate."3 Section 2-302's plain language does not deny the
court's power to dispense with procedural proof "should it be
moved to exercise it by the extremity of the situation before
it,""4 but it also does not preclude a court from insisting on
such proof. Commentators have taken well-defined sides on the
question. Freedom of contract proponents support requiring
procedural proof. They argue that courts otherwise function as
"price regulators," with the result that freedom of contract prin-
ciples are "severely circumscribed."' Because bargains pro-
cured through procedural "naughtiness" were never assented to,
courts can properly intervene.
4 2
Such proponents also justify proof of procedural unfairness
as efficient. One argues that competitive markets work best
Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L REV. 253, 281 n.73 (1947)
(stating that appellate decisions seem to make extreme inadequacy the primary basis
for relief even with additional factors present). In practice, most equity cases have
held an excessive price unconscionable only with proof of other inequitable factors.
See Spanogle, supra note 125, at 951 (stating that older case doctrine recognized
price disparity as a potential area for abuse but relief was not usually granted un-
less the price disparity was accompanied by additional inequitable factors). Some
commentators and equity courts analyze gross price disparity as presumptive of
fraud, and presumably would uphold such a bargain if the party seeking to enforce
the contract proved both parties bargained deliberately over price. 3 SPENCER W.
SYMONS, POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 927, at 634-37 (5th ed. 1941). Reading
these equity authorities together, a grossly excessive price could apparently be struck
down without proof of unfairness in the contract's formation, but it is unclear if
proof of fair bargaining would change that result. See James Gordley, Equality in
Exchange, 69 CAL. L REv. 1587, 1654 (1981) (observing by reviewing American equi-
ty cases that courts have granted relief for extremely one-sided exchanges more of-
ten than commentator and court remarks would indicate). See generally Hillman,
supra note 119, at 36-37 (analogizing issues in equitable unconscionability to current
issues surrounding § 2-302). Commentators in any event dispute equity's influence
on the meaning of § 2-302. Compare Leff, supra note 124, at 533 (stating that equi-
ty unconscionability cases are irrelevant as a guide to the meaning of § 2-302) with
Hillman, supra note 119, at 37-41 (arguing that Professor Leff erred in calling equi-
ty cases 'irrelevant," especially noting that § 2-302 requires a "balancing" very simi-
lar to the equitable balancing used by chancellors).
139. See M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 774
(1969) (stating that the current version of § 2-302 is less 'unequivocal" than the
1948 draft, which had more definitely indicated that unconscionability could be found
independent of a fair bargaining process).
140. Id. at 775.
141. Harvey L Zuckman, Walker-Thomas Strikes Back: Comment on the Plead-
ing and Proof of Price Unconscionability, 30 FED. B.J. 308, 311 (1971).
142. See DEtrrCH, supra note 73, at 122 (stating that a showing of procedural
unconscionability demonstrates that the contract terms were never assented to).
Freedom of contract proponent Richard Epstein argued that the unconscionability
doctrine should only be used to 'facilitate the setting aside of agreements that are
as a matter of probabilities likely to be vitiated by the classical defenses of duress,
fraud, or incompetence." Epstein, supra note 113, at 295-96 (footnote omitted).
143. See BARNES & STOUT, supra note 117, at 65-66 (opining that consumers
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when buyers are encouraged to seek out the most efficient
seller.'" Manipulating rules of proof to encourage efficiency,
however, likely will have little practical impact on most
consumers' failure to comparison shop, whether caused by lazi-
ness, ignorance, embarrassment, haste, or their general expecta-
tion of fair pricing in the marketplace. 45 Moreover, it seems
more efficient to encourage merchants to price fairly than to
require that consumers protect themselves. A consumer who
knows that the law tolerates excessive pricing might be com-
pelled to search the marketplace for every purchase, or risk
exploitation by the first seller. 4
The strongest argument in support of substantive unfair-
ness alone is that procedural defects almost always accompany
grossly inequitable terms. 14  Consumers could readily prove
some procedural unfairness in almost every case of substantive-
ly unfair terms, 1"s and it would seem an efficient use of judi-
cial resources to dispense with that proof. Cogent support co-
mes from those "classic" consumer price unconscionability cas-
es' which held or have been read to support that unconscio-
nability can be based on excessive price alone."I These cases
should function as rational maximizers and that therefore courts should not create a
better deal than the parties made).
144. Edward A. McQuoid, Note, UCC Section 2-302 and the Pricing of Goods:
Are the Courts More Than the Market Will Bear?, 33 U. PITT. L REv. 589, 597
(1972).
145. See Roundtable Discussion of Unconscionability, 31 U. PITr. L. REV. 547,
556-57 (1970) (Professor R. Stanton Wettick, Jr. remarking that most consumers'
failure to comparison shop is caused by the typical consumer's experience in select-
ing a product, knowing that stores offer only one price that the consumer must take
or leave).
146. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and its Limits, 95 HARV. L
REV. 741, 781 (1982) (stating that consumers will not search for a slightly lower
price, but when the price could be significantly lower, as under legal tolerance of ex-
cessive pricing, consumers will feel the need to search several marketplaces).
147. See, e.g., Spanogle, supra note 125, at 967 (stating that it is rare to find
gross price disparity without other inequitable factors); David G. Dennis, Note, Kelly
v. Widner. Unconscionability Through the Looking Glass, 53 MONT. L REV. 99, 106
(1992) (stating that procedural defects almost always accompany other inequitable
factors); see also 1 THOMAS D. CRANDALL Er AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 4.8.4, at 4:82 (1993) (stating that the presence of an excessive price is strong evi-
dence of the seller's misconduct in the negotiations).
148. Cf. Hillman, supra note 119, at 22 (arguing that unconscionability based on
substantive unfairness alone makes it unnecessary for courts to manipulate the facts
to find procedural unfairness).
149. Support also comes from equity's approach of treating certain groups as
unable to protect themselves and deserving of special protection, without much inqui-
ry into the actual bargaining of each particular case. See Leff, supra note 124, at
556-57 (discussing how class stereotypes influenced chancellors in equitable uncon-
scionability cases).
150. See American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886 (N.H.
1964) (finding unconscionability when a financing application left blank at the time
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each involved circumstances from which a court could find suf-
ficient procedural defects if such a finding was deemed neces-
sary.151 Dispensing with procedural proof will also increase
of making the contract resulted in the homeowner being charged $2,568.60 for goods
valued at $959); Toker v. Per, 247 A.2d 701 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968)
(finding a credit price of $1,092.96 unconscionable when the freezer's "maximum"
value was $300), affd on other grounds, 260 A.2d 244 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1970); Toker v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Union County Dist. Ct. 1970) (holding
unconscionable a credit price that was 2 times the freezer's reasonable retail val-
ue); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (finding a selling
price of $900, with a credit price of $1,439.69, for a freezer valued at $300 uncon-
scionable as a matter of law); Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391
(Civ. Ct. N.Y.C. 1967) (allowing defendant purchasers of an automobile the opportu-
nity to present evidence that the purchase price of $939.75 plus a service charge of
$242.47 was so excessive as to be unconscionable as a matter of law); State v. ITM,
Inc., 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (holding unconscionable cash prices about 2
times the retail market price and credit prices about 3 times the retail market
price); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966) (finding a
cash price of $900 with a credit charge of $245.88 unconscionable for an appliance
the seller admitted cost it $348), rev'd on other grounds, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App.
Term. 1967). Corbin hailed Maclver as a "famously just decision ... demonstrating
that price alone can be sufficient unconscionability to invalidate a contract." CORBIN,
supra note 79, § 128, at 30 (Supp. 1993). See generally Eisenberg, supra note 146,
at 753 n.41 (stating that the facts in many of the cases cited above may suggest
some form of high-pressure selling, but few cases develop the issue and none based
their holding on it). Two leading price cases from the D.C. Court of Appeals insist
that absence of meaningful choice be shown to sustain a finding of unconscionability.
See Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co., 280 A.2d 775 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971)
(noting the requirement of absence of meaningful choice and holding that there was
ample support for the trial court's holding that no unconscionabiity existed where a
buyer failed to comparison shop and paid $832, including a $219.30 credit charge,
for goods costing only $234.35); Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 277 A.2d
111 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971) (requiring a showing of the absence of meaningful choice
as well as unreasonable contract terms when the appellant claimed excessive pricing
after defaulting on her payments). Refer to note 161 infra for a discussion of the
absence of meaningful choice. See also In re Colin, 136 B.R. 856, 858-59 (Bankr. D.
Or. 1991) (stating that the rent-to-own price itself may not make a contract uncon-
scionable because that would undermine the 'economic principles upon which the
economy of this country operates"); Lundstrom v. Radio Corp. of America, 405 P.2d
339, 342 (Utah 1965) (stating that because parties can bargain over price, an exces-
sive price alone is not unconscionable in the absence of fraud, deception, or misrep-
resentation).
151. See Jeffrey C. Fort, Understanding Unconcionability: Defining the Principle,
9 Loy. U. Cm. LJ. 765, 780 (1978) (stating that decisions which found excessive
price alone unconscionable involved parties of clearly disparate bargaining ability).
For example, Maclver involved price unfairness 'accompanied by circumstances which
rendered it questionable whether defendant [consumer] had assented to the contract."
See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Note, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L.
REV. 1151, 1160 (1976) (referring to Maclver, in which the seller violated a New
Hampshire statute requiring disclosure of the finance charge and charged $2568.60
for goods valued at $959); see also Perl, 247 A.2d 701 (finding that the seller mis-
represented the price of a freezer by stating the freezer was "included" in a food
plan then seeking to charge a price 2 times its value); Frostifresh, 274 N.Y.S.2d
757 (finding that the seller exploited its customer's inability to read English by mis-
representing the freezer's true price). Similarly, the seller in ITM misrepresented
that the consumers would earn enough in referrals to purchase the merchandise
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certainty by eliminating the case-by-case determination of suffi-
cient procedural unfairness." Moreover, it avoids embarrass-
ing proof of consumer incompetence, necessity, and the like.
2. Procedural Unfairness Under Section 2-302. Courts and
legislatures may insist on proof of procedural unfairness. More-
over, some courts employ a "sliding scale" analysis whereby
more procedural unfairness permits a finding of unconscionabil-
ity on less substantive unfairness.'" Either way, it is neces-
sary to examine what suffices as procedural unfairness. Neither
section 2-302 nor its official comments explain the nature of
procedural unfairness. Section 2-302 defines unconscionability
in terms of itself."6 ' Its official comments1" explain the con-
cept in the uncertain terms of "oppression"1  and "unfair
surprise.""6 7 Courts have done little to define the standard
without using their own money and that the products were not available elsewhere
at the prices sold. ITM, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 314, 321. Finally, Jones v. Star Credit
Corp. involved a door-to-door sale (invariably suspect) to a welfare recipient.
152. One commentator argued that requiring procedural unfairness actually aids
certainty because of the difficulty in formulating a standard for when price is sub-
stantively unfair. See DEUTCH, supra note 73, at 145. He argued that requiring some
showing of procedural unfairness takes pressure off the need for exactitude in the
standard for substantive excess, which he alleged to be unachievable. Id. This author
believes that there is just as much, if not more, uncertainty inherent in the stan-
dard for procedural unfairness, and this Article attempts to provide a more exacting
standard for substantive unfairness than has emerged in the § 2.302 cases. Refer to
Part II(C)(3) infra.
153. Refer to the text accompanying note 137 supra.
154. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990).
155. Id. at cmt. 1.
156. It is unclear whether "oppression7 refers to unfairness in contract formation,
or to the unfair effect of the contract itself, but either way it offers little practical
guidance to courts. See Leff, supra note 124, at 499 (discussing how 'oppression7
was theoretically chosen to clarify § 2-302, but is actually a word chosen for this
ambiguity). Commentators have speculated that oppression as applied to procedural
unfairness implies 'some form of compulsion resulting from a lack of opportunity to
codetermine terms." See Spanogle, supra note 125, at 943.
157. See DEUTcH, supra note 73, at 187 n.83 (stating that there are no "fair
surprises"); Spanogle, aupra note 125, at 942 (arguing that 'unfair surprise" and
'oppression' are terms as ambiguous as 'unconscionable"). If unfair surprise de-
scribes an offensive contract term hidden in boilerplate, it may not encompass price
terms that are 'often expressly agreed upon so that surprise cannot be claimed." See
id. at 951 (stating that such express agreement makes excessive pricing a unique
"harsh term"); McQuoid, supra note 144, at 598 (stating that price is almost always
explicitly considered by the buyer as it is frequently the most important term). The
same explicit consideration might be given to interest rates, though some consumers
may pay more attention to the monthly payment amount. See generally 1 JOHN I.
FONSECA, HANDLING CONSUMER CREDIT CASES § 7:3, at 264 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing
how consumer preferences for the amount of the monthly payment vary with eco-
nomic status). Federal, and often state, requirements that consumer loan rates be
disclosed conspicuously may make surprise unlikely in theory, though disclosure leg-
islation may not have this effect in practice. Refer to note 408 infra and
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more precisely. Some courts apparently fear that a definition
would unduly constrain the concept as a check on fairness."
Nonetheless, at least four factors appear relevant in proving
procedural unfairness under section 2-302, whether they are
said to result in oppression, unfair surprise, or some other
shorthand expression of unfairness, such as lack of sophistica-
tion,1" financial necessity, fraud (or other sharp practices),"e
or lack of choice.'' Courts have not clearly articulated the
accompanying text.
On the other hand, unfair "surprise" might exist for such obvious terms as
price if the complaining party assumed the price was reasonable. That party is 'sur-
prised" upon discovering sometime later that the price agreed to is substantively
excessive. Cf Richard J. Hunter, Jr., Unconscionability Revisited: A Comparative
Approach, 68 N.D. L REV. 145, 153 (1992) (defining price unconscionability as a
failure by the seller to apprise the buyer of contract terms that depart from 'com-
mon expectations"); Stedronsky, supra note 118, at 83 (arguing that cases finding
unconscionability on "significant cost-price disparity" appear to be examples of both
substantive and procedural unconscionability as the buyers were unaware of the
excessive price). Such unfair surprise could result from the seller's nondisclosure. See
American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886 (N.H. 1964) (finding
unconscionability when the financing application failed to inform the homeowner of
the interest rate and charges resulting in what the court held to be an excessive
price); cf Besta v. Beneficial Loan Co., 855 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding it pro-
cedurally unfair for the lender not to disclose to the borrower that a different loan
program it offered would be more advantageous). Unfair surprise could result from
the seller's affirmative fraud as to the buyer's true cost. Cf Frostifresh Corp. v.
Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966) (finding that the buyer was misled that
the purchase would not cost the buyer money), rev'd on other grounds, 281 N.Y.S.2d
964 (App. Term. 1967). It could also result from the buyer's lack of sophistication, or
her inability to comprehend the transaction, or both. I& (noting that the seller re-
quired a freezer buyer who spoke only Spanish to sign a contract written in Eng-
lish). See generally John E. Murray, Jr., Unonacionability: Unconscionability, 31 U.
PITT. L. REv. 1, 59-66 (1969) (discussing and analyzing how landmark unconsciona-
bility cases have or could have applied § 2-302).
158. See, e.g., Nu Dimensions Figure Salons v. Becerra, 340 N.Y.S.2d 268, 272
(Civ. Ct. 1973) (noting that the term "unconscionable" contains both procedural and
substantive elements yet declining to further define the term).
159. Lack of sophistication was described in one case as "mental or physical dis-
ability or a wide disparity of knowledge or experience." In re Estate of Vought, 334
N.Y.S.2d 720, 729 (Sup. Ct. 1972), affd, 360 N.Y.S.2d 199 (App. Div. 1974); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981) (listing factors contribut-
ing to unconscionability and including knowledge that the weaker party is unable to
protect her interests because of an infirmity such as ignorance, illiteracy, or inability
to understand the agreement).
160. See DEUTCH, supra note 73, at 136 (discussing how courts have found un-
conscionability in "sharp practices" such as deception and chicanery).
161. Lack of choice should be distinguished from insistence in several cases on
so-called "absence of meaningful choice." See e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furni-
ture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (stating that 'meaningful choice" is a ques-
tion of facts and circumstances that may be negated by a "gross inequality of bar-
gaining power" or by facts surrounding the contract's making). Lack of choice means
the party could not have gotten a different (better) contract term elsewhere, result-
ing in a take-it-or-leave-it, or 'adhesion," contract. See generally DETCH, supra note
73, at 147 (discussing the similarity between "lack of choice" and "absence of
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requisite proof of these factors or specified a recipe for their
successful combination. Though several commentators have pro-
posed carefully drawn formulas for courts to follow under sec-
tion 2-302, their notable efforts have had little impact on the
courts."2 This Article therefore examines other relevant sourc-
es of aid in articulating a standard of procedural unfairness for
interest pricing.1"
meaningful choice" and analyzing the tests and factors used to distinguish them).
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) presents the classic
example of a car buyer who would have confronted the same warranty exclusion
term from other car manufacturers, so the only choice was to accept the term or
forgo the purchase. Absence of meaningful choice is not merely the lack of choice, it
is the lack of "meaningful" choice. One commentator correctly criticized the court's
conclusion in Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co., 280 A.2d 775 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1971) that the buyer of allegedly overpriced furniture who was free to compar-
ison shop had no 'absence of meaningful choice," observing.
Mhe [Morris] court was imprecise in stating that because the customer had
been free to indulge in comparative shopping, he could not later claim "ab-
sence of meaningful choice." The elements of absence of meaningful
choice ... are not necessarily related to the possibility of purchasing else-
where but rather the question of whether such a choice is meaningful. In
some cases, even if the possibility existed to purchase somewhere else, it
was, nevertheless, not meaningful.
DEtrrCH, supra note 73, at 146-47 (footnotes omitted). Courts employing this formula-
tion should not overlook its initial articulation in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furni-
ture Co.:
Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particular case can only be
determined by consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the trans-
action... Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education
or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the
contract, or were important terms ... minimized by deceptive sales practic-
es?
350 F.2d at 449. Whether stated as oppression, unfair surprise or absence of mean-
ingful choice, courts such as Williams insisting on procedural unfairness tend to re-
quire proof of one or some combination of the factors identified of lack of sophistica-
tion, financial necessity, seller sharp practice, and lack of choice. See WHITE & SUM-
MERS, supra note 134, § 4-3, at 187 (stating that courts which find a lack of "mean-
ingful choice" usually base their holding on both consumer ignorance and 'seller's
guile').
162. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 74, at 406; Davis, supra note 55, at
1336 n.8 (stating that courts have not adopted the analytical framework proposed by
classic unconscionability scholarship, but that those works have contributed by iden-
tifying relevant factors in an unconscionabiity case and by showing the "difficulty of
analyzing them in a systematic way'). The primary contribution that has entered the
mainstream of unconscionability case law is the courts' adoption of Professor Leff's
terminology and argument for the relevance of both substantive and procedural un-
fairness.
163. Refer to Parts 11(B) (codifications of unconscionability more recent than the
UCC), II(C) (American interest pricing cases), II(D) (comparative rate regulation),
and II(E) (American usury regulation) infra.
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3. Substantive Unfairness Under Section 2-302. Regardless
of whether courts require procedural unfairness, the challenged
term must be proven substantively unfair. Section 2-302 does
not specify a measure of substantive unfairness. The classic
price unconscionability cases also have not produced a clear
standard of substantive unfairness.'6 They do, however, sug-
gest several possible measures:
(1) Price Over Cost-the sales price of the good compared
to merchant cost;
(2) Net Profit-the sales price compared to the merchant's
total costs of operation, including the cost of the good sold;
(3) Retail Price Comparison-the sales price compared to
that of other retailers selling the same good; or
(4) Similarly Situated Retailer Comparison-the sales price
compared to just those "similarly situated" merchants."
The price over cost measure, employed in at least one
case,'m measures substantive unfairness too crudely because it
disregards the merchant's operational costs.'67 The retail price
measure is more accurate."S Commentators advocate that the
retail price comparison be made only to "similarly situated sell-
ers"'(  to avoid penalizing inefficient lower income area
164. See Spanogle, supra note 125, at 953 (stating that the decisions do not ex-
press their reasoning in enough detail). But see Ellinghaus, supra note 139, at 790
("nat the precise degree of disparity required for a finding of unconscionabiity has
not been defined is a matter for rejoicing rather than for sorrow.*).
165. This standard has been urged to address the higher costs of operation of
"ghetto merchants" compared to other sellers. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note
134, § 4-5, at 192 (arguing that any standard which fails to account for costs will
run merchants out of low income areas).
166. See Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966) (finding
unconscionability when a freezer costing the merchant $348 was sold for a cash
price of $900 and a credit price of $1,145), rev'd on other grounds, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964
(App. Term. 1967).
167. See DEUTCH, supra note 73, at 149 (stating that considering only the vari-
ance between the retail and wholesale prices ignores the seller's costs and risks and
is therefore an inaccurate means of determining unconscionabiity).
168. As with the price over cost measure, this would be relatively uncomplicated
to apply, though it may be difficult to determine the sample of merchants to be
used. For example, would the purchaser of a name brand appliance need to offer
proof of every price throughout the country? If some narrower sample was employed,
however, counsel might seek to manipulate the sample of merchants chosen. Adopt-
ing the standard of similarly situated merchants still presents the problem of how to
define and limit the "similarly situated" seller.
169. See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 134, § 4-5, at 192 (arguing that
fairness requires comparing only sellers with similar costs and risks to avoid driving
merchants from low income areas); see also Richard E. Speidel, Unconscionability,
Assent, and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 359, 373 (1970) (noting that
costs, efficiency, and risks are variable among sellers and advocating a net profit
comparison for determining substantive unconscionability). It is unclear whether
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merchants who may receive the same actual profit as mer-
chants generally despite higher prices. 17 Even as modified,
however, the retail price standard i4 flawed. It is difficult to
determine the scope of "similarly situated sellers." 7' More-
over, the retail price standard would validate a price in line
with those of similarly situated sellers without regard to the
possibility of price distortion caused by a monopoly or price fix-
ing.
172
The net profit measure is the most accurate gauge of un-
fairness of price and related terms such as interest. This stan-
dard avoids defining the scope of comparative sellers. Rather, it
scrutinizes the costs of the particular seller, such as cost of the
good, overhead, commissions and the like.173 This standard is
admittedly more complicated than the market price comparison
because the merchant's costs must be allocated to the particular
sale. Merchants might also try to manipulate this standard.17
Nevertheless, this author advocates the net profit measure as
the most accurate way to discern price unfairness. 7 '
those price unconscionability cases using a retail price standard determined retail
price by reference to other retailers in general or some more limited class of simi-
larly situated sellers. See, e.g., Murphy v. McNamara, 416 A.2d 170, 175 (Conn. Su-
per. Ct. 1979) (making a comparison to the 'retail sales price" of a television); Jones
v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 265 (Sup. Ct 1969) (making a comparison to
the 'maximum retail value" of a freezer); State v. ITM, Inc., 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 320
(Sup. Ct 1966) (making a comparison to the 'retail market price" of various consum-
er goods).
170. A 1968 FTC study concluded that ghetto merchants charged higher prices
for consumer durable goods than other sellers, but their profits did not differ signif-
icantly because of higher salaries, commission expenses, and credit costs, among
other reasons. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N REPORT ON DISTcr OF COLUMBIA CONSUM-
ER PROTECTION PROGRAM 14-15 (1968) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
171. For example, is the similarly situated seller chosen by reference to location
alone, or to size? A Sears department store in a low income neighborhood could like-
ly operate more efficiently than a neighboring 'mom and pop" operation. A small-
scale merchant would likely argue that only those stores charging similar prices are
similarly situated. This standard, if employed, would defeat the purchaser's claim.
172. See Perdue v. Crocker Natl Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 512 (Cal. 1985) (stating
that while it is unlikely that a price set by a competitive market is unconscionable,
oligopoly prices 'should not be immune from scrutiny*); see also California Grocers
Ass'n, Inc. v. Bank of America, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396, 403 (Ct. App. 1994) (treating
as relevant the NSF fees of other financial institutions and noting that the record
did not establish that the California banking industry was oligopolistic).
173. The credit risk posed by the buyer would also be relevant when goods are
purchased on credit.
174. For example, a self-employed merchant could pay herself an excessive sala-
ry and assert that as part of each product's cost. See WHITE & SUMMERS, aupra note
134, § 4-5, at 193 (showing how merchants may lower their apparent profits through
various distortions).
175. A tolerable consequence of focusing more precisely on the actual profit of
the challenged seller is that an inefficient seller with costs higher than those of
similarly situated sellers would presumably go unpenalized. Conversely, the net prof-
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The amount of disparity the courts will tolerate must be
determined for any standard employed to gauge substantive
fairness. Courts and commentators have struggled in drawing
the line. 17 Although the price unconscionability cases appear
to disdain a fixed mathematical solution,177 successful claims
of price unconscionability typically involve a disparity ratio in
excess of two to one.78
A few commentators have urged use of the two to one ratio
to allocate the burden of proving price unfairness. Notably,
Professor Speidel proposed that proof by the consumer of a two
to one retail price comparison ratio would shift to the merchant
the burden of proving that its actual net profits were reason-
able.19 This approach rightly places the burden of disclosing
its standard arguably penalizes merchants who operate more efficiently (cheaply)
than competitors. Cf. Note, Inadequacy of Consideration as a Factor in Determining
Unconscionability Under Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 1248, 1255 (1969) (arguing that it is unfair to penalize sellers for high profits
attributable to efficient operations or desirable business locations). However, sellers
should desire to seek more efficient means of operation to gain a greater market
share even if they must share their efficiency profits with consumers.
176. See Reuben Hasson, Unconscionability in Contract Law and in the New
Sales Act-Confessions of a Doubting Thomas, 4 CANADIAN Bus. LJ. 383, 394 (1979-
80):
Let us suppose that in a given case a dealer admits that he makes net
profits of 60% and the evidence shows that other similarly situated dealers
make profits of between 15% and 70% and that the average profit is 25%.
Does the court give relief... on the ground that 60% is considerably in
excess of the 15% profit that many dealers make and considerably in excess
of the average profit? Your guess is as good as mine.
177. See, e.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 267 (Sup. Ct. 1969)
(stating that courts are reluctant to reduce § 2-302 to a mathematical formula).
178. See, e.g., Murphy v. McNamara, 416 A.2d 170 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979) (find-
ing unconscionability when the credit price of a television was over 2 times the
"regular retail sales price"); Toker v. Perl, 247 A.2d 701 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1968) (finding unconscionability when a freezer's credit price was over 3 times the
"maximum value" and the cash price was over 2 times that value), affd on other
grounds, 260 A.2d 244 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Toker v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Un-
ion County Dist. Ct. 1970) (finding unconscionability when the credit price of a re-
frigerator was over 3 times the "reasonable retail value," and the cash price was
approximately 2 times that value); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264
(Sup. Ct. 1969) (finding unconscionability when a freezer credit price was over 4
times the "maximum retail value," and the cash price was 3 times that value); State
v. ITM, Inc., 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 320 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (finding unconscionability when
the time price for various appliances ranged from 2 to 6 times the seller's cost);
Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966) (finding unconsciona-
bility when the cash price of freezer was over 2 times the merchant's cost) rev'd
on other grounds, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Term 1967). But see Scheirman v. Coulter,
624 P.2d 70 (Okla. 1980) (holding it not unconscionable for a consumer to purchase
cookware on credit for $457 when the items were advertised later in a department
store sale for $100).
179. See Speidel, supra note 169, at 372-73; see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 134, § 4-5, at 193-94 (suggesting that a prima facie showing of unconscionabili-
ty be established by a markup of two to three times cost or a price two to three
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costs and justifying the price charged on sellers who possess
that information. However, this solution is incomplete. It is
unclear what happens to consumers who cannot establish the
threshold ratio. Presumably, the seller need not reveal its net
profit and the sale is validated even if the market price itself is
unfair." If the ratio is established, Professor Speidel pro-
posed that the merchant's net profit be compared to that of
similarly situated sellers, presumably for their retail transac-
tions in general. 8' If there is "gross disparity" here, the
merchant's price is unconscionable.8 2 This leaves the question
of what constitutes "gross" disparity for this purpose. A two to
one ratio?"s3
Despite decades of effort by courts and commentators, a
definitive standard for determining substantive price unfairness
has not been articulated. The approach advocated by this au-
thor would examine the net profit made by the seller (or lend-
er) on the transaction challenged, but would not include a
mathematical formula conclusive of either fairness or unfair-
ness.
4. Remedies for Unconscionable Pricing Under Section 2-
302. Section 2-302 provides that the court may remedy an un-
conscionable contract or clause by "refus[ing] to enforce the con-
tract," by enforcing "the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause," or by "so limit[ing] the application of
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable re-
sult.""s The statute thus authorizes relieving the victim of
price unfairness of all or some remaining payment obligation,
but it does not appear to contemplate recovery of affirmative
damages. Several courts have construed it to deny restitution of
past excessive payments made."m Similarly, courts uniformly
times the retail price of either similarly situated or other merchants generally);
Zuckman, supra note 141, at 319 (agreeing with Professor Speidel but advocating a
ratio of 1.7 or 1.8 to 1 rather than 2 to 1).
180. Presumably the seller's net profits on the challenged transaction would be
unconscionable only if grossly excessive compared to the net profits in general of
similarly situated sellers. See Speidel, supra note 169, at 373, 374. Thus, high net
profits in the industry would insulate a price from challenge regardless of whether
that market was competitive.
181. See id. at 373.
182. I&
183. Speidel stated only that a two to one ratio would be acceptable for the
threshold purpose of requiring the seller to justify its excessive retail price. Id.
184. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1990).
185.. See, e.g., Vom Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries, Ltd., 380 N.Y.S.2d 532, 541
(Sup. Ct. 1976) (holding that damages could not be recovered on the basis of an
unconscionable contract when the plaintiff paid $67,000 for an Oriental jade carving
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deny punitive damages under section 2 -3 0 2 .1"
The classic price unconscionability cases illustrate the nar-
row range of remedies courts award under section 2-302.
Though the trial court in Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso had al-
lowed the seller only its cost for the overpriced freezer, the
appellate court awarded a reasonable profit over all costs in-
curred in the sale. 7 A later New York court did relieve a
freezer buyer from further payments, but that buyer had al-
ready paid so much in excess of the freezer's value the seller
was "amply compensated."" These decisions give sellers no
incentive to be reasonable---the message is gouge as gouge
can, for at worst, if the victim fights back, sellers are limited to
a fair profit and can even keep excessive profits already paid
worth less than half that amount); Best v. United States Natl Bank, 714 P.2d 1049,
1056 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that the doctrine of unconscionability is not a
basis for affirmative relief in a class action suit by depositors challenging the validi-
ty of the bank's NSF service charge), affd on other grounds, 739 P.2d 554 (1987).
But see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 134, § 4-8, at 204 (observing conversely that
§ 2-302 does not expressly preclude restitutionary recovery). The theory of economic
duress, if proven, does allow restitution to the victim. See E. ALLAN FARNSwORTH,
CONTRACTS § 4.19, at 282-83 (2d ed. 1990). Borrowing out of financial distress to
obtain a necessity may not constitute economic duress, unless the lender's wrongful
act or threat caused the distress. Unconscionability, therefore, goes beyond duress in
denying enforcement of certain bargains resulting from the exploitation of distress,
whether or not the promisee created the distress. See Eisenberg, supra note 146, at
759.
186. See, e.g., Pearson v. National Budgeting Sys., Inc., 297 N.Y.S.2d 59, 60
(App. Div. 1969) (denying recovery of punitive damages by a plaintiff induced to buy
a freezer at an unconscionable price).
187. 281 N.Y.S.2d 964, 965 (App. Term. 1967) (granting plaintiff seller recovery
of net cost for refrigerator freezer, plus reasonable profit, in addition to trucking and
service charges necessarily incurred and reasonable finance charges after finding that
contract price of $1145.88 was unconscionable for an appliance that the seller ad-
mitted cost $348), rev'g 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966).
188. See Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (holding
that contract price was to be amended to $619.88 for a $300 freezer unit).
189. See Craig Horowitz, Reviving the Law of Substantive Unconscionability: Ap-
plying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Excessively Priced
Consumer Credit Contracts, 33 UCLA L REV. 940, 960 (1986) (arguing that consum-
ers have little to gain by suing a merchant due to the high cost of legal represen-
tation and the time and effort required to bring a lawsuit); Donald B. King, The
Tort of Unconscionability: A New Tort for New Times, 23 ST. LOUIS LJ. 97, 122-23
(1979) (pleading for unconscionable conduct to be classified as a tort because other-
wise the most a company has to lose under contract theory is its unfair advantage
under the unconscionable contract); see also FONSECA, supra note 157, § 4:9, at 139
(noting that the Froatifresh appellate court's remedy encourages unconscionable con-
tracts since creditors are aware that courts will allow a net profit from the deal).
For a similar criticism of Frostifresh from a distinguished contracts theorist, see IAN
R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS, EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS 4-10 (2d ed. 1978)
(Teacher's Manual) (explaining that sellers under the Frostifresh recovery rule suffer
no penalty for unconscionable behavior because the unconscionability sanctions under
§ 2-302 are "to put it mildly, not very potent).
758
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them.
This remedial imbalance has sparked debate on how to
secure stronger remedies for unfair pricing. Section 2-302 ap-
pears to expressly sanction nonenforcement of the contract, so a
court might deny the seller recovery of any amount still unpaid,
not just that in excess of a fair profit."9 Some commentators
have advocated this remedy, 9' but the few cases employing it
can be distinguished readily on their unusual facts."m Thus,
nonenforcement has not yet entered the mainstream of reme-
dies for price unfairness under section 2-302."
Some commentators advocate compensating victims of un-
conscionable conduct for emotional distress, or awarding puni-
tive damages. One urges courts to award punitive damages
directly under existing section 2-302 for unconscionable conduct
that is a "first cousin to fraud;" another advocates that un-
conscionable conduct in general be actionable as a tort indepen-
dent of the UCC.'" Courts thus far have refused to award
190. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990):
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the con-
tract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the con-
tract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
191. See, e.g., Ellinghaus, supra note 139, at 782 (advocating that courts consid-
er refusing to enforce, rather than rewriting, contracts characterized by 'overall im-
balance"); Brooks, supra note 133, at 428 n.79 (suggesting that to maintain the spir-
it and intent of § 2-302, courts should refuse any enforcement of the contract and
allow buyers to recover all payments).
192. The court in American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886
(N.H. 1964) refused to enforce an unfairly priced home improvement contract, reliev-
ing the homeowner from any payment obligation. Because the contractor had per-
formed only a 'negligible amount" of work, the contract was essentially executory.
Id. at 887. Moreover, the court concluded a state disclosure statute had been violat-
ed and its purpose would be furthered by refusing to enforce the contract. Id. at
888. The court in State v. ITM, Inc., 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966) also refused
to enforce retail installment contracts for the purchase of various appliances. This
result can be explained by the court's finding that, in addition to being unconsciona-
ble, the contracts resulted from an illegal lottery 'referral selling" scheme and con-
stituted a public nuisance. Id at 328. As such, refusing to enforce the contracts may
have been the usual remedy for contracts found void against public policy.
193. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 134, § 4-8, at 201 (stating with regard
to unconscionability in general that courts only occasionally refuse to enforce entire
contracts).
194. Id. at 203-04 (suggesting the use of punitive damages in situations where
sellers persuade unsophisticated buyers to pay two or three times the going market
price and to believe the transaction is a "good deal"); cf Smith v. First Family Fin.
Serv., Inc., 626 So. 2d 1266 (Ala. 1993) (holding that summary judgment for a lend-
er was improper on a claim that the lender committed fraud by concealing excessive
loan origination costs). See generally Frank J. Cavico, Punitive Damages for Breach
of Contract-A Principled Approach, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 357 (1990) (discussing the
applicability of punitive damages).
195. See King, supra note 189, at 123 (proposing that unconscionable conduct be
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tort remedies unless the merchant's conduct constitutes some
established tort such as fraud."9 One innovative commentator,
recognizing that courts were awarding tort remedies to redress
breaches of the implied covenant of good faith in insurance
contracts, theorized that excessively priced consumer goods
would breach that covenant as implied for merchants." 7 In
the mid-1980s it made sense to hitch unconscionability to the
rising star of the bad faith tort, but that star has since fallen
for borrowers, as several jurisdictions recently have refused to
remedy bad faith in a lender-borrower relationship as a tort
separate from a contract claim."
Another "remedy" possible in bankruptcy is to equitably
subordinate claims involving some "inequitable conduct" that
injures other creditors or confers an unfair advantage."z
Available under existing law," this sanction might be de-
ployed to deter unconscionable conduct.
classified as a tort, allowing a damaged party to sue for emotional distress and suf-
fering).
196. See, e.g., F.N. Roberts Pest Control Co. v. McDonald, 208 S.E.2d 13 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1974) (affirming a jury award of $4425 exemplary damages and $5575 gen-
eral damages from an excessively priced home improvement contract procured
through fraud); Star Credit Corp. v. Ingram, 347 N.Y.S.2d 651 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973)
(awarding punitive damages of $15,000 to deter a refrigerator and food plan sales
scheme involving fraudulent representations and "grossly unconscionable profit").
197. See Horowitz, supra note 189, at 975 (proposing that a breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith should give rise to tort remedies).
198. See, e.g., Careau & Co. v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 272 Cal.
Rptr. 387, 404 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that there was no basis for a tort recovery
for breach of an implied covenant of good faith in a contract between a corporation
and a bank because no "special relationship" existed); Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank,
756 P.2d 1223, 1226-27 (Okla. 1988) (declining to extend the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing imposed upon contracts of insurance to contracts for commer-
cial loans). See generally Kerry L- Macintosh, Gilmore Spoke Too Soon: Contract
Rises From the Ashes of the Bad Faith Tort, 27 LOY. LA. L. REv. 483 (1994) (detail-
ing the sudden reversal of fortunes for the bad faith tort which has died in every
application except insurance).
199. See In re Castletons, Inc., 990 F.2d 551, 559 (10th Cir. 1993) (authorizing
equitable subordination when (1) the claimant engages in some type of inequitable
conduct, (2) the misconduct resulted in injury to the creditors of the bankrupt or
conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant, and (3) equitable subordination of
the claim is not inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code); Equity Mortgage, Inc. v.
Johnson (In re Johnson), 149 B.R. 284, 287-88 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1993) (declining to
decide trustee's claim that mortgage debt implicated principles of equitable subordi-
nation because mortgage loan transaction was unconscionable); Note, Bankruptcy:
Equitable Subordination of Unconscionable Claims, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 165 (1967)
(examining the nature and proposed criteria governing the decision in bankruptcy to
subordinate a security agreement negotiated at arm's length between a lender and
the bankrupt because the judge finds it unconscionable).
200. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(cXl) (1988).
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5. The Consumer/Commercial Party Distinction Under
Section 2-302. Application of section 2-302 appears to support
the same standard for unconscionability for both consumer and
commercial transactions. Though courts applying section 2-302
are generally not solicitous of commercial parties claiming un-
conscionability,0 1 commercial parties are not automatically ex-
cluded from its protection.' A few have been successful on
proof they were "poorly educated, 'over a barrel,' or the victim
of fine print. °
B. Statutory Unconscionability-General
Several commentators have puzzled over the trickle of price
unconscionability cases under section 2-302 since the flurry of
cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s.' The best explana-
tion is that section 2-302, applicable only to sales of goods'
201. See CRANDALL Er AL., supra note 147, § 4.8.5, at 4:83-84 (noting that there
are few instances in which commercial contracts have been found unconscionable);
FARNSWORH, aupra note 185, § 4.28, at 330-32; WFrIE & SUMMERS, supra note 134,
§ 4-9, at 205-10 (analyzing unconscionability in commercial settings). One commenta-
tor explained that the cold shoulder given commercial parties results from the 'far
greater opportunities for inequities in bargaining power, lack of choice, unfair sur-
prise, and deception in relations between individual customers and a corporation
than in merchant-to-merchant relations.' See DEUTCH, aupra note 73, at 137.
202. A majority of the Permanent Editorial Board Study Group, which in 1990
recommended revision of Article 2 of the UCC, does not believe § 2-302 should be
revised to distinguish between consumer and commercial contracts. See PEB STUDY
GROUP, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2 at 81
(1990).
203. WHITE & SUMMERS, aupra note 134, § 4-9, at 207; see, e.g., Weaver v.
American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 145-48 (Ind. 1971) (holding that when a provision
in a service station lease exculpating the lessor oil company for its negligence and
compelling the lessee to indemnify the lessor for loss resulting from lessor's negli-
gence was not explained to the lessee, who had left high school after 1 years, the
hold harmless clause was unconscionable); Rozeboom v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
378 N.W.2d 241, 244-45 (S.D. 1984) (stating that an individual businessperson was
not a professional and could not negotiate with the defendant telephone company,
thus the clause limiting liability of the telephone company for omission of a listing
to the amount paid by the businessperson was unconscionable and unenforceable).
Professor Farnsworth observed more generally that the successful commercial cases
involve some 'imbalance' in the parties' relationship. FARNSWORTH, 8upra note 185,
§ 4.28, at 331; see also CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 147, § 4.8.5, at 4:84 (noting
that successful commercial cases usually involve companies that vary in size, with
the small companies persuading courts that they lack the resources to deal effective-
ly with the larger companies); Hillman, 8upra note 119, at 43-44 (suggesting that
dealings between merchants should be carefully scrutinized when one of the mer-
chants involved is in a position of dependency or is poorly educated).
204. See, e.g., Horowitz, aupra note 189, at 958-60 (speculating that the demise
was caused by 'doctrinal disarray' from "confused judicial reasoning" in the classic
price unconscionability cases, as well as inadequate remedies in § 2-302).
205. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1990) ("Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article
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and unchanged since its inception, has been replaced as the
preferred vehicle for pursuing unfair pricing claims by subse-
quent state law ranging from price controls on consumer goods
during natural disasters" to California's statutory prohibition
of unconscionability in contracts generally.' Price litigation
has slowed under section 2-302 but thrives under newer stat-
utes" that offer more detailed standards as well as more po-
tent remedies."
1. Statutory Unconscionability-The Procedural v.
Substantive Debate. Unfortunately, these newer statutes do not
resolve the procedural unfairness debate. Many do not address
the issue at all.21° A few have been construed to require more
applies to transactions in goods.").
206. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 396-r (McKinney 1984):
During any abnormal disruption of the market for consumer goods and ser-
vices vital and necessary for the health, safety and welfare of consumers,
resulting from stress of weather, convulsion of nature ... [or] national or
local emergency... , no merchant shall sell or offer to sell any such con-
sumer goods or services for an amount which represents an unconscionably
excessive price.
207. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West 1985):
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the con-
tract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the con-
tract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
208. For examples of statutes under which price unconscionability claims might
be brought, see such unfair trade practice statutes as the Uniform Consumer Sales
Practices Act, adopted in Kansas, Ohio, and Utah, and such consumer credit statutes
as § 5.108 of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, adopted in its 1968 version by
Colorado, Guam, Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah, Wisconsin (based on both the UCCC and
the National Consumer Law Center's National Consumer Act), and Wyoming, and in
its revised 1974 version, or working drafts leading to the 1974 version, by Idaho,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, and South Carolina.
The Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act provides:
In determining whether an act or practice is unconscionable, the court shall
consider circumstances such as the following of which the supplier knew or
had reason to know:
i2)'that when the consumer transaction was entered into the price grossly
exceeded the price at which similar property or services were readily obtain-
able in similar transactions by like consumers.
UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRAcTICES AcT, § 4, 7A U.LA. 241 (1971).
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code identifies factors to be considered in de-
termining unconscionable transactions, including a 'gross disparity between the price
of the property or services sold or leased and the value of the property or services
measured by the price at which similar property or services are readily obtainable in
credit transactions by like consumers.' UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108, 7A
U.L.A. 167-68 (1974).
209. In contrast, uncertain standards and tepid remedies are blamed for the de-
cline in price litigation under § 2-302. Refer to note 204 supra.
210. See, e.g., UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108 (4Xc), 7A U.LA. 168 (1974)
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than excessive price alone.21' Those that require such proof
also expressly recognize that gross price disparity is inevitably
accompanied by procedural unfairness.2  These statutes seem
to anticipate that victims of excessive pricing will be able to
prove the requisite procedural unfairness.2
13
2. Statutory Unconscionability-Procedural Unfairness
Standards. These statutes do, however, offer more pointed guid-
ance than section 2-302 on what constitutes procedural unfair-
ness. For example, both the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices
Act and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) detail the
procedural factors courts should consider in determining
conscionability. 214  Both specify taking advantage of the
(providing that courts may consider the disparity of price in deciding the
conscionability of the consumer credit sale transaction, but failing to expressly state
that disparity alone supports a finding of unconscionability).
211. See, e.g., People ex. rel. Hartigan v. Knecht Serv., Inc., 575 N.E.2d 1378,
1386 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (rejecting the contention that unconscionably high prices
alone are sufficient to find a contract in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act
in a suit against a plumbing, heating, and air conditioning business with respect to
advertising, servicing, and charging of customers).
212. The Uniform Land Transactions Act, not adopted by any state, provides
that price disparity in real estate sale contracts 'does not, of itself, render the con-
tract unconscionable." § 1-311(bX4), 13 U.L.A. 502 (1977). Other real estate uniform
and model acts employ the same approach. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP
AcT § 1-112(bX4), 7 UJLA. 261 (1982) ("A disparity between the contract price and
the value of the property measured by the price at which similar property was
readily obtainable in similar transactions does not, of itself, render the contract un-
conscionable."); UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 1-112(bX4), 7 U.L.A 450, 451 (1980)
(adopted in eleven states) ("[A] disparity between the contract price and the value of
the real estate measured by the price at which similar real estate was readily ob-
tainable in similar transactions does not, of itself, render the contract unconsciona-
ble.'); MODEL REAL ESTATE COOPERATIVE ACT § 1-112(bX4), 7B U.L.A. 248 (1981)
(adopted in Virginia) ("[A] disparity between the contract price and the value of the
cooperative interest measured by the price at which similar cooperative interests
were readily obtainable in similar transactions does not, of itself, render the contract
unconscionable.'); MODEL REAL ESTATE TME-SHARE ACT § 1-105 (bX4), 7B U.LA
363 (1980) (adopted in Massachusetts and Rhode Island) ("[A] disparity between the
contract price and the value of the time share measured by the price at which a
similar time share was readily obtainable in similar transactions does not, of itself,
render the contract unconscionable.").
213. See, e.g., UNIF. LAND TRANS. ACT § 1-311, cmt. 2, 13 U.LA. 503 (1977) ("In
practically all cases where a claim is made that there is a gross disparity between
price and value, there will be other factors [beyond gross disparity alone] which pre-
vented one of the parties from reasonably protecting his interests.).
214. UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 4(c), 7A U.LA. 241 (1971) (listing
six factors that should be considered in determining whether an act is unconsciona-
ble: (1) the supplier's knowingly taking advantage "of the inability of the consumer
reasonably to protect his interests*; (2) the price "grossly exceeding" the price at
which similar items were readily obtainable; (3) the consumer's inability to "receive
a substantial benefit from the subject of the transaction; (4) "no reasonable proba-
bility of payment"; (5) excessive "one-sided[ness] in favor of the supplier'; and (6) the
seller's having made "a misleading statement of opinion on which the consumer was
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consumer's inability to protect her interests because of "physical
infirmity, ignorance, illiteracy, inability to understand the lan-
guage of an agreement, or similar factors."2 5 Though more
specific than the plain language of section 2-302, these factors
have long been identified in UCC case law."1 These more re-
cent codifications do not specify a recipe for successful proof,
leaving that task to the court's discretion and to commentator
speculation.
3. Statutory Unconscionability-Substantive Unfairness
Standards. These statutory codifications of unconscionability
more recent than section 2-302 offer guidance on both the ap-
propriate benchmark for determining excessive price and the
extent of disparity necessary.217 Most refer to comparable re-
tail prices, not the seller's net profits.21s For example, the
1974 UCCG and the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act
likely to rely to his detriment"); UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108, 7A U.L.A.
167-68 (1974) (listing five factors to be considered in deciding whether a transaction
was unconscionable when made or was induced by unconscionable conduct: (a) the
seller's belief that there is "no reasonable probability of repaymente; (b) knowledge
by the seller of "the inability of the consumer to receive substantial benefits'; (c)
'gross disparity between price and value; (d) separate insurance charges; and (e) the
seller's knowingly taking advantage of the inability of the consumer to protect his
interests because of "mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy, inability to understand
the language of the agreement, or similar factors").
215. UNF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES Aar § 4(cX1), 7A U.LA. 241 (1971). The
1974 UCCC adds mental infirmities and whether the seller, lessor, or lender took
"knowing" advantage of the consumer to the list of factors. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT
CODE § 5.108(4Xe), 7A U.LA. 168 (1974). See also South Carolina's adoption of the
UCCC, which directs the court to consider "the relative sophistication ... [and] the
relative bargaining power of the debtor and creditor." S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-108(9)
(Law. Co-op. 1989).
216. Section 2-302 case law also considers relevant both seller deception and the
claimant's financial necessity. See Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266
(Sup. Ct. 1969) (noting that the very limited financial resources of the purchaser can
be considered in determining unconscionability). The Uniform Consumer Sales Prac.
tices Act refers specifically to a seller's misleading statements of opinion. § 4(cX6),
7A U.LA. 241 (1971). Financial necessity could be considered under that Act and
the UCCC as either a "similar factor" preventing the consumer from protecting her
interests, or as one of the unspecified circumstances a court can consider in deter-
mining conscionability. See UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT §4(c), 7A U.LA.
241 (1971); UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108, 7A U.LA. 167-68 (1974).
217. See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108(4Xc), 7A U.LA. 168 (1974)
(instructing the court to consider whether there exists "gross disparity between the
price of the property or services sold or leased and the value of the property or
services measured by the price at which similar property or services are readily
obtainable in credit transactions by like consumers"); UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRAC-
TICES ACT § 4(cX2), 7A U.LA. 241 (1971) (providing that the court shall consider
whether "the price grossly exceed[s] the price at which similar property or services
were readily obtainable in similar transactions by like consumers").
218. Refer to notes 165-75 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of some
possible measures of substantive unfairness of price.
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both direct courts to compare the price challenged to that at
which "similar property or services" are "readily obtainable" by
"like consumers."219 The Uniform Land Transactions Act,'
Uniform Condominium Act,221 Uniform Common Interest Own-
ership Act,' Model Real Estate Cooperative Act,' and the
Model Real Estate Time-Share Act 2  adopt this reference for
the real property transactions they govern. A few other statutes
call for a comparison of the contract price to the "value" re-
ceived by the complaining party.' It is unclear how courts
should assess "value," but these statutes do not appear to con-
template reference to the actual profits of the seller or lender.
Those statutes directing comparison to retail price typically
compare the retail price obtainable "by like consumers,' 2 an
acknowledgement that different consumers present different
risks' and that low income area merchants often have high-
er than average operating costs.' The National Consumer
Act,' however, refers to the price obtainable "by other con-
sumers,-2W presumably inviting a court to "compare ghetto
219. See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108(4Xc), 7A U.LA. 168 (1974);
UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 4(cX2), 7A U.LA. 241 (1971); see also S.C.
CODE ANN. § 38-39-80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993) (stating that service charges for an
insurance premium payment agreement cannot substantially exceed those that are
'usual and customary).
220. UNIF. LAND TRANS. ACT § 1-311(bX4), 13 U.L.A. 502 (1977) (not adopted by
any state). The more recent Uniform Land Security Interest Act does not contain an
unconscionability provision.
221. UNiF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 1-112(bX4), 7 U.LA. 451 (1980).
222. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-112(bX4), 7 ULLA. 261 (1982)
(adopted in Connecticut, Nevada, and West Virginia, though Nevada omitted this
subsection).
223. MODEL REAL ESTATE COOPERATIVE ACT § 1-112 (bX4), 7B U.LA. 248 (1981).
224. MODEL REAL ESTATE TIME-SHARE ACT § 1-105(bX4), 7B U.LA. 363 (1980).
225. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 815, para. 515,3(aX3) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (pro-
viding that a home repair contract is unconscionable when 'an unreasonable differ-
ence exists between the value of the services, materials and work to be performed
and the amount charged"); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(5) (Vernon 1987)
(defining unconscionability to include "gross disparity between the value received and
consideration paid'). The National Consumer Act offered in 1970 by the National
Consumer Law Center as a consumer-oriented alternative to the UCCC refers in
§ 5.107(3Xc) to gross disparity as measured by the price at which similar goods or
services are obtainable "or by other tests of true value."
226. See, e.g., UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108(4Xc), 7A U.LA. 168 (1974).
227. See Shanker & Abel, supra note 75, at 706-07 (recognizing that the credit-
worthiness of some buyers is much less than others, justifying higher prices to ad-
dress the seller's higher risk).
228. See Nehf, supra note 107, at 824 (presuming that the cost of providing
merchandise under a rent-to-own plan to low income consumers is high).
229. This Act, issued in 1970 by the National Consumer Law Center, and the
UCCC jointly influenced Wisconsin's consumer code.
230. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT § 5.107(3Xc)
(1970).
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prices with general retail prices outside the ghetto, door-to-door
prices with store prices, and prices charged by different
branches of a single chain."21 If a statute or court adopts a
retail price comparison for interest pricing, the "other consum-
ers" standard is too open-ended and could unfairly penalize
lenders with higher costs and unfairly benefit consumer liti-
gants who pose risks greater than consumers in general.
These codifications are instructive in their almost uniform
adoption of a retail price standard, but most offer less guidance
on the extent of disparity necessary. They often employ the
standard of "gross" disparity,' but some refer to a "substan-
tial" excess,' and one to an "unreasonable difference."'
"Gross," "substantial," and "unreasonable," each vague, will
likely be interpreted similarly by courts. Both those statutes
providing more concrete guidance and the case law interpreting
these less specific standards indicate that the disparity ratio
must exceed two to one for the claimant to succeed. For exam-
ple, the 1974 UCCC comments illustrate that a price of three
times the retail price is unconscionable.' Illinois' Home Re-
pair Fraud Act provides that a repair price over four times
market value is prima facie unconscionable.' West Virginia
rent-to-own legislation proscribes charging more than 240 per-
231. FONSECA, supra note 157, § 4:12, at 143.
232. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108(4Xc), 7A UL.A 168 (1974) ('gross
disparity"); UNip. CONSUMER SALES PRAcnCES ACT § 4(cX2), 7A U.LA. 241 (1971)
('grossly exceeded"); UNIF. LAND TRANS. ACT § 1-311(bX4), 13 U.LA. 502 (1977)
('gross disparity); UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-112(bX4), 7 U.LA.
261 (1982) ('gross disparity"); UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 1-112(bX4), 7 U.LA. 451
(1980) ("gross disparity").
233. See, eg., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03(BX2) (Anderson 1993) (substitut-
ing 'substantially in excess" for the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act's stan-
dard of "grossly exceeded"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-39 -80(e) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993)
(proscribing service charge rates by insurance premium service companies 'substan-
tially exceeding" the "usual and customary charge"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-108(9)
(Law. Co-op. 1989) (employing the 'substantial excess" standard for consumer credit
charges generally).
234. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 815, para. 515/3(aX3) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (Home
Repair Fraud Act) (proscribing 'unreasonable difference" between value and price
charged). Senate Bill 1145, introduced but defeated in the 1993-94 California legis-
lature, would have governed fees imposed for unsecured open-end consumer credit
arrangements, such as credit cards, under a standard of commercial reasonableness.
Fees would have been deemed commercially reasonable when they were less than or
equal to the comparable fee charged by at least one of the ten largest lenders head-
quartered outside California.
235. See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108 cmt. 4, 7A U.LA. 170 (1974)
(providing that a home solicitation sale of cookware for $375 in an area where a set
of comparable quality is available on credit in stores for $125 or less would entitle a
consumer to relief).
236. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 815, para. 515/3(aX3) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (governing
home repair contracts requiring payment of at least $4000).
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cent of the goods retail price.' Courts have held five to
one' and three to one' discrepancies unconscionable, and
two to one discrepancies conscionable.'
4. Statutory Unconscionability-Remedies for
Unconscionable Pricing. These newer statutes codifying uncon-
scionability usually offer a wider range of sanctions than sec-
tion 2-302: from restitution to civil penalties and loss of license.
This severity indicates that unconscionable conduct is increas-
ingly recognized as tortious or the equivalent. Most codifications
permit penal remedies for unconscionable conduct, typically by
providing a fixed recovery of a "consumer" penalty, or by a
trebling of actual damages."l
237. See W. VA. CODE § 46B-3-9 (Supp. 1994). Under the West Virginia statute,
retail value is determined by reference to prices in the particular market area.
Though almost all states now have special rent-to-own regulation, fewer than ten
impose similar price controls on the transaction. See generally Hearing, supra note 3,
at 242-43 (written testimony of Association of Progressive Rental Organizations)
(stating that six states regulate the total amount a merchant may charge for an
item under a rent-to-own transaction).
238. See, e.g., Wernly v. Anapol (In re Wernly), 91 B.R. 702, 704 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1988) (holding that a check cashing fee five times the industry norm violated
Pennsylvania's unfair trade practice statutes).
239. See, e.g., Phillips v. Dukes (In re Dukes), 24 B.R. 404, 412-13 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1982) (holding that loan closing costs of three times customary costs violated
the Michigan Consumer Protection Act standard of 'grossly in excess").
240. See, e.g., California Grocers Ass'n, Inc. v. Bank of Am., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d
396, 403 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a $3 "deposited item returned" fee including a
100% markup over the bank's processing cost was not unconscionable as the price
unconscionability cases "generally involve much greater price-value disparities");
Remco Enters., Inc. v. Houston, 677 P.2d 567, 572-73 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that Kansas' version of the 1974 UCCC was not violated by a 108% markup over
retail price of a TV from a rent-to-own center since the consumer received benefits
over a retail transaction of free repairs and the right to terminate at will). Cases
under Texas' Deceptive Trade Practices Act appear to apply a more consumer favor-
able definition of "gross disparity," as a 28% disparity has been declared "gross." See
Mercedes-Benz of North Am. v. Dickenson, 720 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1986, no writ) (finding "gross disparity" when the buyer paid $30,429 for a car
worth approximately $8,500 less); Greg S. Gober, Comment, DTPA Gross Disparity:
A Risky Business, 44 BAYLOR L. REv. 133 (1992) (analyzing how much disparity is
required by Texas courts).
241. See, e.g., UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTIcES AcT § 11(b), 7A U.LA. 255
(1971) (allowing a consumer to recover actual damages or $100, whichever is great-
er). Utah's adoption of that Act allows generous recovery of the greater of actual
damages or $2,000. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(2) (Supp. 1993). Texas' Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act allows recovery for unconscionable disparity of actual dam-
ages plus twice the actual damages that do not exceed $1000, and uncapped treble
damages for knowing violations. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(bXl) (Vernon
Supp. 1994).
The National Consumer Law Center's 1970 National Consumer Act authorizes
punitive damages for unconscionability, but its more moderate Model Consumer
Credit Act published in 1973 does not. See generally DEUTCH, supra note 73, at 236-
39 (noting the distinctions between the Model Consumer Credit Act and the National
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Though denied by section 2-302 case law, restitution is a
fixture of these more recent codifications. 2 Victims of exces-
sive pricing can thus recover excessive payments made, even if
they have fully paid the contract price.' Attorneys' fees for
successful claimants are allowed almost uniformly.'
Claimants who pursue actions they know to be groundless,
however, may be compelled by statute to pay the other party's
fees.' A few commentators argue that this chills private en-
forcement,' but it guards against claimants who might ex-
ploit the uncertainties of unconscionability to exact settlement
Consumer Act). See also Brown v. Lyons, 332 N.E.2d 380, 386-87 (Ohio Ct. C.P.
1974) (allowing punitive damages for unconscionability under Ohio's adoption of the
Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act).
Article 2A of the UCC authorizes 'appropriate relief' for unconscionable con-
duct in the leasing of goods. U.C.C. § 2A-108 (2) (1990). One commentator speculat-
ed that it may be difficult or impossible for a lessee to recover punitive damages
under that provision because of other limitations in the UCC. See Michael J. Her-
bert, Unconacionability Under Article 2A, 21 U. TOL. L, REv. 715, 732 (1990) (refer-
ring to § 1-106(1) which states "neither consequential or special nor penal damages
may be had except as specifically provided for in this Act or by other rule of law
[e.g., an independent tort claim]').
242. See, e.g., Fleet v. United States Consumer Council, Inc. (In re Fleet), 95
B.&. 319 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (finding that grossly overpriced lawyer referral ser-
vices violated New Jersey unfair practices law, entitling consumers to the statutory
remedy of a refund of all monies acquired by a deceptive or unconscionable practice);
Wernly v. Anapol (In re Wernly), 91 B.R. 702, 704 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (awarding
the return of excessive check cashing charges under Pennsylvania's unfair practices
law); Phillips v. Dukes (In re Dukes), 24 B.R. 404, 417 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982)
(concluding that the consumer was entitled to the return of excessive closing costs
under Michigan's Consumer Protection Act); see also People v. Two Wheel Corp., 525
N.E.2d 692, 696 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that the trial court has discretion under New
York's price gouging statute to design a restitutionary fund for consumer victims).
243. This right would presumably be subject to any applicable statute of limita-
tion.
244. See, e.g., UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108(6), 7A U.LA. 169 (1974)
(providing that "the court shall award reasonable fees to the attorney for the con-
sumer or debtor"); UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 11(e), 7A U.L.A. 255-56
(1971) (providing that 'the court may award to the prevailing party a reasonable
attorney's fee"); U.C.C. § 2A-108(4Xa) (1990) (providing that 'the court shall award
reasonable attorney's fees to the lessee").
245. See, e.g., UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108(6), 7A U.L.A. 169 (1974);
UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES AT § 11(e), 7A U.L.A. 255-56 (1971); U.C.C.
§ 2A-108(4)(b) (1990).
246. See Charles A. Heckman, Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code: Gov-
ernment of the Lessor, by the Lessor, and for the Lessor, 36 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 309,
331 (1991-92) (suggesting that the provision on attorneys' fees will make consumers
hesitant to litigate unconscionability claims not previously sanctioned in the juris-
diction); Donald B. King, Major Problems with Article 2.- Unfairness, 'Cutting Off*
Consumer Defenses, Unfiled Interests, and Uneven Adoption, 43 MERCER L REV. 869,
873 (1992) (stating that Article 2A's provision defeats unconscionability claims be-
cause the term "groundless" is not well defined and places consumers who assert
unconscionabiity at risk). Oregon and Florida are among the handful of states that
didn't adopt either of Article 2A's attorneys' fees provisions. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 680.1081 (West Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 72A.1080 (1993).
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of a groundless claim.27 Moreover, civil procedure codes al-
ready impose similar constraints on such claims,' and most
consumer credit contracts provide the creditor a contractual re-
covery of attorneys' fees for successfully defending even good
faith claims. 9
Most unconscionability claims present expensive problems
of proof with small amounts at stake. Class actions' and ad-
ministrative enforcement are two additional mechanisms em-
ployed commonly to overcome these discouraging economics.
The UCCC and the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act
authorize an administrative authority (typically the state's At-
torney General)"' to seek injunctive relief and actual damages
for victimized consumers. 2 Attorneys general have employed
the administrative enforcement power to gain relief from unfair
pricing for consumers unlikely to pursue their claims
247. See DEUTCH, aupra note 73, at 235 (calling the UCCC approach a 'balanced
solution! that should be adopted in any future revision of § 2-302).
248. See Herbert, supra note 241, at 738 (noting that the Article 2A provision
will likely have little real significance due to Rule 11 sanctions in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the like).
249. Cf Credit Union One v. Stamm, 867 P.2d 285, 291 (Kan. 1994) (holding
that an attorney fee clause for a creditor authorizing fees to the extent permitted
under law was contingent and therefore did not violate Kansas law prohibiting con-
sumer credit agreements from requiring the payment by consumers of the creditor's
fees).
250. Section 11 of the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act expressly allows
class actions, but precludes recovery of damages in such actions. 7A U.LA. 255
(1971). The National Consumer Law Center's National Consumer Act §§ 5.308, 6.111
(1970) and Model Consumer Credit Act (1973) both broadly authorize class actions
for unconscionability.
Professor Leff observed that it would be "most useful" if an effective class ac-
tion remedy could be conjoined with the unconscionability standard to cut down the
"per-plaintiff transaction cost.' Leff, supra note 118, at 357 n.34. Class actions to
challenge unfair pricing have been pursued most notably against financial institu-
tions charging NSF fees alleged to be unfairly excessive. See, e.g., Perdue v. Crocker
Nat' Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 507 (Cal. 1985) (rejecting defendant's demurrer to an un-
conscionability challenge to NSF fees in a class action suit); Best v. United States
Natl Bank, 739 P.2d 554, 555 (Or. 1987) (affirming summary judgment in favor of
defendant bank on class action unconscionability claim against the bank's NSF fees
but finding genuine issues of material fact on whether the bank had breached its
implied covenant of good faith in setting the fees); cf. Fleet v. United States Con-
sumer Council, Inc. (In re Fleet), 95 B.R 319, 322-23 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (hold-
ing that the defendant misrepresented the nature of its services and that the
defendant's fees were unconscionable in light of the bankruptcy attorney referral
services provided and entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff class).
251. See UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 2, 7A U.LA. 235 cmt. 2
(1971) (noting in official comments that the Attorney General has substantial power
with respect to consumer sales practices in some states and recommending designa-
tion of the Attorney General in those states as the "Enforcing Authority* for purpose
of the Act).
252. See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 6.111, 6.113, 7A U.L.A. 201-02, 204
(1974); UNiI. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 9, 7A U.LA. 252 (1971).
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individually.' Other administrative sanctions range from loss
of license to civil penalties.'
5. Statutory Unconscionability-The Consumer/Commercial
Party Distinction. Several of the recent codifications of uncon-
scionability protect only consumers. Often this is because the
unconscionability provisions are adopted as part of the state's
consumer credit code or consumer deceptive practices statutes.
Article 2A of the UCC, which otherwise governs both commer-
cial and consumer leases of goods, limits some of its unconscio-
nability protection, particularly its allowance of attorneys' fees,
to consumer lessees.' It apparently presumes that commer-
cial lessees are sophisticated enough to bargain effectively, and
even if they are not, concludes policy reasons counsel against
protecting them.' In contrast, the National Consumer Law
Center's 1970 National Consumer Act extends its enhanced
unconscionability remedies and protection to sole proprietors
purchasing business equipment, 7 apparently presuming that
small businesspersons share the bargaining disadvantages of
consumers.
253. See, e.g., Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 654 (N.J. 1971) (ruling in favor
of the New Jersey Attorney General under New Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act for
the benefit of all purchasers of excessively priced educational books); State v. ITM,
Inc., 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 322 (Sup. Ct 1966) (enjoining enforcement of excessively
priced consumer goods in an action by the Attorney General under New York's con-
sumer fraud statute).
254. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-707 (aX)(EXi) (1994) (providing for loss of a
license to cash checks as the sanction for charging unconscionable fees that "do not
adequately reflect" risks and costs of operation); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r
(McKinney 1984) (imposing a civil penalty of up to $5000 for "price gouging'). But
see UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 6.113(2), 7A U.L.A. 204 (1974) (excluding 'un-
conscionable agreements" and 'unconscionable conduct" from $5000 civil penalty for
UCCC violations).
255. Subsection 2A-108(2) on the "appropriate relief' for unconscionable conduct
and subsection 2A-108(4) on attorneys' fees are limited to "consumer leases," defined
in § 2A-103(lXe) as leases to individuals primarily for a personal, family or house-
hold purpose. See generally Herbert, aupra note 241, at 750 (noting that this distinc-
tion reflects a perceived need to protect consumers who may be naive and unable to
negotiate favorable terms from lessors). Additionally, U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1990) pro-
vides that limitations on consequential damages in contracts for the sale of consum-
er, but not commercial, goods are prima facie unconscionable.
256. Cf. Herbert, aupra note 241, at 751 (noting that providing businesses with
less protection in contractual arrangements might further the goal of economic effi-
ciency by allowing less efficient producers to go bankrupt).
257. Section 1.301(8) defines consumer as "a person other than an organization
who seeks or acquires (a) business equipment for use in his business, or (b) real or
personal property, services, money or credit for personal, family, household or agri-
cultural purposes."
770
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C. Interest Pricing Cases-General
A surprising number of reported cases decide the
conscionability of interest pricing.' In fact, the cases out-
number the pricing cases under section 2-302, and might
therefore be expected to shed more light on the appropriate
standard for unconscionability. Unfortunately, these cases gen-
erally suffer from the same shoddy and conclusory legal anal-
ysis as those under section 2-302.
1. Interest Pricing Cases-The Procedural v. Substantive
Debate. Only a few interest pricing cases address the need for
proof of procedural unfairness, and the results are mixed. Older
cases parallel equity's standard that substantive unfairness
alone is not unconscionable unless the disparity is extraordi-
nary,' but one nineteenth century interest case demanded
proof of some procedural defect without exception.' ° Recent
case law is inconclusive-the few cases that address the issue
directly are split, 1 and no clear factual distinction such as
258. Usury regulation has lapsed before, and a few cases date to the nineteenth
century when at times there was no usury protection. See, e.g., Boyce v. Fisk, 42 P.
473, 474 (Cal. 1895) (holding that the court could not interfere in a contract where
$260 was loaned at 4% monthly interest because neither fraud nor incapacity was
involved); Lamprey v. Mason, 19 N.E. 350, 351 (Mass. 1889) (finding loans of $62
and $37 at $2 per month interest and loans of $60.75 and $90 at $3-4 per month
interest were not unconscionable and must be enforced in the absence of fraud).
These early cases typically invoked the authority of equitable courts to review con-
tracts for their conscionability. Refer to note 84 supra and accompanying text. More
recent interest cases are often brought under the increasing number of statutes codi-
fying the unconscionability standard. Refer to notes 79-83 supra and accompanying
text.
259. See, e.g., Boyce, 42 P. at 475-76 (noting that the general rule is that equity
courts will only interfere in the most extraordinary cases except when the parties
stand in a 'peculiar predicament! such as expectant heirs or sailors). Refer to note
138 supra for a discussion of the unconscionability standard in equity.
260. See Lamprey v. Mason, 19 N.E. 350, 351 (Mass. 1889) (arguing that courts
cannot refuse to enforce contracts with excessive interest rates in the absence of
fraud, because that would constitute a finding of gross inadequacy of consideration,
which does not render the contract invalid).
261. Compare Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 849 (Ct. App. 1991) (re-
quiring both procedural and substantive unconscionability before a contract or clause
will be held unenforceable) and Verson v. Hardt, 246 N.E.2d 461, 464 (Ill. App. Ct.
1969) (holding that an extremely high rate of interest 'without more' does not make
a case for equitable relief) with In re Chicago Reed & Furniture Co., 7 F.2d 885,
886 (7th Cir. 1925) (refusing to enforce an interest rate, including commission, in
excess of 40% because it was on its face "glaringly and obviously harsh') and
Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 1 CA-CV 91-0485, 1993 WL 440534, at *6
(Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1993) (Kleinschmidt, J., dissenting) (proclaiming agreement
with Professors White and Summers that substantive unconscionability alone is suffi-
cient and noting that such a rule had been applied by Arizona courts previously).
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the consumer or commercial nature of the parties readily ex-
plains the difference. As with the pricing cases under section 2-
302, this issue has not been considered directly by enough high-
er courts to settle the dispute over the necessity of showing
procedural unfairness.
2. Procedural Unfairness in the Interest Pricing Cases. In
articulating what constitutes procedural unfairness, the interest
pricing cases borrow their standards from cases decided under
section 2-302.2 Thus, the factors of lack of borrower sophisti-
cation, financial necessity, lender sharp practices, and lack of
choice are deemed relevant in most of the interest pricing cas-
es. As neither the section 2-302 cases nor the interest pricing
cases provide a precise recipe for success, claimants should offer
proof in as many of these categories as possible.' However,
some conclusions can be drawn from the case law. To be found
sophisticated is the borrower claimant's "kiss of death,"'
One commentator argues that the Carboni court's finding of procedural un-
fairness is "unpersuasive" and criticizes that court's "near total reliance on the sub-
stantive aspects" as a "highly subjective method of determining unconscionability."
Giedgowd, supra note 123, at 101. However, substantive unfairness seems less *sub-
jective" than procedural unfairness, for which the court must gauge the borrower's
sophistication and financial necessity without reference to some concrete standard
such as the market rate or retail price.
262. Many cases employ the phrasing, "absence of meaningful choice," discussed
supra at note 161. See e.g., Greene v. Gibraltar Mortgage Inv. Corp., 488 F. Supp.
177, 180 (D.D.C. 1980) (finding that plaintiff lacked any meaningful alternative at
the time the loan documents were executed given the overwhelming terms and the
inability to review the documents before they were to be signed); Carboni v.
Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 850 (Ct. App. 1991) (upholding the trial court's re-
duction of an interest rate from 200% to 24% due to substantive and procedural
unconscionable conduct by the lender and finding procedural unconscionability by the
absence of meaningful choice since the borrower was acting under emotional distress
and had no alternative sources of credit); Barnes v. Helfenbein, 548 P.2d 1014, 1020
(Okla. 1976) (rejecting an unconscionability claim because the borrower had 'viable
alternatives" including selling the property for substantial profit or undergoing the
foreclosure proceedings and retaining the excess); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664
P.2d 455, 461 (Utah 1983) (finding no lack of meaningful choice because the contract
was formed between sophisticated business people).
263. Cf. Equity Mortgage., Inc. v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 149 B.R. 284, 288
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1993) (stating that, for real estate transactions, interest price un-
conscionability is determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all perti-
nent facts and circumstances).
264. See E & W Bldg. Material Co. v. American Say. & Loan Aas'n, 648 F.
Supp. 289, 291 (M.D. Ala. 1986) (declaring a loan agreement not unconscionable
since rescission of a contract for unconscionability is an "extraordinary remedy usual-
ly reserved for the protection of the unsophisticated" and in this case the borrower
was 'sophisticated and knowledgeable" and fully aware of the terms of the note);
Marshall v. Mercury Fin. Co., 550 So. 2d 1026, 1028 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989) (holding
that the credit purchase of car at 29% was not unconscionable when the debtor was
college educated in business management and could understand the loan documents);
Cheshire Mortgage Serv., Inc. v. Montes, 612 A.2d 1130, 1135-36 (Conn. 1992)
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though proof of egregious deception might overcome that sophis-
tication or constitute the tort of fraud. Even sophisticated bor-
rowers could fall victim to deception if the lender misrepresents
or "buries" the true costs of the loan,' and several courts
that found the borrower sophisticated noted that the lender had
not engaged in deceptive practices.'
It is unclear whether financial necessity and lack of choice
can override the borrower's sophistication. 7 Although some
courts have confused the analysis, necessity and lack of choice
can coincide or occur separately. For example, someone who
borrows for a medical emergency may have nothing to sell to
raise the money. Compare the borrower who seeks funds to
avoid loss by foreclosure of valuable equity in property. The
latter borrower is under financial necessity but presumably
could sell the property in advance of foreclosure or reinstate
and restructure the oversecured obligation in bankruptcy. Fi-
nancial necessity should ordinarily be combined with a lack of
choice to carry persuasive weight. Some of the interest pricing
cases support this analysis.' Conversely, lack of choice
(finding that a second mortgage taken out for the purpose of purchasing vinyl siding
for the home was not unconscionable because the Puerto Rican borrowers fully un-
derstood the loan and were not illiterate in English as claimed); lamartino v.
Avallone, 477 A.2d 124, 128 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (concluding that the note was not
unconscionable because the borrower was an experienced real estate speculator repre-
sented by counsel); Barnes, 548 P.2d at 1021 (denying relief on the ground of uncon-
scionability when the borrower had "extensive business acumen" in real estate trans-
actions and where the borrower's attorney explained the interest rate to the borrow-
er); Bekins Bar V Ranch, 664 P.2d at 463-64 (treating a borrower as an experienced
busineasperson, thus rejecting a portrayal as simple-minded hay farmer and holding
the contract not unconscionable); cf Comdisco Disaster Recovery Serv., Inc. v. Money
Management Sys., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 48, 55 (). Mass. 1992) (holding a default rate
of 18% not unconscionable when negotiated at arms-length by a sophisticated corpo-
rate borrower). Sophistication might not be fatal if the court allows substantive un-
fairness alone to constitute unconscionability.
265. Several cases have held that compounding of interest contravenes public
policy. See, e.g., Kredietbank, N.V. v. Esic Capital Corp. (In re Rosner), 48 B.R. 538,
558 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1985). One commentator explained that courts are concerned
with the deceptive nature of compounding. See BROWN & KEEST, supra note 26,
§ 4.2.3.2.2, at 89.
266. See, e.g., E & W Bldg. Material v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 648 F.
Supp. 289, 291 (M.D. Ala. 1986) (finding no evidence of "trickery or deception);
Behins Bar V Ranch, 664 P.2d at 464 (noting the lack of evidence to support fraud,
deception, unfair surprise or exploitation).
267. Professor Ellinghaus has argued that courts should look beyond "any nomi-
nal parity of status" to situations in which "unusual pressures are being brought to
bear on one of the parties," such as the prospect of impending bankruptcy.
Ellinghaus, supra note 139, at 768. Presumably he means that even the sophisticat-
ed borrower can be unconscionably exploited.
268. See, e.g., Barnes, 548 P.2d at 1021 (arguing that a claimant who borrowed
money at a high rate to avoid foreclosure of commercial property had the alternative
of selling property before foreclosure); Bekins Bar V Ranch, 664 P.2d at 464 (holding
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should not be relevant without financial necessity. For example,
a speculator who seeks funds for a business opportunity but
has no alternative to the high interest loan is acting under the
artificial financial 'necessity" of "nothing ventured, nothing
gained." Courts requiring procedural unfairness shouldn't rescue
this speculator regardless of how excessive the rate paid.-
3. Substantive Unfairness in the Interest Pricing Cases.
The interest pricing (and UCC) cases often blunder through
their analysis of substantive fairness. Several do not specify the
standard that makes a rate substantively excessive.' Others
employ the market comparison borrowed from the UCC pricing
cases under which experts testify to the rate a borrower and
the collateral would fetch in the marketY 1 That market rate
comparison, however, takes too little into account. At least four
elements compose a fair interest rate: (1) the lender's cost of
that loans at 36% and 58% were not unconscionable despite financial need to save a
ranch because selling a portion of the ranch would have raised the necessary funds).
Carboni v. Arrospide involved a financially distressed borrower who sought to pay
his parents' medical expenses but was unable to borrow from other sources; the
lender could thus propose terms on a "take it or leave it" basis. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845,
851 (Ct. App. 1991). The collateral apparently had over $50,000 equity when the
first loan of $4000 was made, id. at 846, but the court didn't discuss whether the
borrower could have sold that property to raise the money. Rather, the court con-
cluded that the 200% per annum interest rate was unconscionable. Id.
269. See, e.g., Shriver v. Druid Realty Co., 131 A. 815 (Md. 1926) (holding that
a corporation borrowing to construct an additional apartment building to reduce
overhead expenses was not a 'necessitous borrower" deserving relief from alleged
excessive interest). But see In re White, 88 B.R. 498, 510-11 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988)
(holding a 48% default rate unconscionable in a loan to a businessperson to pur-
chase a nightclub).
270. See, e.g., Greene v. Gibraltar Mortgage Inv. Corp., 488 F. Supp. 177 (D.D.C.
1980) (finding unconscionability when a lender was to be repaid $7,000 for a $2,700
loan, but not discussing whether the lender costs or borrower risks justified or did
not justify that price); Burnett v. Ala Moana Pawn Shop, No. 90-267 (D. Haw. Mar.
3, 1992) (holding 20% per month interest on a pawn transaction without explanation
'oppressive" to consumers and in violation of Hawaii's unfair trade practices stat-
utes), affd, 3 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 1993).
271. See, e.g., Carboni, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 846-49 (relying on plaintiffs own testi-
mony, when plaintiff was a licensed real estate broker, that a 200% rate was 10
times the prevailing rate for similar loans); Cheshire Mortgage Serv., Inc. v. Montes,
612 A.2d 1130, 1137-38 (Conn. 1992) (referring to testimony that the rate and points
charged were 'in the middle of the market"); cf. Iamartino v. Avallone, 477 A.2d
124, 128 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (stating that the rate charged on the second mort-
gage, either 37% or 45% depending on the calculation, was in line with rates pre-
vailing for highly speculative real estate ventures); Mobile Am. Corp. v. Howard, 307
So. 2d 507, 508 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (noting that judges are aware of 'common
knowledge" that an 11.75% rate is within prevailing limits for mobile home install-
ment contracts); see also Peter J. Shedd, Real Estate Transactions and the Principles
of Unconscionability, 13 REAL EST. L.J. 334, 351 (1985) (arguing that unconscionabil-
ity can only be applied properly when the rate charged exceeds market interest by
an above normal amount).
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obtaining the money lent, 2 (2) its cost in making and admin-
istering the loan,"3 (3) the risk of inflation, 4 and (4) the
risk of defaultY5 The lender also deserves a fair return on in-
vestment over these costs and risks. The market rate standard
reflects the risk of inflation, but it otherwise substitutes the
marketplace experience for that of the particular lender and
borrower. A lender's unique costs of operation are not relevant.
A borrower's individual risk of default would likely be ignored
beyond such general classifications as the existence of collateral
and lien priority. The market standard may also be unfair to
claimants when the market return on investment is unfairly
high due to monopolies or other circumstancesY
A better approach would examine the relation of the rate
charged to the four composite elements (plus profit) that deter-
mine a fair rate. This is essentially a net profit, or cost-justifi-
cation, approach because it examines costs and risks for each
specific transaction in relation to the rate charged. Some appel-
late courts appear to adopt this standard," ¢ but the vague
272. Benfield, aupra note 17, at 826.
273. Id at 829.
274. See Allen & Staaf, supra note 98, at 225 (noting that inflation is an impor-
tant concern, since the money loaned today may be worth less in the future).
275. Id at 224; Benfield, supra note 17, at 830. The risk of default includes
detrimental impacts of bankruptcy, as well as the risk of nonpayment on default.
Thus, factors relevant to the risk of default, such as the borrower's credit-worthiness,
and factors relevant to the prospect of full payment upon default, primarily the val-
ue of any collateral, should be considered. For a general discussion of the compo-
nents of interest, see Oeltjen, supra note 16, at 196-98.
276. See California Grocers Ass'n v. Bank of Am., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396, 402 (Ct.
App. 1994) (recognizing that a price within the range of general market prices could
be held unconscionable if the market is oligopolistic). The Carboni case illustrates
another problem with a market rate comparison. See Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 845, 849-51 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding a note that carried a 200% interest
rate which ballooned to $390,000 from $4,000 was both procedurally and substantive-
ly unconscionable). One commentator reasoned that the borrower's inability to get a
loan from other sources renders prevailing market rates irrelevant, as there was no-
'market" for this loan. See Giedgowd, supra note 123, at 101. While this logic is
debatable, judging fairness separate from any market rate avoids that complaint.
277. See, e.g., Harm v. Taylor, 429 A.2d 946, 948-49 (Conn. 1980) (claiming that
determining whether interest rates are unconscionable should not be decided by "ju-
dicial surmise' about prevailing prime interest rates but rather by the financial cir-
cumstances of the borrower, the increased risk of a second mortgage, and the in-
come-producing capability of the mortgaged property should be considered). The Cali-
fornia courts, in resolving pricing challenges to banking services fees, have also em-
ployed a cost-justification standard comparing fees charged to the bank's costs in
providing the service. See, e.g., California Grocers Ass'n, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 403
(rejecting an unconscionability claim against a $3 NSF fee when the actual cost was
approximately $1.50 and noting that while the 100% profit was generous, the cases
of price unconscionability generally involve greater price-value disparities). See gen-
erally Giedgowd, supra note 123, at 104 (predicting that the California courts'
willingness to require cost-justification of banking service fees will undoubtedly be
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direction from some of them to examine the loan's commercial
"risks," "purposes," and "effects"' 8 offers little guidance to tri-
al courts. Trial courts should at least examine the articulated
composite factors in every case, whether or not they go on to
consider commercial policies and the like.
Regardless of the standard employed, practical problems
unique to the lending industry complicate gauging the substan-
tive fairness of rate pricing. Lenders rarely tailor a rate to a
particular borrower's credit characteristics. Instead, the lending
market presents a stratified range of lenders who typically offer
a single "house" rate to all qualified customers even if their
credit standings merit lower ratesY9 The market ranges in
rough order from commercial banks and credit unions to credit
card financing, retail installment sales credit, finance compa-
nies, rent-to-own companies, pawnshops, and loan sharks. A
consumer who desires furniture on credit may face borrowing at
(say) 21 percent from a retail seller, 40 percent from a finance
company, and an effective rate of 200-300 percent from a rent-
extended to loan pricing).
278. See, e.g., In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 874 (E.D. Pa. 1966)
(listing the issues the judge should explore including the extent to which the rate
reflects anticipated risks); Towne Funding Co. v. Macchia, 501 N.Y.S.2d 717, 717-18
(App. Div. 1986) (requiring a hearing, under Connecticut law, to examine the sur-
rounding context of the loans including "their commercial setting, risks, purposes,
and effects"). One commentator has observed that the Elkins-Dell analysis looking to
risk "may be a severe limitation on the usefulness of the unconscionability doctrine
to those persons who are so impoverished that they ... could not have gotten cred-
it elsewhere, or at least not on any better terms." Shanker & Abel, supra note 75,
at 708. The unconscionability standard, however, does not charitably ensure low
prices or low rates. Rather, it polices against unfairly excessive rates. An
uncreditworthy borrower may justify a high rate.
Some courts have examined only the borrower's risk of default when deciding
whether to hold a rate conscionable. See, e.g., Harris v. Howell, 739 F. Supp. 565,
568 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (holding a 20% rate not unconscionable given borrower's 'credit
status"), affd, 902 F.2d 959 (11th Cir. 1990); Bank of New Haven v. Liner, No. 91CV
0345165, 1994 WL 282222, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 10, 1994) (holding an inter-
est rate of prime plus 2% charged to claimants who were not the "most responsible
and substantial" customers who receive the prime rate was not unconscionable as a
matter of law); Christiano v. Bonesteel, No. 89 CV 0104622, 1991 WL 162160, at *3
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 1991) (upholding a trial referee's finding that a 23% loan
to a "shaky credit risk* was not unconscionable); see also In re Chicago Reed & Fur-
niture Co., 7 F.2d 885, 885 (7th Cir. 1925) (holding a 40% loan unconscionable
where the collateral was ample given surplus obtained on foreclosure). Courts should
not focus only on credit risk unless that risk alone justifies the rate agreed to by
the parties. It would also be erroneous to allow a miserable credit history to justify
any agreed upon rate.
279. See Oeltjen, supra note 16, at 225 (describing how the rise of uniform rates
is due in part to the convenience of establishing a "credit package"). See generally
CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra note 48, at 113 (describing how credit grantors
find it uneconomical to adjust the price of credit precisely to differences between the
borrowers).
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to-own dealer. If a consumer whose risk merits a rate of 50
percent can successfully challenge the 200 percent rent-to-own
rate as unfair, lenders would have to adjust their business
procedures. The rent-to-own dealer would be compelled to offer
loan programs at (say) 75 percent, 100 percent, 125 percent and
so on or risk a fairness challenge from more creditworthy bor-
rowers. Though not necessarily a bad result, legislatures and
courts should understand this effect when developing and ap-
plying an appropriate fairness standard.
A closely related problem is that some creditors, particular-
ly rent-to-own companies, forgo the transaction costs of indi-
vidual credit decisions in favor of more generalized inquiry,
such as the overall default record of their past borrowers.'
As a result, borrowers who in fact present a comparatively low
credit risk (here fifty percent) may be charged a rate (200-300
percent) that a court would deem grossly unfair in relation to
that risk, particularly when a net profit approach is employed.
Courts should be aware that applying the net profit standard
may force these lenders to incur (and pass on) the transaction
costs of tailoring rates to each borrower. The appropriate inqui-
ry for a lender that does not determine the credit risks of par-
ticular borrowers should focus on the risk record of its borrow-
ers generally, rather than the predictive risk for each particular
borrower.
The final practical problem in judging substantive rate
fairness is the necessity that courts understand the variable
costs and risks of the lending industry. If they do, the uncon-
scionability standard should overcome the critique that usury
does not take into account the costs and risks of a particular
loanY1 For example, courts should understand that because
transactions costs are usually fixed and independent of the
amount loaned, seemingly high rates for small loans may be
justified. 2  Ghetto merchants may have higher costs of
280. Cf. Remco Enters., Inc. v. Houston, 677 P.2d 567, 573 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984)
(finding that a rent-to-own customer received the benefit of not having to undergo a
credit check and holding a 108% markup over retail conscionable). Some consumer
advocates have challenged the rent-to-own industry's assertion that it does not check
credit, alleging that the industry in fact uses nationwide computer checks such as
Tele-Track. See Hearing, supra note 3, at 244-49 (written testimony of attorney Da-
vid L. Ramp) (stating that the rent-to-own industry uses nationwide computer net-
works to check the credit-worthiness of prospective customers). The industry re-
sponds that it typically does not check credit, and that the Tele-Track service, used
by few companies, reports only those customers who have stolen merchandise from
other subscribers. Id. at 744 (May 18, 1993 letter from Bill Keese to Rep. Henry
Gonzalez).
281. Cf Note, supra note 175, at 1253 n.30 (arguing that usury laws which set
an inflexible rate are unreflective of the "true costs and risks" to the lender).
282. See generally Robert W. Johnson, Conclusions for Regulation, in THE CON-
1994] 777
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operation than retailers generally.' The rent-to-own industry
claims its special services justify higher effective rates.2 '
Pawnshops limit their recourse to the collateral and therefore
assume the risk that the collateral's value may decline.' A
market price standard might force lenders to offer the same or
fewer services than lenders generally. Though the net profit
standard encourages specialized services, courts must be sure to
give proper credit for those extra services in judging substan-
tive rate fairness.
Determining the market rate, or as this Article advocates,
the rate justified by the composite elements identified (the net
profit standard), does not conclude the court's scrutiny. The
next question is what degree of excess over the reference em-
ployed is tolerable. One leading case held a rate ten times the
market rate unconscionable by reference to the classic UCC
pricing cases that found sales of goods unconscionable when the
price was three to four times their retail value.' Because the
market standard already builds in a market return on invest-
ment (profit), courts using the net profit approach must be
careful when borrowing any disparity formula developed in
pricing cases employing the market standard. The net profit
standard might justify more disparity above costs and risks
because it does not initially include the built-in profit of the
market rate comparator.
Rather than state a mathematical formula to adjust for
this concern, the disparity necessary for unconscionability
SUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY, ITS COSTS AND REGULATION 148 (John M. Chapman &
Robert P. Shay eds., 1967) (noting that fixed costs constitute a substantial portion of
the cost of the loan). The UCCC usury statutes account for this by employing a
graduated rate ceiling that declines as the loan amount increases. See UNIF. CON-
SUMER CREDIT CODE §2.201, 7A U.LA. 61 (1974) (requiring finance charges for non-
open-end credit to not exceed the greater of 18% or the total of 36% on unpaid bal-
ances of $300 or less, 21% on unpaid balances that exceed $300 but not $1000, and
15% on unpaid balances that exceed $1000); id. §2.401, 7A UJA. 79-80 (1974)
(same limitations for open-end credit); id §2.201, 7 U.LA. 643 (1974) (1968 Act)
(same limitations for non-revolving charge accounts); id- §3.508, 7 U.LA. 772 (1974)
(1968 Act) (same limitations for so-called supervised loans).
283. See FTC REPORT, supra note 170, at 14-15.
284. See Hearing, supra note 3, at 53 (statement of Bill Keese, Executive Direc-
tor of Association of Progressive Rental Organizations) (testifying that due to the
unique nature of the rent-to-own business, labor costs, interest cost, delivery, and re-
pair costs are greater than for other operations); cf. Remco Enters., Inc. v. Houston,
677 P.2d 567, 573 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a 108% markup by a rent-to-
own center was not unconscionable when, among other things, the center was re-
sponsible for servicing the TV).
285. Cf. Jonathon King, In Hock for Thirty Years, SUN SENTINEL, July 11, 1993,
at 21 ('[A] pawnbroker ... will never take more [in collection] than you bring
[her].... Mhat in itself may be worth a few percentage points.").
286. See Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 849 (Ct. App. 1991).
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should be left to a court's discretion. Mathematic formulas
smack of usury and may lead to unfair results. For example, if
a rate of six percent covers risks and costs, a rate of eighteen
percent should not automatically be unfair,' whereas a rate
of sixty percent, given costs and risks justifying thirty percent,
should not always be fair despite the lesser relative disparity.
In determining how much profit is too much, Professor Speidel's
proposal under section 2-302 to compare net profits in the mar-
ketplace is valuable if applied as a persuasive rather than con-
trolling standard.2 '
4. Remedies Under the Interest Pricing Cases. Too few of
the interest pricing cases have held challenged rates unconscio-
nable to give a developed picture of the remedies courts will
award. A recent case awarded the usual remedy of the UCC
pricing cases; the excessive rate was reduced to a reasonable
one.' Some authority seems to support denying all interest,
but it is either datedo or involved "default" interest, which
287. Cf. Best v. United States Natl Bank of Or., 739 P.2d 554, 556 (Or. 1987)
(observing that $5 NSF charges were "relatively small" despite being allegedly two
to three times the bank's costs).
288. See Speidel, supra note 169, at 373 (proposing the seller's net profit be
compared under a standard of gross disparity to net profits of similarly situated
sellers of similar goods). A recent California decision deciding the conscionability of
NSF charges appears to employ the flexible analysis advocated, as it held the
charges conscionable by reference to both the bank's actual processing costs and the
prices charged by other financial institutions. See California Grocers Ass'n v. Bank of
Am., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 396, 402-03 (Ct. App. 1994). In addition to comparing profits
in the similarly situated marketplace, the court should have the discretion to look at
profits of other lenders or of industries generally. This may aid in determining if the
market for the particular loan is a monopoly. For example, in scrutinizing a rent-to-
own operation's rate of return, courts might consider statistics of rent-to-own profit
margins compared to those of conventional retailers. Cf. Alix M. Freedman, Peddling
Dreams: A Marketing Giant Uses Its Sales Prowess to Profit on Poverty, reprinted in
139 CONG. REC. H7142, at 145 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1993) (reporting a 16% profit
margin of a rent-to-own operation-a margin that is "eye-popping by retail stan-
dards").
289. Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 847 (Ct. App. 1991) (affirming
the trial court's reduction of a 200% rate to 24%). A reviewer of Carboni complained
that there was no mention of how the trial court determined the substitute rate, see
Giedgowd, supra note 123, at 103, but presumably it applied testimony that the
market rate for third lien loans was 18-21%, whereas the disputed loan was secured
by a fourth deed of trust. See Carboni, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 846; see also In re Elkins-
Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 875 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (allowing a bankruptcy judge
to reduce interest to a reasonable rate if the rate is found unconscionable on re-
mand); Bridge v. Kedon, 126 P. 149, 150 (Cal. 1912) (affirming the trial court's re-
duction of unconscionable rates of compounded 2 -3% per month to "reasonable and
fair" amount of simple 12% per annum).
290. See, e.g., In re Chicago Reed & Furniture Co., 7 F.2d 885, 885-86 (7th Cir.
1925) (affirming the bankruptcy court's refusal to allow a lender an unconscionable
$300 loan commission, though validating a 7% interest rate since the borrower
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implicates liquidated damages principles and remedies." 1 Af-
firmative relief for unconscionable interest, whether
restitutionary or punitive, will likely be denied--one court held
that a borrower who had repaid the loan entirely could not
recover unconscionable interest. 2 Relief might be possible,
however, if either principal or interest remains due on the obli-
gation against which past excessive payments of interest can be
offset.
5. The Consumer/Commercial Party Distinction Under the
Interest Pricing Cases. Though at least one commentator has
assumed that unconscionability will not protect commercial
borrowers,' the interest pricing cases have applied the same
standards to consumer and commercial borrowersY However,
apparently challenged the commission only); Westchester Mortgage Co. v. Grand
Rapids & I.R. Co., 213 N.Y.S. 593, 598 (Sup. Ct. 1926) (holding that even if a loan
was governed by Rhode Island law which imposed no usury limit on the loan, the
rate was unconscionable and therefore void), modified, 219 N.Y.S. 695 (N.Y. App.
Div.), modified, 158 N.E. 70 (N.Y. 1927).
Another remedy sometimes employed is denying foreclosure of any realty
collateral. See, e.g., Harem v. Taylor, 429 A.2d 946, 949 (Conn. 1980) (declaring that
a court can reduce an unconscionable rate or withhold foreclosure). Presumably the
lender would lose its secured position and have to proceed against the collateral as
a judgment creditor, a result similar to the bankruptcy penalty of equitable subordi-
nation, discussed supra at note 199 and accompanying text. Setting aside the mort-
gage lien as a sanction for unconscionable interest has also been employed in other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Wingold v. Horowitz, 274 So. 2d 591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1973) (applying a Bahamas statute and finding the trial court within its authority to
cancel a mortgage and indebtedness when the interest charged was unconscionable),
rev'd on other grounds, 292 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1974); Milani v. Banks, 98 D.L.R. 4th
104, 109 (Ont. 1992) (setting aside the charge, vacating the registration, revising the
repayment note to $32,000 from $35,000, and striking the interest).
291. See In re Hollstrom, 133 B.R. 535, 541 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991) (ordering
recovery at a nondefault contractual rate of 12% rather than 36%); In re White, 88
B.R. 498 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (holding a 48% default rate unconscionable and
asserting that the court lacks authority to reform the note to a reasonable default
rate).
292. See Williams v. E.F. Hutton Mortgage. Corp., 555 So. 2d 158, 162 (Ala.
1989). The Williams case is one of the few reported class action cases challenging
the fairness of loan interest rates. Such claims do not seem amenable to class action
pursuit, as they turn on borrower-specific proof of risk, and when insisted on, proce-
dural unfairness. One possible use of class actions, though, would be against credi-
tors who base their rates on their experience with borrowers generally and do not
investigate individual borrower risks.
293. See Shedd, supra note 271, at 351 n.54 (arguing that 'unconscionability
would not provide relief for interest rates charged in the financing of commercial
real estate").
294. For examples of cases applying the unconscionability standard to commer-
cial borrowers, see Metal-Built Prods., Inc. v. Bornstein (In re Metal-Built Prods.,
Inc.), 3 B.R. 176, 179 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding a 100% rate conscionable in a
debt between commercial parties); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 457
(Utah 1983) (holding rates of 36% and 58% conscionable).
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because a finding of lack of sophistication may be required,
commercial parties will prevail on rare occasions only.'
Moreover, several of the cases involving commercial borrowers
counsel judicial restraint because interfering with commercial
loan pricing may inhibit vital high risk capital.'
D. Comparative Rate Regulation-General
Australia, the Bahamas, Belgium, Canada, England, Ger-
many, Mexico, New Zealand, and Switzerland are among
the jurisdictions that regulate interest rates using an uncon-
scionability standard. The discussion below focuses on the stat-
utory unconscionability models of England and Germany be-
cause of England's influence on similar adoptions in other coun-
tries and the advanced development of both countries' case law
and legal commentary on this issue.'
Uncertainty followed England's 1854 repeal' of its three
centuries old usury standard. ° Aside from the Court of
Chancery's very limited jurisdiction, there was no check on
295. Refer to note 264 supra and accompanying text.
296. See, e.g., In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 871 (E.D. Pa. 1966)
(noting that important policy considerations favor promotion of availability of funds
for businesses in distress even if at high rates of interest); Bekins Bar V Ranch, 664
P.2d at 464 (arguing that finding unconscionability 'on these facts" would discourage
future lenders from loaning to financially troubled businesses because of the risk
that a court would not allow the cost of high risk capital); see also Shriver v. Druid
Realty Co., 131 A. 815, 819 (Md. 1926) (noting that relieving a corporation from an
allegedly excessive rate would chill credit for "hazardous or venturous enterprises').
Of course, the same might be said for credit to high risk consumers. Cf. Amoco Oil
Co. v. Ashcraft, 791 F.2d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 1986) (speculating that poor borrowers
may be worse off if courts do not enforce unfair bargains because merchants with
knowledge of that potential may be unwilling to deal with them).
297. Interest regulation summaries for these and certain other countries can be
obtained from the annual Martindale-Hubbell International Law Digest. Canada's
legislation was enacted by each province rather than federally. See generally GERALD
H. FRIDMAN, THE LAW OF CONTRACT IN CANADA 313-16 (2d ed. 1986).
298. England's Moneylenders Act of 1900, discussed infra in the text accompany-
ing note 302, was adopted with some variation by, among other jurisdictions, the
Canadian provinces, Australia and New Zealand. See generally K.L. Fletcher, Review
of Unconscionable Transactions, 8 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 45, 57-58 (1973) (tracing the
Moneylenders Act's influence into the twentieth century).
299. See A.H. Angelo & E.P. Ellinger, Unconscionable Contracts: A Comparative
Study of the Approaches in England, France, Germany, and the United States, 14
Loy. LA. INVL & COMP. L.J. 455, 462 (1992) (noting that English courts were slow
to intervene in cases involving usurious bargains when those cases became free from
legislative controls in 1854). See generally PRIDGEN, supra note 24, § 10.01[2], at 10-
4 (discussing the history of usury in England).
300. Adopted in 1545, England's legislation allowing interest at 10% or less was
repealed during the reign of Queen Mary but reenacted in 1570. See BROWN &
KEEST, supra note 26, § 2.2.1, at 20. The 10% rate allowed was lowered to 5% by
the 1713 Statute of Anne. Riley, supra note 20, at 201 n.9.
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interest rates."1  Coming in response to then widespread
abuse, the 1900 Moneylenders Act articulated a flexible uncon-
scionability standard and explicitly authorized courts to reopen
"harsh and unconscionable" loan bargains.' In 1974, the
Consumer Credit Act amended that standard; it now proscribes
"extortionate" and "grossly exorbitant" interest pricing.' 3
Germany's rate regulation experience is remarkably similar
to England's. German usury regulation succumbed in 1867 to
free market regulation, but abuses prompted the Parliament to
adopt a flexible unconscionability standard to police interest
pricing fairness in the German Civil Code of 1900.'
1. The Procedural v. Substantive Debate in Comparative
Rate Regulation. The procedural unfairness debate lurks unre-
solved in both England and Germany. England's Consumer
Credit Act defines a credit bargain as extortionate if it "(a) re-
quires... payments... which are grossly exorbitant, or (b)
301. See generally P.V.B., Reforming the Moneylenders Acts, 83 LAW Q. REV. 196,
196 (1967) (observing that no restraints on "extortionate moneylending" existed after
the repeal of usury statutes in 1854 with the exception of the Court of Chancery's
ability to set aside harsh and unconscionable bargains).
302. The 1900 Act provided in relevant part that when interest is 'excessive"
and "the transaction is harsh and unconscionable, or is otherwise such that a court
of equity would give relief, the court may re-open the transaction . . . [and provide
such relief) as the court, having regard to the risk and all the circumstances, may
adjudge to be reasonable . . . ." Moneylenders Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., ch. 51, § 1
(Eng.). For an excellent historical discussion of England's unconscionability regula-
tion, see H.W. Wilkinson, Extortionate Credit Bargains Under the Consumer Credit
Act 1974, 8 ANGLO-AM. L. RFV. 240, 241-43 (1979).
303. Section 138 of the 1974 Act provides in relevant part that a "credit bargain
is extortionate if it (a) requires the debtor ... to make payments ... which are
grossly exorbitant, or (b) otherwise grossly contravenes ordinary principles of fair
dealing.' Consumer Credit Act, 1974, ch. 39, § 138 (Eng.). Debate ensued in England
and the question remains open whether the new phrasing meant something different
than prior law, which would limit the utility of case authority under the 1900 Act.
See Lionel Bentley & Geraint G. Howells, Judicial Treatment of Extortionate Credit
Bargains, 1989 CONY. & PROP. LAW 164, 166 (concluding that the new standard
seems more lenient to creditors). But see Wilkinson, supra note 302, at 243 (suggest-
ing the changes will have little effect).
304. Article 138 of the German Civil Code provides:
(1) A legal transaction which is contrary to public policy is void.
(2) A legal transaction is also void whereby a person exploits the distressed
situation, inexperience, lack of judgmental ability or grave weakness of will
of another to obtain the grant or promise of pecuniary advantages for him-
self or a third party which are obviously disproportionate to the performance
given in return.
Angelo & Ellinger, supra note 299, at 483 (employing translation of 1976 amendment
in ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & JAMES R. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 1188, 1209
(2d ed. 1977)). See generally John P. Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair Ex-
change in French and German Law, 12 TUL. L REV. 42 (1937) (concluding that the
German experience with Article 138 introduced moral and social values into the con-
cept of usury).
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otherwise grossly contravenes ordinary principles of fair
dealing."' Commentators have found the phrase "or other-
wise" ambiguous." The German Civil Code is similarly uncer-
tain. One commentator observed without citation that German
courts require, in addition to substantive disparity, that the
borrower's weakness be exploited,'3° but gross pricing dispari-
ty alone may be actionable under Germany's more general pro-
hibition of transactions contrary to public policy."
2. Procedural Unfairness in Comparative Rate Regulation.
The same factors of procedural unfairness identified in case law
under the UCC appear relevant under the English and German
statutes." English courts apply the standard of sophistication
as whether the borrower could understand the loan terms of-
fered.310 Having been represented by counsel in negotiating
the loan is usually fatal to an English borrower's claim."'
305. Consumer Credit Act, 1974, ch. 39 § 138 (Eng.).
306. See, e.g., Bentley & Howells, supra note 39, at 235. It is unclear whether
'otherwise" means some procedural unfairness must be shown, or whether substan-
tive unfairness alone contravenes ordinary principles of fair dealing. See Wilkinson,
supra note 302, at 243-44. Cases decided under the former 1900 Moneylenders Act
applied that Act to redress substantive unfairness alone. See, e.g., Fortescue Ltd. v.
Bradshaw, 27 T.L.R. 251 (K.B. 1911) (reducing contract rate from 220% to 50/ with-
out finding any procedural unfairness).
307. See Angelo & Ellinger, supra note 299, at 499.
308. See Dawson, supra note 304, at 71 (referring to Article 138(1) of the Ger-
man Civil Code of 1900, which provides that a legal transaction that is contrary to
public policy is void).
309. The debtor's "age, experience, business capacity and state of health," and
the degree and nature of the debtor's "financial pressure" are detailed by the Eng-
lish Consumer Credit Act as relevant "in relation to the debtor" in determining
whether the loan is extortionate. Consumer Credit Act, 1974, ch. 39, § 138(3) (Eng.).
It also appears relevant whether the English lender employed any misrepresentation
or sharp practice to disguise the actual rate paid. Presumably that would render the
rate unconscionable, though this issue has been addressed in cases denying relief to
a sophisticated borrower, with the court adding a conclusory statement that no de-
ception was involved. See, e.g., Reading Trust, Ltd. v. Spero, 1 K.B. 492, 509-10
(C.A. 1930) (finding no lender misrepresentation to experienced borrower); see also
Davies v. Directloans Ltd., 2 All E.R. 783, 783-87 (1986) (holding that a 25% mort-
gage interest rate was not extortionate because the borrowers had independent legal
advice and financial pressures were not excessive and noting that the lender testi-
fied that it advised every borrower to seek a loan elsewhere because its rates ex-
ceeded those of a building society); Carringtons, Ltd. v. Smith, 1 K.B. 79, 92 (C.A.
1906) (enforcing a 75% rate for a business loan and finding no deception). German
statutes void a transaction that exploits inexperience, weakness, inability to judge or
distressful situations. Refer to note 304 supra.
310. See, e.g., Reading Trust, 1 K.B. at 510 (holding that a loan was not harsh
and unconscionable when the borrower at a 80% rate understood the loan transac-
tion thoroughly). Courts should determine whether the borrower understood that the
rate substantially exceeded risks and costs, not solely whether the borrower knew it
was paying a facially high rate.
311. See, e.g., Davies, 2 All E.I. at 790 (finding no unconscionabiity when
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English courts take a strict view of what constitutes financial
necessity or "pressure"; one court suggests that "penniless debt-
ors" who are "desperate for money" would qualify as necessi-
tous."2 Borrowers for business speculation, however, are not
necessitous. 13 English courts have refused to aid borrowers
who created their own distress, or who had some viable alter-
native to a high rate loan such as selling their property.314
This is the English equivalent of lack of choice.31 German
cases have drawn the same distinctions.1 6
3. Substantive Unfairness in Comparative Rate Regulation.
England's Consumer Credit Act directs the court to evaluate
the rate charged in relation to prevailing interest rates and the
borrower's risk. 17 German courts have justified high interest
rates by reference to comparable market transactions,3 18  bor-
rower risk, and the effects of inflation.319 It is apparent from
"naive and trusting' consumer borrowers were advised by an independent solicitor,
and holding that they could not challenge the loan due to their own business inex-
perience); Parkfield Trust Ltd. v. Portman, 81 Sol. J. 687 (1937) (holding that a loan
at 177% to a borrower advised by an independent solicitor was not unconscionable).
312. See Patel v. Patel, (Q.B. Nov. 25, 1987) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file)
(holding that borrowers paying 48% interest on a loan to prepare for the religious
visit of a swami were neither penniless nor forced to accept the loan).
313. See, e.g., Reading Trust, 1 K.B. at 509-10 (holding that an antique dealer
who borrowed to finance inventory was not necessitous). But see Shahabinia v.
Giyahchi (C.A. July 5, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) (ruling that a 45%
loan to a sandwich bar business was unconscionable even without any apparent
proof of lack of sophistication or financial necessity).
314. See, e.g., Davies, 2 All E.R. at 790 (holding a loan not unconscionable when
pressure on the borrowers to borrow to avoid losing their home purchased under a
unique deferred sales arrangement was the "inevitable consequence of their original
decision to buy [the home]").
315. For a discussion of lack of choice refer to note 161 supra.
316. See Angelo & Ellinger, supra note 299, at 484 (illustrating necessity under
German law as when the debtor faces economic collapse, but not for business expan-
sion or acquisition); John P. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version,
89 HARV. L REV. 1041, 1057-58 & n.37 (1976) (citing German court decisions in
which necessity was not found when money was sought for business speculation, or
if the borrower had assets that were disposable or available as security on a less
expensive loan).
317. See Consumer Credit Act, 1974, ch. 39, § 138(2) (Eng.) (In determining
whether a credit bargain is extortionate, regard shall be had to ... interest rates
prevailing at the time it was made ... [and the] creditorrs] . . . degree of risk.").
This supports the author's approach of judging rates in relation to risks and costs,
with the market standard employed as persuasive authority only. English courts
have been criticized for looking to rates prevailing for the class of lender involved,
without regard to whether the actual rate charged is excessive in relation to the
risks the particular claimant presents. These courts are 'accepting the nature of the
lending institution as a satisfactory explanation of the high interest rate." Bentley &
Howells, supra note 39, at 236.
318. See Dawson, supra note 316, at 1063 (noting that annual interest rates of
96% and 34% were upheld when similar rates were commonly charged).
319. See Angelo & Ellinger, supra note 299, at 486 (reporting that annual
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English cases that almost anything goes when the debtor has a
bad credit history, minimal collateral, or both. Rates of 177 per-
cent, 120 percent, and 80 percent have been upheld in such
circumstances,' as English courts struggle to ascertain a fair
rate for such loans.32
The English and German statutes employ vague standards
of disparity typical in America; England's statute refers to
"gross exorbitance,"3" Germany's to an obvious dispropor-
tion.3" They both stand in contrast to the Roman doctrine of
laesio enormis in rejecting a purely mathematical approach to
disparity in favor of a flexible case-by-case standard.'a Laesio
enormis, which allowed sellers to rescind sales of land sold for
less than half of true value,3  was never generally accepted
interest rates of 96% were approved during periods of high inflation); Dawson, supra
note 316, at 1063 n.52 (noting that interest rates of 10% a day were not held ex-
cessive during the 1920 to 1923 German period of inflation); see also HOMER &
SYLLA, supra note 20, at 508 (noting that the Berlin Stock Exchange once quoted a
market rate for call loans of over 10,000% per annum).
320. See Parkflield Trust Ltd. v. Portman, 81 Sol. J. 687 (1937) (approving 177%
interest for loan secured by a speculative reversion in an insurance company loan);
Mills Conduit Inv., Ltd. v. Tattersall, 56 T.LR. 209, 210 (K.B. 1939) (approving
120% interest for a loan to a borrower who provided no income information and
secured the loan with a postdated check); Reading Trust, Ltd. v. Spero, 1 K.B. 492,
510 (CAL. 1930) (approving loans at 60% and 80% to a business borrower with no
security who bought stock on credit and who had bank overdraft).
321. See Mills Conduit Inv., Ltd. v. Tattersall, 56 T.LR 209, 210 (KB. 1939)
(holding that a 120% loan to a "reckless" debtor was not excessive because Ti]f ever
there was a case in which the interest cannot be calculated at all except in terms of
a quite ridiculous figure ... this is that case"). English commentators suggest that
the line should be drawn somewhere. See Lord Meston, Rates of Interest in
Moneylending Transactions, 1 SOLIc. 40, 46 (1962) (suggesting that where a loan is
unsecured and the borrower is irresponsible, the lender is justified in charging 80%
and more, but 'an astronomical rate of interest such as 400 per cent would offend
against the conscience'); Wilkinson, supra note 302, at 252-53 (arguing that interest
rates on high risk loans still have a conscionable ceiling).
322. Consumer Credit Act, 1974, ch. 39, § 138(1) (Eng.).
323. See Dawson, supra note 316, at 1063.
324. In 1927, England flirted with a mathematical formulation and adopted a
presumption of unconscionabiity where loan rates exceeded 48%. The 1927 Money-
lenders Act provided in relevant part that if the annual rate exceeded 48%, the
court shall 'unless the contrary is proved, presume for the purposes of [the 1900
Moneylenders Act] that the interest charged is excessive. .. ." Moneylenders Act,
1927, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, ch. 21, § 10 (Eng.). The 1974 Act abolished this presumption,
but placed on the creditor the burden of proving the loan was not extortionate,
whether the interest rate was below or above 48%. Consumer Credit Act, 1974, ch.
39, § 171(7) (Eng.). See generally Bentley & Howells, supra note 39, at 241 (analyz-
ing governmental reasons for rejecting a 48% rate presumption). See Dawson, supra
note 316, at 1062-63 (noting the formula of laesio enormis was "emphatically reject-
ed" by the German Civil Code drafters who employed the test of disproportion which
'probably gave as much guidance as language could usefully provide once simple
arithmetic had been abandoned").
325. See generally REINHARD ZrMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, 259-70
(1990) (chronicling the expansion, contraction, and eventual disappearance of laesio
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in Europe for other types of contractual exchanges 2  and was
criticized by commentators as arbitrary and inflexible.3'
4. Comparative Rate Regulation Remedies. English and
German remedies for unfair interest rates are at least equal to
and in some cases better than those allowed in America.
Germany's statute declares unfair transactions "void." "
Though interpreted initially to bar recovery of both principal
and interest, courts now allow recovery of principal.3" The
lender cannot recover any interest, however, even as reduced to
a fair rate.' In contrast, English courts reduce an excessive
rate to a fair one." * Commentators criticize Germany's denial
enormis in European law). The unconscionability doctrine, while applied typically to
protect buyers rather than sellers, would in appropriate circumstances relieve sellers
and lenders from unfair bargains. Cf In re Estate of Young, 367 N.Y.S.2d 717, 722
(Sup. Ct. 1975) (holding that a contract for an interest-free payment obligation to an
author was conscionable because of the risk assumed by the publisher).
326. See Dawson, aupra note 138, at 276 (reviewing the limitation of Iaeaio
enormis to property transfers and the refusal to review adequacy of bargains gener-
ally during the ascent of consideration). Loaesio enormis has some remaining life in
the French law governing realty sales. See Angelo & Ellinger, supra note 299, at
474-75 (discussing lUsion as the modern remnant of laesio enormis which nullifies
consent for property sold at less than half its value). Laesio enormis also lurks in
the interest rate statutes of some jurisdictions. For example, loans in France are
usurious and criminal if they exceed by more than 33% the rate charged generally
for loans of similar costs and risk. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL INTERNATIONAL LAW
DIGEST, FRA-17 (1993). Rates exceeding the normal market rate by 75% are punish-
able as crimes in Uruguay. Id. at URU-5. Cf. Krocker v. Midtown Mortgage &
Loans Ltd., 52 D.L.R.3d 286, 291 (Alta. Sup. Ct. 1975) (ruling that a rate of almost
twice the 'going rate" is unconscionable).
327. See, e.g., 3 SYMONS, supra note 138, § 927, at 637 n.18 (arguing that arbi-
trary rules of value are unfair and preferring determination on a case-by-case basis
after consideration of all circumstances); ZIMMERMANN, supra note 325, at 270 (advo-
cating judicial consideration of the specific circumstances rather than rigid limita-
tions). Both usury and the unconscionability standard (when demanding proof of
substantive unfairness only) have been referred to unflatteringly as descendants of
laeeio enormis. See TEEVEN, supra note 138, at 318 (stating that cases finding un-
conscionability on the sole basis of gross inadequacy are perhaps a "loose adoption"
of the aesio enormis theory); Leff, supra note 110, at 427 (arguing that usury laws
are an emotional remnant of attempts to determine a "fair price" rather than inquir-
ing into procedural unfairness).
328. Refer to note 304 supra for a translation of the German unconscionability
statute.
329. See Angelo & Ellinger, supra note 299, at 486-88 (citing the German policy
change in 1939 that allowed recovery of principal but not interest by a usurious
lender); Dawson, supra note 316, at 1056 n.31 (citing the vigorous debate generated
by this new policy, and the reluctance of German courts to change).
330. Cf Angelo & Ellinger, supra note 299, at 487, 505 (arguing that the better
system is the court's power under § 2-302 of the UCC to set a fair rate).
331. See, e.g., Shahabinia v. Giyahchi, (C.A. July 5, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen li-
brary, Cases file) (modifying an interest rate on appeal to 30% after the trial court
reduced it to 15% from 45%). For cases under the former Moneylenders Act of 1900,
see, e.g., Grosvenor Guarantee Trust Ltd. v. Colleano, 1950 W.N. 501 (150% reduced
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of all interest as harsh and inflexible, but those in England
complain that merely reducing the rate does not deter unfair
pricing, and advocate reform to render "the whole bargain un-
enforceable."' Neither the English nor the German statute
provides penalties more punitive than the loss of all or a por-
tion of interest.'
5. The Consumer/Commercial Party Distinction Under
Comparative Rate Regulation. The English Act relieves "individ-
uals" from extortionate loans.a' It defines "individuals" to in-
clude partnerships but exclude corporations,' a distinction
which is artificial and ill-conceived." The Act protects indi-
viduals whether they borrow for commercial or consumer pur-
poses. 7 However, proving procedural unfairness if required
would pose the same formidable hurdle that American commer-
cial borrowers face.
to 60%); Verner-Jeffreys v. Pinto, 1 Ch. 401, 421 (1929) (48% reduced to 15%);
Garde v. Kerman, 41 T.LR. 597 (Ch. 1925) (60% reduced to 30%); Jennings v.
Seeley, 40 T.L.R. 97 (Ch. 1923) (82 % reduced to 15%). Canadian courts also em-
ploy this remedy under Canadian statutes based on those of England. See, e.g.,
Krocker v. Midtown Mortgage & Loans Ltd., 52 D.LR.3d 286, 292 (Alta. Sup. Ct.
1975) (reducing a 65% rate to 14% for a loan secured with mortgage insurance and
held to be a no risk loan).
332. See Bentley & Howells, supra note 39, at 238-39. Though England's Con-
sumer Credit Act in Section 139(2) authorizes the court to "set aside the whole or
part of any obligation,* which arguably allows voiding the loan agreement, that au-
thority is given only 'for the purpose of relieving the debtor ... from payment of
any sum in excess of that fairly due and reasonable." Consumer Credit Act, 1974,
ch. 39, § 139(2) (Eng.). The statute therefore seems to allow relief only for the un-
fair portion of the bargain. The English statute does allow retroactive relief from
unfair rates; courts have applied past payments of excessive interest partly to future
interest at the reduced fair rate, and the rest to principal. See, e.g., Shahabinia v.
Giyahchi (CA. July 5, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) (applying excess
interest paid to reduce 'capital'). English courts would presumably allow affirmative
recovery of past excessive interest paid when outstanding principal is not enough to
offset that excess. Canadian courts have so construed their remedial provisions based
on England's statutes. See Churchill v. Le Barron Mortgages Ltd., 86 D.LIR3d 538,
540 (Nfld. Dist. Ct. 1978) (allowing retroactive relief to a debtor whose unconsciona-
ble loan was paid off).
333. See Consumer Credit Act, 1974, ch. 39 § 139(2) (describing English law
readjustment of extortionate debt to a fair interest rate); Dawson, supra note 316, at
1056 n.31 (describing German law allowing the usurious creditor to recover principal
but requiring it to forfeit interest).
334. See Consumer Credit Act, 1974, ch. 39, § 137(2Xa) (Eng.).
335. I& § 189(1).
336. Some American usury statutes make the same distinction in excluding only
corporate borrowers from usury protection. Refer to note 351 infra and accompanying
text. Whatever fairness protection given (or not given) to partnerships should be
accorded corporate borrowers as well.
337. See, e.g., Shahabinia v. Giyahchi (CA.. July 5, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen li-
brary, Cases file) (finding a loan to a sandwich bar owner for business purposes
extortionate and readjusting the rate).
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E. The American Usury Standard-General
Usury restrictions persist in most states for certain loan
transactions despite the ravages of state deregulation and fed-
eral preemption.' The next sections of this Article examine
how usury controls can contribute to the formation of an un-
conscionability standard for policing rate unfairness.
1. American Usury-The Procedural v. Substantive Debate.
The usury experience supports dispensing with proof of proce-
dural unfairness for consumer purpose loans. Usury statutes
are violated without proof that the lender exploited the
borrower's necessity or lack of sophistication.' States that ex-
clude corporate or business loans from their usury protection,
however, implicitly recognize that corporate borrowers are so-
phisticated and likely to borrow for profit speculation.' ° Stat-
utes with such exclusions thus combine a substantive compo-
nent of a rate deemed per se excessive and a "procedural" com-
ponent established if the loan was for consumer purposes. Con-
sumers are treated as deserving protection as a class without
borrower-specific findings of necessity or lack of sophistication.
2. American Usury-Procedural Unfairness. The most often
cited purpose of usury statutes is to protect unsophisticated and
necessitous borrowers."' Thus, if legislatures or courts insist
that procedural unfairness be proven by borrowers under the
unconscionability standard, the usury standard suggests proof
that the borrower was unsophisticated and necessitous justifies
relief. 2
338. Refer to text accompanying notes 57-71 supra.
339. Usury statutes have therefore been criticized as regulating without relation
to morality. See William C. Prather, Mortgage Loans and the Usury Laws, 16 Bus.
LAW 181, 182 (1960) (arguing that fixed rate ceilings are not morally responsive
because they apply equally to loans to the starving and loans to the wealthy).
340. Refer to note 351 infra (providing the rationale for the distinction between
consumer and corporate borrowers).
341. See Scientific Prods. v. Cyto Medical Lab., Inc., 457 F. Supp. 1373, 1379 (D.
Conn. 1978) ('The prohibition against usury is based on the principle that it is un-
conscionable to charge excessive interest on loans of money to those who are forced
by necessity to borrow it."); Riley, supra note 20, at 223 (justifying usury laws to
protect unsophisticated borrowers).
342. Other guidance in shaping the unconscionability standard comes from courts
estopping borrowers who procured their loans by fraud from asserting usury. See,
e.g., Buck v. Dahlgren, 100 Cal. Rptr. 462, 463-65 (Ct. App. 1972) (affirming the
trial court's decision that a sophisticated developer who concealed the true value of
land securing a loan was estopped from asserting usury against an inexperienced
lender where the developer suggested the terms challenged as usurious). The
788 [Vol. 31:721
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3. American Usury-Substantive Unfairness. Usury regula-
tion evidences that rates for certain risky consumer transac-
tions can be justifiably high. For example, several states that
limit pawnbroker rates permit facially high rates of return.'
Such high pawn rates reflect both the lender's need to recoup
transaction costs in these typically small dollar transactions
and the risk assumed by the lender in limiting its recourse to
the collateral.
4. Remedies Under the American Usury Standard. Usury
remedies are notoriously nonuniform and therefore of limited
use in setting remedial standards for unconscionable interest
pricing. Usury penalties historically were more severe than they
are now."' Today, only a dozen or so states provide criminal
penalties,"5 and most of those defer to private enforcement
borrower's deception as to her risk status should typically preclude relief under the
unconscionability standard despite an otherwise unconscionable loan. See E & W
Bldg. Material v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 648 F. Supp. 289, 292 (M.D. Ala.
1986) (denying equitable relief on the grounds of unconscionability to a borrower
who falsely represented to a lender that his house was unencumbered).
343. See Oeltjen, supra note 48, at 784 n.166 (listing 11 states that statutorily
allow comparatively high interest rates: Connecticut, Kansas, Nevada, Ohio, Oklaho-
ma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia and Washington). There
are two distinct approaches to usury-setting a ceiling consistent with industry risks
and costs, as a public utilities commission would do, or setting a ceiling higher than
industry risks would justify, so that rates are set for the most part by competition
with some outward check on abuse. See generally FONSECA, supra note 157, § 7:1, at
259 (analyzing the historical development of instituting rate ceilings). The UCCC is
a notable example of the latter approach and is one small step removed from reg-
ulation by the unconscionability standard. That Act is described by one commentator
as a 'startling departure" from prior regulation for its reliance on competition to
govern loan costs. Robert P. Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: An
Economist's View, 54 CORNELL L REv. 491, 494 (1969). If courts applying the uncon-
scionability standard look to usury statutes effective in other states for guidance in
gauging the rate justified for a particular type of loan, they should be aware which
approach the statutes follow.
344. For example, the usurer forfeited his lands and chattels in eleventh century
England, and in Rome was subject to twice the criminal fine as thieves. Usury was
also compared in the Bible to rape, murder, and robbery. See Ackerman, supra, note
21, at 62.
345. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 190.40 (McKinney 1988) ("A person is guilty of
criminal usury when, [without authorization by law] he knowingly charges ... inter-
est ... at a rate exceeding twenty-five percent per annum ... ."). Federal law en-
acted in 1968 as title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act made "extortionate
credit transactions" a federal crime. 18 U.S.C. § 892 (1988). Rates exceeding 45%,
when several other factors are present, are prima facie evidence of extortionate
credit. 18 U.S.C. § 892(bX2) (1988). Since the statute is concerned only with combat-
ting organized crime, it requires borrower belief of a reputation for extortionate col-
lection methods be proven for that evidentiary rule to apply. -18 U.S.C. § 892(c)
(1988). As such, except for lenders who deal in legbreaking, this Act is not implicat-
ed. See generally Walter D. Malcolm & John J. Curtin, Jr., The New Federal Attack
HeinOnline  -- 31 Hous. L. Rev. 789 1994-1995
790 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:721
rather than employing government resources to enforce the
penalties robustly. The typical usury statute still imposes puni-
tive civil sanctions by either denying recovery of principal or
interest, imposing statutory penalties, or inflicting some combi-
nation of these remedies.' Some void only the interest that
exceeds the usury limit, but most levy some additional sanction
to deter the usurer."' Similarly, the deterrence argument sup-
ports penalizing unconscionability beyond the reduction of ex-
cessive rates to fair ones.
Usury statutes vary on whether usurious interest already
paid can be recovered.' The common law recognizes this
remedy, but some usury statutes have abrogated that recov-
ery. 9 Courts should employ this common law remedy by
on the Loan Shark Problem, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 765 (1968) (discussing and
evaluating title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act).
346. For example, in Arkansas the lender forfeits the principal and interest of
usurious consumer loans. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 13 (1982). In Nebraska a lender
making a usurious loan forfeits all interest but not principal. NEB. REV. STAT. § 45.
105 (1988). If employed, statutory penalties are typically double or triple either the
entire interest charged, the usurious portion of the interest, or some other measure.
E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-5-202 (West 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-5-202
(Burns 1994); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon Supp. 1994). The
UCCC provides a statutory penalty of $100 to $1,000 as determined by the court.
UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.201, 7A UJA. 182 (1974). For a general discus.
sion of usury remedies, see PRIDGEN, supra note 24, § 10.07 (describing the great
variation in state usury remedies but noting that the most common remedy is dis-
allowance of interest).
The federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ('RICO"),
with its treble damages remedy, is implicated by collection of an "unlawful debt' at
a 'usurious rate" at least twice the "enforceable rate." See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1988)
(defining the term "unlawful debt"). Query whether an outrageous rate held uncon-
scionable in the absence of a usury ceiling could implicate RICO.
Class actions to challenge usury have been certified when the procedural
requisites for such actions are otherwise satisfied. See Cohen v. District of Columbia
Nat'l Bank, 59 F.R.D. 84, 88-91 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that borrowers of unsecured
installment loans from a single bank that charged a usurious rate met the procedur-
al requirements of Fed. RL Civ. P. 23(a) and were thus certified as a class). See
generally PRIDGEN, supra note 24, § 10.07[4] (stating the elements that the plaintiff
must prove to receive class certification and the difficulties inherent in achieving
that status). The UCCC, however, denies recovery in class actions of its statutory
penalty for usury violations. 7A U.L.A. 182 (1974) (explaining in comment 2 that the
statutory penalty was designed in part as an incentive for a consumer to bring an
action and consequently cannot be recovered in a class action).
347. See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.201, cmt. 3, 7A U.LA 183 (1974).
The UCCC statutory penalty for usury serves to deter lenders who might gamble
and make usurious loans, because without the penalty they would only have to for-
feit the illegally gained interest. Id.
348. See generally BROwN & KEEST, supra note 26, § 9.4.1.1.2, at 248-49 (dis-
cussing statutory and common law approaches to recovery of payments made to prin-
cipal or interest prior to the lawsuit).
349. See KEEST, supra note 6, § 9.4.1.1.2, at 201-02 (listing cases dealing with a
borrower's recovery of usurious payments).
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analogy under the unconscionability standard to allow a claim-
ant to recover past excessive interest paid when there is not
enough principal left unpaid to offset that amount.
Separate from usury's influence on shaping unconscionabili-
ty remedies, an unconscionable rate could trigger usury reme-
dies in deregulated states that amended their usury statute to
allow any "agreed rate."' Borrowers might argue that proce-
dural unfairness precluded their effective "agreement" to the
excessive rate, thereby invoking the jurisdiction's remaining
usury sanctions.
5. The Consumer/Commercial Party Distinction Under
American Usury. Most usury regulation treats corporate and
consumer borrowers differently. Some states allow higher ceil-
ings for corporate borrowers, but many others exempt corporate
loans from usury limits altogether. The trend is to extend this
"corporate exemption" to business loans generally."m Some
350. See BROWN & KEEST, supra note 26, § 9.2.3, at 219-22 (discussing the ways
that a usury statute can be violated in a state which has amended its usury statute
to allow any agreed rate of interest).
351. See MICHAEL T. MADISON & JEFFRY R. DWYER, THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE
FINANCING, § 5.05[4][e][i], at 5-38 (1994) (recognizing that several states have ex-
panded their corporate exemption to other commercial borrowers). The rationale for
treating corporate borrowers differently than consumers is derived from usury's poli-
cy of protecting unsophisticated and financially necessitous borrowers. As a class,
corporate borrowers are perceived as having a "natural sophistication in business
matters" and therefore as being able to bargain at arms length with lenders. See
Note, Stemming Abuses of Corporate Exemptions from the Usury Laws: A Legislative
and Judicial Analysis, 59 IOWA L. REV. 91, 92 (1973) (explaining that corporate
entities enjoy a more equal bargaining position with lenders); see also Riley, supra
note 20, at 208 (explaining that usury protection is aimed at "poor individual con-
sumers" rather than corporate borrowers because corporations have both sophisticat-
ed leveraging techniques and 'bargaining competence"); Melissa Stimmel, Note, The
Scope of the Corporate Exemption to State Usury Laws, 3 ANN. REV. BANKING L
309, 316 (1984) (arguing that corporate borrowers have more business experience,
greater borrowing strength, and are not subject to the particular needs and limita-
tions of individuals). Moreover, corporate borrowers are less susceptible to financial
coercion because they seek to further profit-making activities, rather than to acquire
personal necessities. See Note, supra at 92 (noting that corporations, as artificial
entities, have been regarded as immune from the personal necessities that cause
individuals to be susceptible to coercion); see also Ackerman, supra note 21, at 78
(noting that John Calvin recognized the oppressive nature of charging interest was
absent in commercial transactions when both parties profited). Other rationales of-
fered for the "corporate exemption" are that a corporation has better access to legal
advice and that its potential loss on default does not implicate consumer necessities.
See BROWN & KEEST, supra note 26, § 9.1.1.1, at 203. But see Hershel Shanks,
Practical Problems in the Application of Archaic Usury Statutes, 53 VA. L REv. 327,
347 (1967) (arguing that corporate exceptions were passed not because corporate
borrowers did not need usury protection, but as a safety valve to relieve the "ad-
verse pressure" usury laws were exerting on "legitimate commercial activities). The
"corporate exemption" rationale clearly extends to business loans generally. See
Merriman & Hanks, supra note 122, at 15-16 (arguing that there is no reason to
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commentators are concerned for the small businessperson who
might have less access than other commercial borrowers to
expert advice and less familiarity with commercial transac-
tions. 2 A few usury statutes address this concern by limiting
their corporate or business loan exemption to loans over a spec-
ified dollar amount' on the assumption that businesses ob-
taining larger loans are better able to protect themselves.'
The 1968 UCCC protected the small businessperson by impos-
ing usury limits on loans of $25,000 or less to individuals for
business purposes,' but the 1974 UCCC abandoned all limits
on business loans.' The 1974 UCCC, the better approach, is
consistent with the federal Truth in Lending Act, which ex-
cludes business loans from its loan disclosure obligations re-
gardless of dollar amount. 7
prevent knowledgeable businesspersons from obtaining loans at high interest rates
merely to protect those businesspersons with poor judgment who probably make poor
decisions in other business contexts as well); Oeltjen, supra note 16, at 186 (arguing
that "it would seem reasonable to revise the corporate exemption to make it a busi-
ness exception'); Riley, supra note 20, at 219 (arguing that often sole proprietorships
and partnerships are equally as sophisticated in business dealings as corporations).
352. See, e.g., BROWN & KEEST, supra note 26, § 9.1.1.1, at 203-04; Merriman &
Hanks, supra note 122, at 10-13 (concluding that borrowers knowledgeable in com-
mercial transactions should not be able to use the defense of usury while less expe-
rienced borrowers should have access to the usury defense).
353. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW. § 12-103(dX3) (1990) (exempting loans to
corporations regardless of amount and loans for commercial purposes over $15,000 if
they are not secured by residential real estate and over $75,000 when they are so
secured); see also Merriman & Hanks, supra note 122, at 14 (arguing that usury
limits should be retained for business loans under $10,000).
354. See BROWN & KEEST, supra note 26, § 9.1.1.1, at 204.
355. UNIV. CONSUMER JREDrr CODE §§ 2.602, 3.602, 7 U.LA. 716, 778 (1974)
(1968 Act). Loans of $25,000 or less to organizations such as corporations and part-
nerships are protected by rate limits only when secured primarily by a one or two.
family dwelling occupied by the debtor or a related person. I& §§ 2.602(l)(b),
3.602(l)(b), 7 U.LA. 716, 778 (1974) (1968 Act). See generally Benfield, supra note
17, at 875-85 (discussing the Uniform Consumer Credit Code).
356. See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.601, cmt. 1, 7A U.LA. 102-03 (1974)
(noting that most business loans involve sophisticated borrowers who can effectively
negotiate credit charges).
357. This is accomplished by somewhat redundant provisions that (1) impose
Truth in Lending requirements only on loans to consumers, defined in 15 U.S.C.
§ 1602(h) (1988) as natural persons, for "personal, family, or household purposes,"
id., and (2) specifically exclude from the Act loans for "business, commercial, or agri-
cultural purposes." 15 U.S.C. § 1603(1) (1988); cf Robert D. Miller Jr., Comment,
Washington's Corporate Exemption from Usury, 12 GONZ. L. REv. 312, 327 (1977)
(arguing that Washington's usury laws should be consistent with such consumer
credit regulation as Truth in Lending, which exempts all business loans).
Washingtoen's statutory history is also instructive in illustrating expansion of the
"corporate exemption." Its "corporate exemption," once limited to certain corporate
borrowers, now exempts business loans of all types whether made to entities or indi-
viduals. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.080 (1992); Miller, supra at 326. That exemption
was also once limited to business loans over $100,000, but was later modified to
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The "corporate exemption" trend supports repeal of state
usury ceilings on business loans generally, whether the borrow-
er is a corporation, partnership, limited liability company, or
sole proprietorship. The question is indeed whether business
borrowers deserve any fairness protection. Though the "corpo-
rate exemption" might be understood to support freedom of
contract without the variable fairness check of unconscionabili-
ty, this interpretation misreads the purpose of such exemptions.
Corporate exemptions reflect the greater sophistication and
lesser financial necessity of business borrowers as a class.'
That does not mean businesses are always sophisticated bor-
rowers seeking funds for speculative purposes. The unconsciona-
bility standard provides a defensible safety net for those rare
situations when financial necessity and lack of sophistication
coincide to cause a business borrower to strike a substantively
unfair bargain. Small business borrowers will be more success-
ful than others in satisfying this standard, but the unconsciona-
bility standard on its face should give all business borrowers an
equal opportunity to demonstrate the requisite unfairness.'
Two related questions in formulating the unconscionability
standard can be answered by reference to usury regula-
tion-whether agricultural loans and large dollar consumer
loans should be treated as business loans in applying the un-
conscionability standard. The 1968 and 1974 UCCC treat loans
to individuals for agricultural purposes as consumer loans,30
exempt loans over $50,000 and finally amended in 1981 to abandon any dollar
threshold for the exclusion of business loans from usury protection. WASH. REV.
CODE. § 19.52.080 (1992); Miller, supra at 315-16.
358. Refer to note 351 supra for a discussion of the rationale of the "corporate
exemption."
359. Cf Benfield, supra note 17, at 883 (arguing that even though the 1968
UCCC excludes large business loans from its usury protection, it is likely that courts
will apply unconscionability concepts to set aside or lower interest payments "in the
unusual case in which the lender has unjustifiably overcharged"). Courts have often
reviewed the conscionability of loans falling under the state's 'corporate exemption."
See, e.g., In re Chicago Reed & Furniture Co., 7 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1925) (holding
that interest of 40% was harsh and oppressive regardless of the fact that the bor-
rower was a corporation). Small businesses seeking working capital constitute a
healthy market for loan sharks. See Oeltjen, aupra note 16, at 219-20 (discussing the
process by which loan sharks infiltrate a legitimate business with illegally gained
money and often, by "milking the business of funds," force it into bankruptcy). The
thriving loan shark market for small commercial loans supports the idea of provid-
ing some fairness protection to commercial borrowers.
360. See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 1.301(14), 7A ULA. 43 (1974) (defin-
ing 'consumer loan" for purposes of usury to mean loans "primarily for a personal,
family, or agricultural purpose"); UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.104(l)(b), 7
U.L.A. 723 (1974) (1968 Act) (same definition). However, because both the 1968 and
1974 Acts in these sections exclude organizational debtors from their definitions of
"consumer loan," agricultural loans would be protected only when made to
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but Truth in Lending disclosure law, which once applied the
same approach, now exempts agricultural loans ' because
they are "essentially commercial in nature." 2 The Truth in
Lending approach is more persuasive. Thus, if different stan-
dards of unconscionability are applied by statutes or courts to
business loans, loans primarily for agricultural purposes should
be treated as business loans.
Some usury statutes, apparently seeing a correlation be-
tween loan amount and borrower sophistication, exempt con-
sumer loans above a specified dollar amount. These dollar lim-
its are often so high, however, that they are meaningless.'
The UCCC in contrast exempts consumer loans over $25,000
unless secured by realty,' as does Truth in Lending.'
Though the Truth in Lending and UCCC approach of employing
a lesser dollar amount with a realty collateral exception could
be carried over in some way to the unconscionability standard,
the dollar limit chosen is necessarily arbitrary and quickly out-
dated.' The unconscionability standard should therefore ap-
individuals. See UNiF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 1.301 (15), 7 U.LA. 43 (1974);
UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.104(1Xa), 7 U.L.A. 723 (1974) (1968 Act).
361. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(1) (1988).
362. S. REP. No. 96-368, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1979) (excluding agricultural
credit from T!ruth in Lending's coverage because of the Senate Banking Committee's
belief that agricultural credit 'is essentially commercial in nature").
363. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2301 (1993) ("[Tlhere shall be no limita-
tion on the rate of interest which may be charged for the loan or use of money,
where the amount of money loaned or used exceeds $100,000, and where repayment
thereof is not secured by a mortgage against the principal residence of any borrow-
er.'); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(6Xa) (McKinney 1989) ("No law regulating the
maximum rate of interest ... shall apply to any loan.., in the amount of two
hundred fifty thousand dollars or more, other than a loan of forbearance secured pri-
marily by an interest in real property improved by a one or two family residence.");
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(BX1) (Anderson 1993) ("Any party may agree to
pay a rate of interest in excess of the maximum rate . . . when .. . [t]he original
amount of principal indebtedness . . . exceeds one hundred thousand dollars .... .).
See generally Riley, supra note 20, at 228 n.137 (suggesting that a $10,000 standard
is sufficient to protect poor, high risk borrowers who are most deserving of usury
protection).
364. See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.104, 7 U.L.A_ 722 (1974) (1968 Act);
UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 1.301(15XaXiv), 7A U.L.A. 43 (1974) (additionally
excluding loans over $25,000 for an agricultural purpose even if se, ured by land).
However, the 1970 National Consumer Act does not impose any dollar limit on its
protection for consumer loans. Section 2A-103 of the UCC used to exclude leases
whose total payments exceeded $25,000 from the special unconscionability protections
in that Article, but as amended in 1990 provides the individual state should decide
whether there should be a dollar limit and its amount. U.C.C. § 2A-103 cmt. e
(1990).
365. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(3) (1988).
366. Truth in Lending, for example, has employed its $25,000 limit since its
enactment, and routine family car financings in the 1990s are sometimes outside
that Act. The legislature could address this problem in part by employing some
794
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ply equally to all consumer loans without regard to their
amount.
F. Commercial Loans-Summary of Proposed Standards
Usury limits on business loans should be repealed and
replaced by the judicial standard of unconscionability. This
standard should apply equally to loans to individuals and
business associations regardless of amount. Both procedural and
substantive unfairness should be proven for a business loan to
be unconscionable. Requiring proof of procedural unfairness is
consistent with the rationale of the corporate or business loan
exemption from usury which assumes business borrowers are
sophisticated and understand the rate agreed to. 7 Such proof
protects against commercial borrowers exploiting the uncertain-
ties of the substantive standard and pursuing a claim
groundless in fact. Unlike consumers, business borrowers who
agreed to a substantively excessive rate do not deserve a con-
clusive presumption that they were knowingly taken advantage
of by the lender.
The factors relevant in proving procedural unfairness are
the commercial borrower's inability to understand that the
agreed upon rate is unfairly high, the lender's deception in
hiding the rate charged, the borrower's financial necessity, and
the lack of some readily available alternative to the high rate
loan. Certainly, a coincidence of all these factors in the busi-
ness borrower's favor should satisfy the procedural component.
What suffices short of that combination should be left for case-
by-case review, though this author suggests the following guide-
lines: (1) egregious lender deception without more may justify
relief from an excessive rate, even if short of common law
fraud, (2) borrowing for the artificial "necessity" of pursuing
some speculative opportunity for profit should not justify re-
lief,' (3) even true financial necessity should not be relevant
adjustment procedure tied to inflation, as do both the 1968 and 1974 UCCC. See
UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 1.106, 7A U.LA. 28 (1974) (using the Consumer
Price Index and guidelines to determine a rate); UNIp. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
§ 1.106, 7 U.LA. 610 (1974) (1968 Act) (same).
367. Refer to note 351 8upra for a discussion of the "corporate exemption" from
usury laws.
368. The author would decide differently the case of In re White, 88 B.R. 498
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1988). That court refused to enforce substantively excessive default
interest payable by a businessperson borrowing to purchase a nightclub and thus
gave relief when the loan was for a speculative profit-seeking venture. Since the
court cited both parties' greed, 88 B.R. at 510, it therefore should have left both
commercial parties alone. Cf MINDY CHEN-WIsHARr, UNCONSCIONABLE BARGAINS 43
1994] 795
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unless combined with the lack of a reasonable alternative, such
as selling property with sufficient equity, to raise the funds
needed, and (4) financial necessity and lack of sophistication
should coincide to justify relief.
Substantive unfairness should be proven by testimony that
the rate charged grossly exceeded a reasonable profit over the
risks of default and inflation, the lender's cost of funds, and the
costs of making and administering the loan. Courts should de-
cide the requisite amount of excess in their discretion, though
section 2-302 case law and other unconscionability codifications
suggest there be at least a two to one disparity by reference to
the standard chosen. If that standard is the market rate
charged similar borrowers by similar lenders, rather than the
net profit approach advocated, the court should identify the
unique costs of a lender that may justify a rate higher than
market, and also make sure the market rate itself is not un-
fair.
Courts should ordinarily employ the usual remedy under
the UCC, the interest pricing cases, and English rate regulation
to reduce the excessive rate to a fair one without further sanc-
tion. The court might have the ability under common law to
refuse to enforce the interest term of the agreement, which it
might employ in egregious cases of procedural unfairness.'
Allowance of attorneys' fees to either side should be left to the
parties' loan agreement, itself subject to constraints of
conscionability.
G. Consumer Loans-The Need for Legislation and a Proposed
Statute
Three reasons support codification of the unconscionability
standard for consumer loans: (1) to confirm that courts have
authority to review interest pricing for its conscionability, (2) to
enhance remedies, and (3) to resolve the need for proof of any
procedural unfairness. Unconscionability has entered the main-
stream of contract law and no recent court decision has dis-
claimed authority to hold a rate unconscionable, but a rogue
court might do so. For example, a court could conclude that
legislation deregulating usury was intended to remove any fair-
ness control on interest pricing.37  Codifying the
(1989) (noting that under common-law comparative unconscionability decisions the
complainant's need for money 'must usually be accompanied by the threat of insol-
vency, business collapse or a forfeiture of mortgage").
369. Refer to notes 290-91 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of cases
in which the court refused to enforce the interest term.
370. Refer to note 79 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of legislative
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unconscionability standard would dispel any doubt that courts
are authorized to review interest rates for fairness. England
codified its unconscionability standard in the 1900 Money-
lenders Act in part for this reason."
Unconscionability should be codified to enhance existing
remedies. Restitution for excessive interest paid has been de-
nied under section 2-302 and its allowance at common law is
questionable. 2 Because there is no reason to deny retroactive
relief from excessive interest, subject to some reasonable statute
of limitation, this remedy should be codified to ensure its avail-
ability. Most importantly, the consumer loan statute can entitle
successful consumers to attorneys' fees, as have most
codifications of unconscionability more recent than section 2-302.y
To counter the trend of court authority demanding proce-
dural proof," statutes should codify that proof of substantive
unfairness by consumer borrowers is alone sufficient. This is
consistent with usury's historical regulation of interest pricing,
which generally takes no account of procedural defects. 5 It is
also consistent with opinion that consumers as a class are not
bargaining equals with lenders, generally do not understand the
nature of the credit transaction, and are typically desperate for
changes to usury laws that might undermine application of the unconscionability
doctrine to interest pricing.
371. Refer to the text accompanying notes 299-302 supra. The argument that
codifying unconscionability expressly authorizes courts to review interest rates may
extend to commercial loans, which is not objectionable, but the other reasons for
codifying the unconscionability standard are more applicable to consumer loans. Al-
though there is little question courts are authorized to apply the unconscionability
standard to interest pricing, refer to notes 79-86 supra and accompanying text, liti-
gants seemingly need some judicial or statutory "green light" to challenge rates as
unconscionable. Most of the recent cases applying the unconscionability standard to
interest pricing were brought in jurisdictions in which courts have signaled claimants
that they will review challenged rates under the unconscionability standard. For
example, numerous challenges to rates have been pursued in Connecticut since its
highest court held in 1980 that courts will review rates for their conscionability. See
Hamm v. Taylor, 429 A.2d 946, 947-49 (Conn. 1980) (affirming that a trial court has
the discretion in a foreclosure proceeding to withhold foreclosure or reduce the
amount of indebtedness upon a finding that terms in a mortgage loan such as the
rate of interest are unconscionable).
372. Refer to note 185 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of relevant
§ 2-302 case law. Cf California Grocers Ass'n, Inc., v. Bank of Am., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d
396, 403-04 (Ct. App. 1994) (observing that affirmative relief for unconscionability,
while not available historically, could be provided by statute).
373. Refer to note 244 aupra and accompanying text (discussing attorneys' fees
under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices
Act, and the Uniform Commercial Code).
374. Refer to note 136 supra and accompanying text.
375. Refer to Part II(EX1) supra.
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money. 78  Finally, it conserves judicial resources because
procedural and substantive unfairness almost always coincide in
consumer transactions.377
A threshold question is whether codification should be ac-
complished by Congress or the states. Some commentators have
urged the federal government to abrogate patchwork state usu-
ry laws and assume regulation of consumer credit contracts,378
but historically, unconscionability and usury have been admin-
istered by the states. Rate unconscionability is probably codified
best at the state level as well.379 The statute proposed below
vests enforcement power in a state administrator, usually the
same authority who enforces the state's unlawful trade practic-
es regulation.' Enforcement of unconscionable loans could
376. BROWN & KEEST, supra note 26, § 2.4.1, at 37.
377. Refer to notes 147-51 supra and accompanying text. It may appear needless
to abandon proof of procedural unfairness if consumer loans almost always involve
such circumstances. Because the standard for proving procedural unfairness is
somewhat nebulous, however, some unsympathetic court might proclaim that a con-
sumer had 'meaningful choice' or the like and deny the claim.
As for whether the court or legislature is best suited to decide the need for
procedural fairness, see Riley, supra note 20, at 223 (arguing that the issue of
whether proof of procedural unfairness should be required is better suited for the
legislature than for the judiciary because it involves fundamental social policy ques-
tions).
378. E.g., Davis, supra note 55, at 1353.
379. One uncertainty in codifying the unconscionability standard, particularly by
states, is the effect on existing federal preemption. For example, the Depository In-
stitutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act first lien regulation preempts the
"laws of any State expressly limiting the rate or amount of interest." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1735f-7a(aX1) (1988). The author believes the unconscionability standard does not
'expressly limit interest, see supra note 86, though codifying unconscionability may
change that result. Whether unconscionability is codified or not, if a decision ever
holds that standard preempted, Congress should move to allow the variable fairness
standard of unconscionability to be employed, as distinct from the fixed fairness
standard of usury that Congress intended to preempt.
A similar uncertainty exists for lenders entitled to 'export' favorable state
rates under the Federal National Bank Act. See generally KFET, aupra note 6,
§ 3.2.1.4, at 24-28 (discussing the extent to which national banks can export their
home states' most favored lender rates to other states). Query the result when a
national bank exports a credit card rate into a state with a more restrictive stan-
dard of unconscionability than the bank's home state. Moreover, what if a particular
state court or legislature rejects authority to review the conscionability of rates?
Could outrageous national bank rates issue from that state to others with impunity?
Congress should consider such possible abuses in the ongoing debate as to whether
it should abolish rate exportation under the National Banking Act.
380. There are too many gaps in coverage and remedies to rely on existing state
unlawful trade practice statutes to regulate interest pricing effectively. Most states'
trade practice statutes do not expressly proscribe unconscionable conduct. Cf JONA-
THAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L CARTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, UNFAIR
AND DEcEprIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 4.4.1, at 136 (3d ed. 1991) (noting that Un-
fair and Deceptive Acts and Practices statutes in 12 states and the District of Co-
lumbia prohibit unconscionable practices explicitly: Alabama, Idaho, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Texas, and
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alternatively be accomplished by some federal authority such as
the Federal Trade Commission.3'
In codifying unconscionability, legislators must decide who
will determine fairness-an administrative body acting prospec-
tively, or courts adjudicating borrower challenges ex post. 2
The administrative model is deceptively attractive because it
would assure fairness in advance. It answers the charge that
consumers rarely pursue unconscionability claims in the courts
and usually do so only as a defense when sued rather than as
a sword to affirmatively challenge unfair agreements.'
Utah). Even if unconscionable conduct is proscribed implicitly as an unfair or decep-
tive practice, some trade practice statutes may not encompass realty secured or un-
secured loans. See, e.g., UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRAcTIcES ACT § 2, 7A U.LA 234
(1971) (defining the threshold "consumer transaction! as involving a sale or lease of
goods or services, which would presumably govern credit purchases or leases of
goods, but arguably not other financing); Barber v. National Bank, 815 P.2d 857,
861 (Alaska 1991) (holding that a mortgage loan was not a good or service under
Alaska's unfair trade practices act); Lamm v. Amfac Mtge. Corp., 605 P.2d 730, 731
(Or. Ct. App. 1980) (concluding that loans do not come under Oregon's Unfair Trade
Practices Act). See generally James R. Cox, State Consumer Protection or Deceptive
Trade Practices Statutes: Their Application to Extensions of Credit and Other Bank-
ing Activities, 105 BANKING L.J. 214 (1988) (surveying several states' approaches to
deceptive trade practices). Moreover, existing unfair trade practice regulation may
not authorize equitable relief or provide for mandatory (or even permissive) recovery
of the successful consumer's attorneys' fees. See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 380,
§ 5.7.4.2A, at 83 (Supp. 1993) (noting that unfair and deceptive acts and practices
statutes may not mandate or even allow recovery of attorney fees). Private enforce-
ment is questionable under a few of these statutes. See id. § 8.2.1, at 415 (1991)
(listing Arkansas, Iowa, and North Dakota as states that may not have private dam-
age remedies for unfair or deceptive practices). In 1991, North Dakota adopted a
private remedy by statute. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-15-09 (Supp. 1993); cf Op. REv.
STAT. § 646.607 (1993) (proscribing unconscionable conduct separate from unfair or
deceptive trade practices but providing no private remedy).
State consumer credit codes do not usually proscribe unconscionability outside
of consumer credit sales and leases. E.g., UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
§ 5.108(4Xc), 7A U.LA. 168 (1974) (referring to the relevance in a "consumer credit
sale" or 'consumer lease' of gross price to value disparity). South Carolina's adoption
of that UCCC subsection does refer more broadly to 'a consumer credit sale, con-
sumer lease, consumer rental-purchase agreement [rent-to-own], or consumer loan."
S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-108(4Xc) (Law. Co-op. 1989).
Instead of adopting a statute specific to unconscionable interest pricing, states
could reform their trade practice or consumer credit codes to address the above con-
cerns. The model statute proposed in this Article would nonetheless be relevant in
such reform, particularly in proposing standards and remedies unique to loan trans-
actions.
381. The Federal Trade Commission could invoke its rulemaking authority to
deem unconscionable loans by entities it regulates, such as finance companies, as an
unfair trade practice.
382. Two other arbiters of rate fairness, the legislature and the parties them-
selves, have been rejected in this Article. It would be unworkable for legislatures to
approve each loan transaction, so they have instead specified approved rates in ad-
vance to govern a class of loans. That approach, of course, is the usury standard.
The alternative of the parties themselves determining a fair rate is the freedom of
contract model also rejected in favor of some fairness standard.
383. See DEUTCH, supra note 73, at 243 (recognizing that consumers rarely chal-
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Advance review of each individual rate by an administrative
body would assure fairness for all loan transactions, but ap-
pears inefficient and impractical. Administrative agencies, dele-
gated the task of setting fair interest rates, have therefore
functioned necessarily as legislatures have by imposing usury
standards on loans as a class.' Lenders in Israel do have the
option to seek individual advance administrative review and ap-
proval of certain contractual terms for their fairness,' but
they have been predictably "indifferent"' because of the
transaction costs of seeking that validation. Individual review
lenge their contracts for unconscionability because of the expense, the time required,
and the uncertainty of litigation).
384. For example, rates for small consumer loans in Virginia are set by the
Commissioner of Financial Institutions agency under the legislative directive to fix
"fair and reasonable" rates. See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-271 (Michie 1993). Such rates
apply equally to all small loan licensees, so that a lender's unique costs of operation
and a borrower's particular credit risk are not taken into account. Presumably, how-
ever, this administrative agency can react more quickly than a legislature to changes
in inflationary risks, or other risks and costs.
Rates for federally chartered credit unions are set in a similar manner by
the National Credit Union Administration Board, which is authorized under the Na.
tional Credit Union Act to substitute rates higher than those prescribed by statute if
economic conditions so compel. See 12 U.S.C. § 1757(5XAXvi)(I) (1988) (setting an
interest rate ceiling at 15% but allowing the rate to exceed the ceiling if the Board
determines that prevailing rates threaten the soundness of individual credit unions).
North Carolina employs a system closer to the unconscionabiity standard for
income tax refund anticipation loans. Each lender must file a fee schedule with an
administrative agency that determines if the schedule is conscionable. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 53-249 (Supp. 1993). Presumably each lender is allowed to justify its unique
costs of operation. This approach would be more efficient than judicial fairness re-
view for lenders such as pawnshops that do not evaluate the individual credit risk
of borrowers. Cf Oeltjen, supra note 48, at 780-83 (discussing the pros and cons of
regulating pawnbrokers under the public utility model of regulation). For general
criticism of using the public utility model to regulate the credit industry, see
Oeltjen, supra note 16, at 221-22 (concluding that an attempt to regulate credit as a
public utility would be undesirable); see also CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra note
48, at 102-03 (concluding that the public utility model for regulation of consumer
credit grantors is unsound because of the lender's ability to manipulate administra-
tive regulation by denying loans to riskier borrowers); Richard Craswell, Property
Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. Cm. L.
REV. 1, 20 n.36 (1993) (observing that public utility commissions have not performed
well in trying to set reasonable rates). Lenders' manipulation of a regulation to deny
riskier borrowers loans would not be a concern, however, when the administrative
model is applied to only those lenders who don't evaluate individual credit risk.
385. For a discussion of this Israeli law, see generally DEUrCH, supra note 73,
at 245.50.
386. Id at 247-66, 247 n.224 (noting that only one company had applied for
prior approval of credit terms between the years 1964 and 1969, and concluding that
voluntary submission of contracts for administrative review had been a failure). An
English commentator suggested creditors be allowed to seek advance court approval
of the interest rate, but that approach would surely gather the same dust as Israel's
administrative opportunity. See Bentley and Howells, supra note 39, at 238 (suggest-
ing that reform of English credit laws include the opportunity for the lender to safe-
guard its position by seeking prior court approval of the credit terms).
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could be mandated, but this fixed expense, perhaps justifiable
for larger loans, would be unsuitable for small ones. 7 One
commentator thus observed that, "despite all its deficiencies,"
reliance on judicial action "is the most effective way to battle
unfair contracts."'
Any statute enacted to codify the unconscionability stan-
dard for consumer loans should at minimum (1) define its scope
broadly to include transactions such as rent-to-own that have
eluded usury regulation but are functionally equivalent to
loans, (2) govern charges related to interest such as points and
origination fees, (3) allocate the burden of proving unfairness,
(4) specify whether proof of procedural unfairness is required,
and if so, what would suffice, (5) specify some benchmark by
which substantive fairness should be judged, (6) authorize
courts to grant flexible remedies, including forfeiture of some or
all interest charged and recovery of past excessive interest
paid, and (7) award attorneys' fees to encourage private enforce-
ment of good faith claims. The following model statute address-
es these concerns:
Section 1. Unconscionable Consumer Credit Charges.
1.1 Except as provided in this Section or other applicable state
law, the parties to a consumer credit transaction may agree to
any charges. If the court as a matter of law finds all or any
part of the charges for a consumer credit transaction to be un-
conscionable at the time the agreement was made, the court
may do one or more of the following: refuse to enforce collection
of all or any part of any charges, order the creditor to repay all
or any part of any charges' in an action brought no later
than [ ] year[s] after the date of final payment on the consumer
credit transaction, 1 and award such equitable relief as it
deems necessary or proper.392
387. See Deutch, supra note 73, at 249 (suggesting that mandated review of all
contracts may be applied to a particular area of law, but is impossible generally).
388. I& at 248.
389. See Ounce, supra note 39, at 110 (arguing for a penalty stiffer than forfei-
ture of just the unconscionable interest, but cautioning the penalty be discretionary
to avoid deterring the court from finding the rate unconscionable).
390. This remedy is based on § 139(2) of England's 1974 Consumer Credit Act.
Refer to note 332 supra.
391. Existing or repealed usury statutes provide an analogous limitation period
which typically varies from one to three years after accrual of the usury action,
usually the date of final payment. See BROWN & KEEST, supra note 26, § 9.3.5.5, at
243.
392. For example, the court might nullify any collateral securing the loan, a
remedy employed on occasion in the common law interest unconscionability cases.
Refer to note 290 supra. In codifying remedies, the jurisdiction should address
1994] 801
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1.2 In determining unconscionability, the creditor shall bear the
burden of proving that the charges were not unreasonably ex-
cessive" in relation to the costs and risks incurred or as-
sumed by the creditor in the consumer credit transaction. Both
parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence to aid the court in making its determination. The
court may, but is not required to, consider the charges in rela-
tion to those for which similar credit could be obtained by like
borrowers at the time the consumer credit transaction was en-
tered into.
1.3 The court shall not require the borrower to prove the exis-
tence of such circumstances as lack of sophistication, deceptive
creditor practices, financial necessity, or lack of other alterna-
tives to the consumer credit transaction, but such proof, in the
court's discretion, may support a finding of unconscionability
upon a lesser degree of substantive unfairness than the court
might otherwise require.
Section 2. Attorneys' Fees.'
2.1 In the event the court finds any portion of the charges un-
conscionable, the court shall award reasonable fees to the
borrower's attorney. In determining reasonable fees, the amount
of relief or recovery on behalf of the borrower is not controlling.
If the court does not find any part of the charges unconsciona-
ble and the borrower brought or maintained an action the bor-
rower knew to be groundless, the court shall award reasonable
fees to the creditor's attorney.
Section 3. Enforcement by the Administrator. 5
3.1 The Administrator may bring a civil action to restrain a
creditor from collecting any unconscionable charge under a con-
sumer credit transaction. The same standards and burden of
proof for determining unconscionability in an action by or
against the borrower shall apply in an action by the Adminis-
trator. The Administrator shall also have authority on behalf of
whether it authorizes or denies punitive damages for abusive interest. UCC author-
ity denies such recovery. See, e.g., Pearson v. National Budgeting Sys., Inc., 297
N.Y.S.2d 59 (App. Div. 1969) (denying punitive damages because the UCC provides
no damage recovery in an unconscionable contract case). However, several state un-
fair trade practice statutes award some form of punitive damage recovery. Refer to
note 241 supra. This issue will likely be resolved differently by states depending on
their standards for allowing punitive damages for claims in general.
393. Imposing the burden on the creditor is based on England's 1974 Consumer
Credit Act § 171(7). Refer to note 324 supra and accompanying text.
394. This section is based on § 5.108(6) of the 1974 UCCC. Refer to notes 244-
48 aupra and accompanying text.
395. For state adoptions, the administrator would typically be the enforcement
authority for the state's unlawful trade practices act, and would be identified in the
enabling legislation. Refer to notes 252-53 supra and accompanying text.
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any aggrieved borrower to seek the relief available under Sec-
tions 1 and 2, including recovery of the Administrator's reason-
able attorneys' fees.
Section 4. Definitions.
4.1 Charges. For purposes of this Act, "charges" means any
cost, fee, charge, discount, commission, compensation, or the
like, whether denominated as "interest," "principal," "points,"
"time price differential" or otherwise, whether paid to the lend-
er or some third party, and whether paid in cash or otherwise,
incurred or to be incurred by the borrower in connection with
any consumer credit transaction, but does not include registra-
tion fees, filing fees, or the like, to the extent paid to any gov-
ernmental authority.'
4.2 Consumer Credit Transaction. For purposes of this Act,
"consumer credit transaction" means any transaction involving
the extension of credit to an individual primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes.' For purposes of this Act, an
extension of credit includes any transaction that is the substan-
tial equivalent of a credit transaction,' including without
limitation, rent-to-own and pawn transactions, and assignments
of income tax refunds.
Section 5. Remedies Supplementary.
5.1 The remedies in this Act are in addition to all other reme-
dies existing at common law or under the laws of this state.'
H. The Unconscionability Standard as a Partial
Solution-Proposals for Further Reform
The unconscionability standard is not a complete cure for
the persistent problem of excessive interest rates. It is the best
compromise between the usury and free market standards, but
396. Canadian statutes properly exclude from review registration or filing fees
paid to the government in connection with the loan. See, e.g., Unconscionable Trans-
actions Act, R.S., ch. 377, §2(a) (1970) (Can.) (excluding registration or filing fees
prescribed by any statute).
397. Truth in Lending so defines "consumer" credit. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h)
(1988).
398. Ontario's Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act subjects to unconsciona-
bility review "any transaction that, whatever its form may be, is substantially one of
money-lending. ." Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, R.S.O., ch. 514 (1980)
(Can.).
399. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (governing credit sales of goods); id. § 2A-108
(perhaps governing rent-to-own transactions); see SHELDON & CARTER, supra note
380, § 5.7.4.2A (Supp. 1993) (discussing the advantages of U.C.C. § 2A-108 for con-
sumers challenging rent-to-own transactions). There may also be a consumer penalty
recoverable under the state's unfair trade practices act if it governs credit transac-
tions. Refer to note 380 supra.
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it has several shortcomings. Rates that are, in fact, excessive,
but are not "grossly" so, may survive substantive scrutiny as
conscionable.4" The unconscionability standard should not be
rejected for this reason, however, as usury tolerates the same
unfairness whenever the usury ceiling exceeds a fair rate for a
particular loan transaction.4 1 A second problem, unique to un-
conscionability, is the cost of ensuring fair rates through case-
by-case adjudication.4" Finally, unconscionability may not
serve the "paternalistic" function of usury'° by keeping credit-
risky borrowers from obtaining credit.
These problems, rather than compelling rejection of the
unconscionability standard, argue for widespread multi-institu-
tional reform to combat excessive interest pricing. The uncon-
scionability standard should exist only as an ex post safety
check on instances of unfair bargaining. Market perfection re-
forms designed to promote competition and equality in bargain-
ing should be pursued to reduce the need for such market con-
trol.
Necessary reforms include consumer education to enable
consumers to understand the composition of a fair interest
rate.4" Car purchasers, for example, can readily obtain third-
400. Both the classic UCC price cases and those under more recent codifications
of unconscionability seem to demand at least a two to one disparity compared to
value, however determined. Refer to notes 178, 239-40 supra and accompanying text.
The interest pricing cases follow the same standard. For example, a home improve-
ment loan at 33% was held conscionable despite its exceeding a fair rate. See
Cheshire Mortgage Serv., Inc. v. Montes, 612 A.2d 1130, 1135, 1150 (Conn. 1992)
(holding conscionable two second mortgage loans made to one family that had a
combined financing cost of more than 33% because the borrowers were not oppressed
or unfairly surprised); see also Unrau v. Modern Fin. Ltd., 12 D.LR.3d 366, 377
(B.C. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that a home loan made to an elderly couple at 24%
was excessive but not so grossly excessive as to be unconscionable); cf Johnson,
supra note 37, at 90 (discussing the inefficiency of rate ceilings that produce a sub-
optimal result, but noting that without them there is no law, absent proof of fraud,
that will protect a consumer paying $500 for a television worth $300, less than a
two to one disparity). It may nonetheless be possible to attack such loans under the
"sliding scale" approach. Refer to note 137 supra and accompanying text.
401. Refer to note 37 supra and accompanying text.
402. Cf. Alan Schwartz, Unconscionability and Imperfect Information: A Research
Agenda, 19 CAN. Bus. L.J. 437, 440 (1991) (observing that courts are poor social
institutions for identifying market imperfections for consumers because so little mon-
ey is involved in consumer protection cases that few reach the courtroom).
403. Refer to notes 101-03 supra and accompanying text.
404. See DAVID CAPLOvITz, THE POOR PAY MORE 192 (1967) (concluding that
consumer education of low income families is one of the limited number of solutions
available short of eradicating poverty itself); CONSUMER CREDrT REPORT, supra note
48, at 197-98 (discussing several existing adult education programs and suggesting
improvements in and expansion of the programs); see also Riley, supra note 20, at
224 (proposing counseling and educating borrowers to increase comprehension of
available information). Consumer education could address the problem of high risk
804
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party information on the dealer's cost for a vehicle and assess
intelligently whether the dealer's price is excessive.' In con-
trast, most borrowers have little understanding of the risk and
cost factors that determine a fair interest rate.40" Consumers
also need to be educated about the existence of other financing
sources and alternatives to high rate loans, such as reorganiza-
tion of existing loans in bankruptcy.
Disclosure reform, another market perfecting strategy,
should be studied and pursued. Reforms might include in-
creased bilingual disclosures and enactment of uniform (federal)
disclosure legislation for transactions not currently covered by
disclosure regulation. °  Studies should examine how to better
provide disclosure before the loan is consummated, and how to
remedy so-called information overload under current disclosure
statutes.4'o Reforming disclosure to address problems of timing
and content, however, will not help consumers who, despite
consumer education efforts, lack the evaluative skills necessary
to use the information disclosed.41 One approach worth ex-
ploring is the feasibility of a public or private information agen-
cy for consumer loans. A few commentators have proposed that
the government compile and distribute pricing information for
goods. 41 ° A similar program for interest pricing,411 which
borrowers getting credit doomed to fail by educating them on budgeting and the ap-
propriate uses of credit, instead of the usury standard being employed to deny them
credit for both luxuries and necessities.
405. But see Ian Ayres & F. Clayton Miller, 'I'll Sell it to You at Cost.' Legal
Methods to Promote Retail Markup Disclosure, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1047, 1055 n.35
(1990) (noting anecdotal evidence that suggests fewer than 50% of car purchasers
obtained such third-party information on dealer cost).
406. Refer to note 433 infra.
407. For example, rent-to-own transactions presently elude the scope of Truth in
Lending and other federal disclosure regulation. Cf EDWARD L. WINN, III, RTO LE-
GAL REFERENCE INDEX 33-66 (1991), reprinted in Hearing, supra note 3, at 547, 580-
613 (discussing twenty-nine state RTO statutes, all requiring certain contractual
disclosures and most requiring advertising disclosures).
408. For a discussion of the shortcomings of current disclosure legislation, see
Davis, supra note 55, at 1344-48. In 1994, Congress enacted legislation to require
that disclosures in certain home equity loan transactions be delivered to the consum-
er at least three days before consummation of the loan. See Pub. L. No. 103-325,
§ 129.
409. See Lary Lawrence, Toward a More Efficient and Just Economy: An Argu-
ment for Limited Enforcement of Consumer Promises, 48 OHIo ST. LJ. 815, 845
(1987) (concluding that mandatory disclosures would limit the number of consumer
mistakes by educating most consumers even if some remain unable to evaluate the
required disclosures).
410. Id at 843; see Kornhauser, supra note 151, at 1176 ("One can imagine the
government acquiring the information from all finms [merchants] and posting the
prices of the firms at some easily accessible spot.").
411. Some progress has been made to develop government informational interme-
diaries to disclose interest pricing. Every six months the Federal Reserve Board
HeinOnline  -- 31 Hous. L. Rev. 805 1994-1995
806 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:721
need not be government run, could augment the evaluative
skills of borrowers by matching the cheapest available loan
programs to the credit profiles of individual consumers much as
travel agencies match passengers to flights. 412 Economic incen-
tives among lenders would shift from efforts to lure the unwary
consumer into an expensive rate (so-called sucker pricing) to
operational cost reforms.
Stratification of the credit industry means few categories of
lenders offer loan programs to risky borrowers.413 Eliminating
usury controls that mandate different ceilings for different
types of lenders may allow commercial banks to compete for
high risk borrowers whose options are currently limited to fi-
nance and rent-to-own companies and the like.414  Lenders
might also offer more rate programs to better target the partic-
ular creditworthiness of each borrower, something the credit
card industry has begun to do.415
publishes APR and other pricing information for credit cards. See 15 U.S.C. § 1646
(1988) ('The Board shall collect, publish, and disseminate to the public . . . the an-
nual percentage rates charged for . . . nonsale credit by creditors in such areas.*).
The Illinois Commissioner of Banks and Trust Companies discloses comparative in-
formation on credit card rates and fees. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 815, § 140/6 (Smith-
Hurd 1993):
,Each credit card solicitation, application and periodic billing statement ...
mailed or otherwise presented to Illinois residents shall contain the following
statement, verbatim, in bold face type: "Residents of Illinois may contact the
Illinois Commissioner of Banks and Trust Companies for comparative infor-
mation on interest rates, charges, fees and grace periods."
Legislation introduced in Congress in 1993 would direct the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System to establish and publicize a toll-free number for
consumers to obtain free information on the 'availability* of low interest rate credit
cards. H.R. 1842, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1993).
412. This would overcome the psychological problem of consumers pursuing no
more than one prospective lender for fear of being denied credit because their only
contact would be the rate broker. Refer to note 55 supra and accompanying text.
The author echoes the advice of Professor Schwartz that "Eu]nderstanding how infor-
mational intermediaries work is an important but unsolved problem" of consumer
protection that should be explored. See Schwartz, supra note 402, at 444 (discussing
the concept of informational intermediaries that would sell market pricing informa-
tion to remedy the problem of costly searches or comparison shopping).
413. Refer to text accompanying note 279 aupra.
414. See Oeltjen, supra note 16, at 225-26 (arguing for a uniform statutory rate
ceiling for all types of financial institutions to encourage competition); see also CON-
SUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra note 48, at 136-39 (encouraging lenders to compete for
high risk borrowers through policy changes to allow banks to compete with licensed
finance companies for high risk loans and to allow easier entry into this market
segment); cf. Bentley and Howells, supra note 39, at 242 (concluding that English
law should remove arbitrary restrictions on mainstream lenders to encourage more
reputable and efficient lenders to move into the. higher risk market).
415. The credit card industry now often offers alternate rates dependent on cred-
it history. See generally Finchler, supra note 87, at 508-09 (discussing alternative
credit card interest rate programs). Instead of a single rate at (say) 16%, rates
might be offered at 20%, 16%, and 12% depending on the consumer's performance
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Finally, some commentators have suggested that the credit
needs of those most vulnerable to unfair loan pricing-the
poor-be addressed by government loan programs or subsi-
dies." 8 The better approach, though, is to achieve fair rates
by pursuing these market perfecting reforms, combined with
the unconscionability standard as a safety net.
Most of the above reforms have been suggested before, but
the problem of unfair rates persists. It may be necessary to
pursue intense spot treatment of abusive rates in situations
that do not respond to deterrence from the unconscionability
standard or to increased competition and bargaining equality
from renewed attention to these reforms. In these problem ar-
eas, "equity concerns may override concerns for efficient func-
tioning of the market."417 Spot treatment might employ usury
against the entire consumer small loan industry,418 or just for
areas of specific abuse such as auto pawn and rent-to-own
transactions.419 The best approach would employ administra-
record with that lender. At the single rate of 16%, customers with payment records
worthy of a 12% rate subsidize those bad risks deserving of a 20% rate.
416. See, e.g., Ross CRANSTON, CONSUMERS AND THE LAw 202 (1978) (suggesting
that government-supported loan schemes may provide better service to low income
consumers); Bentley & Howells, supra note 39, at 242 (proposing that government
provide 'cheap* loans); Hasson, supra note 176, at 394 (suggesting that one approach
to the problem of unconscionable price would be to replace or supplement the pri-
vate-sector credit industry, where "high-risk" borrowers are concerned, with a govern-
ment consumer loan program in the form of direct government loans, by public sub-
sidization of loans, or by guarantee of private loans); Johnson, supra, note 37, at
104 (arguing for subsidies); Riley, supra note 20, at 229 n.140 (discussing four alter-
natives for providing credit to high risk borrowers, which include creating a pool of
high risk borrowers, guaranteeing high risk loans from general tax revenues, forming
a credit union underwritten by the government, and providing tax incentives to lend-
ers who extend high risk credit); see also CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra note 48,
at 159 (recommending that Congress establish a pilot consumer loan fund and an
experimental loan agency for those families whose incomes are at or below the Fed-
eral Guideline for Poverty Income Levels); Steven Savner et al., Note, An Alternative
to the UCCC: Publicly Subsidized Consumer Loans, 4 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 239,
274 (1974) (proposing a Federal government subsidized loan program to make low
cost credit available to those who use credit to purchase basic needs).
417. Kornhauser, supra note 151, at 1183. Employing usury as a safety net for
markets in which unconscionability fails to deter abuse differs from the approach
suggested by Professor Oeltjen that unconscionability be the last defense against
abuse in the free market. See Oeltjen, supra note 16, at 235.
418. See Riley, supra note 20, at 227-28 (proposing usury for consumer loans of
less than $10,000).
419. The proposed federal Rent-to-Own Reform Act of 1993, introduced in Sep-
tember 1993 by Rep. Henry Gonzalez, is an example of such spot treatment. See
H.R. 3136, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). That legislation would classify rent-to-own
transactions as credit or retail installment sales under state law, thereby invoking
existing usury limits in many states for such sales. Id at 6-7. The legislation would
also apply Truth in Lending's disclosure regulation to rent-to-own transactions. Id at
9. Refer to note 237 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of existing state
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tive rate-setting for these isolated, abusive industries, as North
Carolina has done for tax refund anticipation lenders.4 This
improves on the legislative usury standard by setting rates
based on detailed fact finding of industry costs and risks, and
responds better to changes over time in those costs and
risks.42 Instead of usury controls on individual transactions,
the government might consider taxing excess profit in abusive
industries.4"
Spot treatment aimed at an abusive industry could involve
innovative use of unconscionability and existing consumer stat-
utes. For example, charging minority homeowners twenty-five
percent rates for home improvement loans may not be held
substantively unfair when fifteen percent is a fair rate.42 Un-
fair loan programs targeted at minority homeowners might
implicate those codifications of unconscionability which provide
that procedural unfairness alone is unconscionable,424 or may
violate federal and state laws such as the Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act4  and the Fair Housing Act.4' Fraudulent
statutes which impose price controls directly on rent-to-own transactions. In 1992,
Georgia imposed usury limits on auto pawn transactions. See GA. CODE ANN. § 44-
12-131 (1994) ("[A] pawnbroker may charge for each 30 day period interest and
pawnshop charges which together equal no more than 25 percent of the principal
amount advanced, with a minimum charge of up to $10.00 per 30 day period.").
420. Refer to note 384 supra.
421. For example, Virginia's regulation of consumer finance companies through
administrative rate setting, discussed at note 384 supra, requires the agency to con-
sider costs of operations and the cost of equity capital in setting rates. VA. CODE
ANN. § 6.1-271.1 (Michie 1993).
422. One commentator once proposed as a solution to excessive prices that in-
stead of regulating individual prices, the average profits of entire industries should
be controlled through payments to the government of excess profits. See W. David
Slawson, Price Controls for a Peacetime Economy, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1090, 1095-96
(1971).
423. Refer to note 400 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
shortcomings of unconscionability. Well-documented abuses have occurred in the
home equity loan industry, particularly those lenders targeting minority homeowners
with rates and loan amounts consumer advocates claim will lead to certain default
and loss of equity in the home. See generally Daniel A. Edelman, Second Mortgage
Frauds, in NATIONAL CONSUMER RIGHTS LITIGATION CONFERENCE (Materials) 67-108
(National Consumer Law Center 1992) (noting controversies involving "second mort-
gage scandals" pursued by the Massachusetts Attorney General which resulted in
settlements with three major Boston banks); Dwight Golann, Consumer Financial
Services Litigation: Major Judgments and ADR Responses, 48 Bus. LAw. 1141, 1146-
49 (1993) (discussing second mortgage fraud by unfair or deceptive inducement of
home improvement financing targeted at those poor homeowners who have relatively
high home equity).
424. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2A-108(2) (1990); Besta v. Beneficial Loan Co., 855 F.2d
532, 535 (Sth Cir. 1988) (holding a six-year loan unconscionable under the Iowa
Consumer Credit Code because of the procedural unfairness involved in failing to
disclose that the loan could be repaid with lower monthly payments in half the
time).
425. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1988 & Supp. V 1993); cf United States v.
HeinOnline  -- 31 Hous. L. Rev. 808 1994-1995
1994] RATE REGULATION 809
representations by the lender (e.g., "This is the lowest rate
you'll find in town") may be redressed under the state's unfair
trade practices act, if applicable to loans, or as common law
fraud.4
Aggressive administrative attention may help deter rate
abuses. The Attorney General in Massachusetts is alerted to
high rate loans (over twenty percent) through a statutory notifi-
cation procedure.4" Though high rates are not always unfair,
this reporting requirement facilitates careful scrutiny.4 State
administrators might obtain the injunction of extreme rate un-
fairness as a public nuisance.4" Finally, the Federal Reserve
Landmark Fin. Serv., Inc., 612 F. Supp. 623, 626 (D. Md. 1985) (holding that the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act allows the Attorney General to bring an action for
alleged discrimination against elderly credit applicants to seek civil penalties, con-
sumer redress and injunctive relief).
426. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see Fleet Finance Settles
Two More Rounds, NCLC REP. CONSUMER CREDIT & USURY EDITION (Natl Consum-
er Law Ctr., Boston, Mass.), Nov/Dec. 1993, at 33 (describing multi-million dollar
settlements by Fleet Finance for second lending practices targeting African-Americans
for high rate loans allegedly in violation of Georgia's Fair Housing Act and other
state law); see also Evans v. First Fed. Say. Bank, 669 F. Supp. 915, 924 (N.D. Ind.
1987) (holding that although the Fair Housing Act applies to an equity loan on an
already-owned home, it did not apply to plaintiffs in this case who were seeking the
loan for an automobile and an education).
427. Cf. Smith v. First Family Fin. Serv., Inc., 626 So. 2d 1266, 1272-73 (Ala.
1993) (holding that summary judgment for the lender was improper on a claim that
the lender defrauded the borrower by concealing that the loan fees charged exceeded
the statutory maximum); Kish v. Van Note, 692 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex. 1985) (hold-
ing that plaintiffs were entitled to recover a statutory penalty from a pool contractor
under the Consumer Credit Code in addition to recovering damages under the De-
ceptive Trade Practices Act for failing to disclose that credit life insurance was at a
premium or rate not fixed or approved by the State Board of Insurance).
428.
The provisions of paragraph (a).... [which provides that a person who
knowingly contracts for, charges, takes or receives, directly or indirectly,
interest and expenses the aggregate of which exceeds an amount greater
than twenty per centum per annum.... shall be guilty of criminal usury"],
shall not apply to any person who notifies the attorney general of his intent
to engage in a transaction or transactions which, but for the provisions of
this paragraph, would be proscribed under the provisions of paragraph
(a) ....
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 271, § 49(d) (1990 & Supp. 1994).
429. It is questionable whether the Massachusetts approach in practice aids the
prevention of egregious abuses. Massachusetts' Attorney General responded to criti-
cism in 1991 that his office ignored "red flags" of abusive lending in the second
mortgage industry by noting that the sheer volume of high rate lending notifications
his office received (80-100 monthly) precluded investigation. See Steve Marantz,
Shannon Says Frequency of Loans at High Interest Precluded Probe, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 10, 1991 (Metro), at 20.
430. See, e.g., Larson v. State, 97 So. 2d 776, 780-91 (Ala. 1957) (holding that
interest rates up to 700% charged to unsophisticated borrowers are a public nui-
sance, entitling the attorney general to injunctive relief denying collection of any
interest, the penalty under the state's then 6% usury legislation); State v. Hooker,
HeinOnline  -- 31 Hous. L. Rev. 809 1994-1995
810 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:721
Board recently rejected an acquisition bid by a lender in ques-
tionable compliance with the federal Equal Credit Opportunity
Act.43' Such tactics could penalize and deter egregious rate
abusers.
More radical disclosure reforms targeted at isolated pockets
of severe abuse should also be examined. Lenders typically
have no statutory obligation to inform borrowers that better
competitor rates exist. Borrowers are presumed able to deter-
mine that for themselves by comparison shopping. The uncon-
scionability standard is poised to impose enhanced disclosure
responsibilities on lenders. The Eighth Circuit has held it pro-
cedurally unfair for a lender to fail to disclose that another
loan plan it offered was more advantageous to the borrower."'
The unconscionability standard might be taken as the next step
to compel lenders to disclose more advantageous rates offered
in the marketplace generally.4"
87 N.W.2d 337, 343 (N.D. 1957) (holding that charging interest rates of 149% to
278% to more than 400 borrowers was sufficient to constitute a public nuisance, and
allowing the state to enjoin operation of defendants' business). See generally Com-
ment, Commercial Nuisance: A Theory of Consumer Protection, 33 U. Ci. L. REV.
590 (1966) (arguing for the concept of commercial nuisance as a solution to inade-
quate legal representation of the poor).
431. Shawmut National Corporation, Hartford, Connecticut, and Boston, Massa-
chusetts; Shawmut New Hampshire Corporation, Manchester, New Hampshire, 80
FED. REsERVE BuLL. 47, 48 (1994) (disapproving acquisition of a bank and formation
of a bank holding company). This application was reconsidered and subsequently
approved in June 1994. Id. at 545 (approving the bid application upon reconsidera-
tion after Shawmut filed information addressing the Board members' concerns about
its mortgage lending record under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act).
432. See Besta v. Beneficial Loan Co., 855 F.2d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding
that under the Iowa Consumer Credit Code it was procedurally unconscionable for
the finance company to write a six-year loan without disclosing that the loan bal-
ance could have been repaid with lower monthly payments in half the time); see also
In re Milbourne, 108 BR. 522, 524 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that the lender's
failure to disclose to the debtor the detriment of refinancing loans as opposed to
making new loans violated the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law). See generally Dwight Golann, Beyond Truth in Lending: The Duty
of Affirmative Disclosure, 46 Bus. LAw. 1307 (1991) (discussing the Besta and In re
Milbourne holdings). A bill introduced in April 1993 in Congress would amend Truth
in Lending to require lenders to post their rates for each category of loans they
offer consumers. H.R. 1610, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) ("A creditor shall post a
sign at each place of business where he extends credit to consumers which-(1) shall
state in clear and conspicuous language the current rates of interest he charges for
each category of loan he makes to consumers ... ").
433. One commentator observed "[u]nconscionability as to price is best thought of
as a seller's failure to fulfill an emerging legal obligation to inform a-customer of
any terms that depart from common expectations-in these [classic price] cases the
expectancy of being charged a price competitive with other freezers, books, or other
consumer products." Stedronsky, supra note 118, at 83. Such failure to disclose could
be held to constitute procedural unfairness if required, or support a finding of un-
conscionability on less substantive excess under a "sliding scale" approach.
As proposed in 1993, the federal Home Equity Protection Act would have
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III. CONCLUSION
Outrageous episodes of lender abuse in the 1990s have
buoyed a consumer protection movement that had languished
since its heady successes in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Consumer advocates (and legislators), however, should resist
reaching for the blunt instrument of usury to restore contractu-
al order in the marketplace. The true evil is abusive profits,
not facially high rates. Scrutinized under the cost justification
standard of unconscionability, the high rates of rent-to-own
centers, pawnshops, and other lenders will stand if risks and
costs justify such rates, but fall if they don't.
required home equity lenders exceeding a specified rate to disclose that "this is a
high cost mortgage. You may be able to obtain a less expensive loan." H.R. 3153,
103d Cong., lt Sess. (1993). That disclosure would apply if the rate exceeded the
yield on one-year Treasury notes by 10% or the loan fees exceeded the greater of 8%
of the loan or $400. This disclosure, however, would be buried in a statement with
other disclosures and does not tell consumers how to comparison search for the
cheaper rate to which they may be entitled. Professor Wallace once proposed and
rejected a similar disclosure scheme by which lenders would disclose their willing-
ness to lend to high risk borrowers, but recommend they do not borrow. See
Wallace, supra note 40, at 494-95 (analyzing alternatives to lowered ceiling for pro-
tective purposes). This could be as ineffective as cigarette labeling, but such disclo-
sures addressed to the problem of high rate lending are worth exploring further.
Congress ultimately enacted various home equity loan reforms as part of the Riegle
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, but failed to
include the proposed "high cost mortgage" disclosure. See Pub. L. No. 103-325.
The complex elements that compose interest pricing, discussed at notes 272-
75 supra and accompanying text, make such disclosure reforms problematic. Compare
the potential for reform of the new car market. Retailers could be compelled to dis-
close their own markup over cost, see Ayers and Miller, supra note 405 at 1076-78,
or the existence of cheaper asking prices by other dealers for the same automobile.
Applied to loan pricing, "lender's cost" would likely be the lender's cost of funds.
Automobile purchasers aware of the markup could decide if the dealer's operational
costs justified that amount, but loan customers would struggle with quantifying the
added risks of inflation and their credit standing. Disclosing the lender's cost of
funds would therefore be of little utility to the borrower. Requiring lenders to dis-
close their total costs and risks is troublesome because that involves much more
subjective evaluations than the cost of funds.
Requiring disclosure that competitors offer cheaper rates is also of question-
able merit for loans of money. A competitor may offer cheaper rates because it em-
ploys stricter standards for approving an applicant's creditworthiness. Such disclosure
reform might therefore be employed properly only in lending industries that do not
check their customer's credit, or disclosure could be manipulated too easily.
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